Determinants of incentive-based forest governance in the Amazon : Evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil by Rosa da Conceição, Hugo
  
ZENTRUM FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSFORSCHUNG  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of incentive-based forest governance in 
the Amazon 
Evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation  
 
 
zur Erlangung des Grades  
 
Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften (Dr.agr.)  
 
 
 
 
 
der Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultät  
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn  
 
 
 
 
 
von  
Hugo Rosa da Conceição 
 
 
aus  
Resende (Brasilien) 
 
 
 
Bonn  
2018 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referent: Prof. Dr. Jan Börner 
1. Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Achim Schlüter 
2. Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Thomas Heckelei 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 28.11.2017 
  
 ii 
 
Abstract 
 
Command-and-control policies are often criticized as insufficient to tackle tropical 
deforestation. Over the past two decades, both academics and policy-makers have promoted 
incentive-based policies, such as payments for environmental services, as attractive alternatives 
to curb forest loss, while also potentially contributing to poverty reduction of forest-dwelling 
populations. Many science-based recommendations on how to design effective incentive-based 
policies have, however, not found much resonance within policy circles. To understand the gap 
between recommendations and practice, it is important to understand why political decision-
makers adopt incentive-based forest conservation schemes and what determines how these 
schemes are designed towards achieving environmental and non-environmental outcomes. To 
this end, we analyzed the governance dynamics of three government-led incentive schemes in 
the Amazon regions of Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. We adopt a theoretical framework based on 
public policy theories, specifically on agenda-setting and policy instruments design. We find 
that environmental concerns are not always the prime motives for PES programs, as political 
and institutional contexts limit environmental policy-makers' actions. Yet, policy choice 
processes become less constrained when environmental issues are closer to a government's 
priorities. Electoral interests and bureaucratic politics exert pressure on policy design teams, 
who then trade off long-term societal efficiency concerns against short-term administrative 
goals. Lessons from other jurisdictions will often be drawn, as they may help in reaching 
acceptable policy proposals in a shorter time-frame. Priority is sometimes given to non-
environmental concerns due to perceptions of political feasibility, to the influence of non-
environmental agencies within governments, to beliefs in what role governments should take 
and how populations respond to proposed policies. These findings are especially relevant for 
scholars studying the processes and impacts of incentive-based conservation policies and for 
practitioners aiming to enhance policy efficiency.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Politische Instrumente zur Überwachung und Bestrafung von illegaler Endwaldung 
(Command-and Control Policies) werden häufig als unzureichend kritisiert, um tropische 
Regenwälder effektiv und nachhaltig zu schützen. In diesem Kontext wurden in den letzten 
zwei Jahrzehnten sowohl von Wissenschaftlern als auch von politischen Entscheidungsträgern 
anreizorientierte Politikinstrumente beworben, um den Verlust der Regenwälder 
einzudämmen. Solche Instrumente umfassen beispielsweise Zahlungen für 
Umweltdienstleistungen, die zusätzlich die Armut der Bevölkerung in den Waldregionen 
mindern können. Dennoch fanden viele wissenschaftliche Empfehlungen für die Entwicklung 
effektiver, anreizorientierter Methoden wenig Resonanz in den politischen Kreisen. Um die 
Diskrepanz zwischen wissenschaftlichen Empfehlungen und der praktischen Umsetzung 
nachvollziehen zu können, ist es zunächst wichtig zu verstehen, warum anreizorientierte 
Instrumente überhaupt von den Politikern implementiert werden. Ferner ist es wichtig zu 
verstehen, welche Faktoren Einfluss auf das Politikdesign haben, dass die umweltspezifischen 
und umweltunspezifischen Ziele der Programme vorgibt. Zu diesem Zweck haben wir drei 
staatlich getragene Governance-Prozesse in Brasilien, Peru und Ecuador analysiert. Für unsere 
Studie benutzen wir ein theoretisches Gerüst, welches auf Theorien zur Staatstätigkeit (Public 
Policy) basiert, im Besonderen in den Bereichen des Agenda-Settings und der Entwicklung 
politischer Maßnahmen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass umweltspezifische Ziele nicht immer 
der Hauptbeweggrund für die Entwicklung von Politiken zur Förderung von 
Umweltdienstleistung sind, da der politische und institutionelle Kontext häufig den 
Handlungsspielraum der verantwortlichen Politiker einschränkt. In diesem Kontext kann 
jedoch festgehalten werden, dass politische Entscheidungen immer dann ein geringeres Maß 
an Restriktionen erfahren, wenn der Umweltschutz allgemein einen hohen Stellenwert bei der 
verantwortlichen Regierung genießt. Wahltaktische und bürokratische Rahmenbedingungen 
beeinflussen zudem die politischen Gestalter, die langfristige gesellschaftliche Interessen und 
kurzfristige Regierungsziele gegeneinander ausbalancieren müssen. Dabei spielen auch immer 
die bisherigen Erfahrungen mit anderen Gesetzvorhaben eine große Rolle, da sie eine zeitnahe 
Ausarbeitung geeigneter politischer Konzepte ermöglichen. Desweiteren können 
umweltunspezifische Ziele denn Vorrang erhalten, wenn deren politische Durchsetzbarkeit 
einfacher erscheint. Ebenso kann die Priorisierung umweltunspezifischer Ziele auch durch den 
politischen Einfluss von Nichtregierungsorganisationen bestärkt werden, sowie durch 
politische Überzeugungen der gesetzesgebenden Akteure, zur Rolle des Staates allgemein und 
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zu möglichen Reaktionen der Bevölkerung auf die Gesetzesvorhaben. Unsere Ergebnisse sind 
vor allem für Wissenschaftler relevant, die anreizorientierte Umweltschutzpolitiken erforschen 
und für Fachleute, die die Effektivität der Umweltpolitik verbessern möchten. 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. More than wood and trees: the Amazon 
 
The Amazon is the largest tropical forest in the world, occupying an area of approximately 5.5 
million km2. As such, it is widely recognized as one of the main repositories of biodiversity 
worldwide and also as one of the largest carbon sinks in the planet, accounting for around 10% 
of Earth’s terrestrial carbon (Boucher et al., 2011). In addition to the environmental wealth, 
over 30 million people live in the Amazon region, in a wide variety of settlements, from over 
one million people cities, such as Belém and Manaus in Brazil, to uncontacted indigenous 
groups. The region also presents a unique ethnolinguistic diversity, harboring hundreds of 
indigenous ethnic groups and languages, many of them bordering disappearance due to death 
and migration of speakers. Amazonian territories are far away from major political, economic 
and demographic centers, and its populations tend to be among the poorest in their countries. 
Public services, such as education, health, sanitation and law enforcement are generally poorly 
delivered and traditional economic activities (i.e. industry) are often scarce (Santos et al., 2014) 
 
The Amazon forest is shared by nine countries and several provincial/state governments 
including local governments and indigenous communities with varying degrees of autonomy, 
in a complicated governance context. Central government agencies involved in sectors such as 
environment, agriculture, land tenure, mining, indigenous affairs, along with their 
state/provincial and municipal equivalents have a say in the governance of Amazonian lands. 
Individual land owners, colonists, companies, indigenous communities and other non-
government agents are also stakeholders in the region. 
 
The natural and human diversities present in the Amazon are severely threatened by the 
pervasive deforestation occurring in the region. The following section summarizes the main 
direct and indirect drivers of deforestation in the Amazon, as well as the main actors and 
institutions involved. 
2. Deforestation in the Amazon: main drivers 
 
Deforestation is a very complex phenomenon and tracing its drivers has been the focus of work 
of many scholars and institutions. The ecological, socio-economic and institutional diversity 
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of the region means that deforestation has several different direct and indirect causes depending 
on geographical location. In this section, we will provide an overview of the most relevant 
causes of deforestation in the Amazon, focusing on the ones that are more pervasive in distinct 
regions of the forest. 
 
Direct Causes 
  
Pasture expansion is arguably the main cause of deforestation in the Amazon, being especially 
relevant in Brazil, the world’s biggest beef exporter, where it occupies three-quarters of the 
deforested area (Boucher et al., 2011). The low land prices, opportunities for land-grabbing 
and governmental incentives have historically motivated the expansion of the activity in the 
region (Margulis, 2003). Cattle-raising in the Amazon region is extensive and shows a very 
low productivity. It is carried out by both large landowners and smallholders. The latter raise 
cattle not only for direct economic profits, but also as a means for savings and insurance 
(Salisbury and Schmink, 2007), as a product with stable and secure returns and high liquidity 
in cases of economic distress (Margulis, 2003; Piketty et al., 2005), as a cheap way of securing 
land claims (Nepstad et al., 2006) and even for political and cultural status (Bommel et al., 
2010; Margulis, 2003). 
 
Small-scale agriculture: the expansion of small-scale agriculture has been in important cause 
of deforestation in Peru (Sy et al., 2015) and Ecuador (Holland et al., 2014) and has in recent 
years increased its share in Brazilian deforestation1 as well (Godar et al., 2014). Population 
growth and internal migration are common triggers for increases in deforestation from small-
scale agriculture (Robiglio et al., 2014). In some cases, internal migration to forest areas is an 
autonomous phenomenon, such as in Peru, where poverty, land scarcity, unfavorable market 
access and high unemployment drive migration from Andean regions into the Amazon (Zelli 
et al., 2014). In other cases, it is driven by governmental policies, which provide incentives to 
settlement programs to areas with undesignated land status, as it is has been the case in much 
of the Brazilian Amazon in past decades (Margulis, 2003). Small scale deforestation is 
concentrated along roads, and smallholders who predominantly carry out cattle-raising tend to 
have greater implications for land conversion than those who produce crops (Pacheco, 2009). 
 
                                                          
1 Also because of the reduction in large-scale deforestation in Brazil. 
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Large-scale agriculture, especially of soybeans, has been long identified as another driver of 
deforestation in the Amazon, mostly in Brazil (Fearnside, 2001), but increasingly in other 
countries like Peru (Gutiérrez-Vélez et al., 2011). Increased international demand for the grain 
and agronomic developments that allowed soybeans to be produced in the normally poor 
Amazonian soils drove an exponential push in production within previously forested areas 
(Boucher et al., 2011). Soybean plantations not only expanded directly into the forest (Gibbs 
et al., 2015; Morton et al., 2006), but the expansion in production areas has helped to push 
pastures further north into the forest (Arima et al., 2011; Barona et al., 2010).  
 
Although logging does not convert large continuous swathes of forest into other uses, it is 
considered a driver of forest degradation and may severely damage forests (Nepstad et al., 
1999). They are also often the first step to complete deforestation, as it establishes minimal 
infrastructure, such as roads to follow up settlers, and may help to finance subsequent 
conversion into pasture or agricultural land (Boucher et al., 2011; Chomitz, 2007). Especially 
in some Peruvian regions, mining has also been a growing deforestation driver (Asner et al., 
2013) 
 
Indirect Causes2 
 
The expansion of road networks is among the most relevant indirect drivers of deforestation in 
the Amazon (Barber et al., 2014). Even a quick look at satellite images of deforestation in the 
Amazon shows that areas along roads are major focal points of deforestation in the region. 
Road construction and improvement tend3 to increase deforestation as they generate increases 
in farm gate prices of outputs, lower prices of inputs and make in-migration more attractive 
(Chomitz, 2007).    
                                                          
2 Some indirect causes are relevant but are outside of the scope of policy action from Amazonian governments 
(i.e. the alleged influence of increased soybean demand from China (Fearnside et al., 2012)). For that reason, 
they are not discussed in this section. Some other indirect causes, such as purposive, large scale government 
settlement programs in the Brazilian Amazon, have been important in previous decades but are not as 
common today (Rudel, 2007).  
3 There are also exceptions to the effect of roads as drivers of deforestation. Margulis (2003, p. 27) points out 
that road construction will only be a driver of deforestation under certain conditions, as “increased 
productivity can lead to more or less deforestation depending on the price elasticity of demand”. Chomitz 
(2007, p. 68-69) argues that “In rural areas where tenure is strong and immigration is limited, better road 
access might allow residents to work in towns, or shift them from extensive production of subsistence crops to 
more intensive production of commercial crops. Deforestation might then fall as long as residents can and will 
exclude in-migrants”. 
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The provision of fiscal incentives, such credits from state funds and banks, has been a 
mechanism for encouraging the expansion of pastures in the region. The Brazilian government, 
for example, provides credits which are used for agricultural expansion at much lower rates 
than a producer would get at commercial banks (Arima et al., 2005; Pacheco, 2009), with one 
governmental fund, for example, providing R$ 1,89 billion to cattle raising activities between 
2003 and 2007 (Barreto et al., 2008). The land tenure structure in the Amazon is another 
indirect driver of deforestation in the region. Insecure and contested tenure is widespread in the 
region and “Deforestation is often a way to establish rights to land, a strategy that has been 
accepted and even promoted historically by governments throughout Latin America” (Duchelle 
et al., 2014a, p. 55).  
 
3. Policy responses to deforestation 
 
Deforestation, as shown above, has multiple drivers, and policy responses produce trade-offs, 
not only in the environmental sector but also with other policy objectives, increasing the 
complexity of the decision-making process even further. Therefore, it is important to present 
what the most commonly discussed options available to policy-makers are. 
 
Policy options to combat deforestation can be divided into three broad categories: 
disincentives, enabling measures and incentives (Börner and Vosti, 2013). Disincentives, also 
known as command-and-control policies, are the most commonly applied policies, historically 
(Serroa da Motta et al., 1996) as well as recently (Assunção et al., 2015). They target changes 
in behavior through regulations, bans, taxes, and restrictions, usually accompanied by fines and 
other legal action, including sometimes imprisonment, for enforcement (Börner and Vosti, 
2013).  
 
Enabling measures are those that contribute to establishing conditions that improve 
environmental management, without changing the underlying incentives to resource users  
(Börner and Vosti, 2013). Examples of enabling measures are land tenure reforms, the 
introduction of environmentally friendly technologies, environmental education and credit 
provisions for sustainable activities. Well-implemented enabling measures help to remove 
constraints that may preclude environmentally desirable behavior and increases options 
available to resource users (Börner and Vosti, 2013).  
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Disincentive policies and enabling measures have, however, been perceived as insufficient to 
halt deforestation pressures in the Amazon. Reasons for that perception are, among others, the 
possible lack of will and resources from governments to protect the environment, the existence 
of ‘hard-to-detect’ issues (Dietz et al., 2003) and costly and ultimately ineffective enforcement, 
with low levels of sanctioning applied (Brito and Barreto, 2006). That perception, however, 
has recently been questioned by studies in Brazil that show the enforcement of command-and-
control policies as driving part of the deforestation reductions experienced in Brazil in the last 
years (Assunção et al., 2015; Börner et al., 2015). The creation and implementation of enabling 
measures have also faced serious challenges, i.e. because they are often the responsibility of 
non-environmental governmental sectors, or because powerful economic actors may benefit 
from enabling structures that are not conducive to sustainable behavior.  
 
4. When sticks do not work: incentive-based policies 
 
Due to the perceived shortcomings of disincentives, the difficulties in implementing enabling 
measures and to “a growing receptivity among policy makers globally to use private incentives 
to achieve social-policy objectives” (Ferraro, 2011, p. 1134) in other sectors, both scholars and 
practitioners have increasingly looked into forest conservation incentives to achieve 
conservation goals. Incentive-based policies aim to encourage conservation through changing 
the behavior in ways that contribute to forest conservation. Examples of incentives are 
subsidies, tax exemptions, certification and direct payments (Börner and Vosti, 2013). 
 
The most common incentive-based conservation option since the 1990s was to provide inputs 
intended to promote alternative land-uses that generate income for forest-dwellers, who would 
then refrain from profiting from environmentally destructive activities (Ferraro and Simpson, 
2002). Generally named integrated conservation and development programs (ICDPs), this 
indirect approach to conservation was widely adopted but had its effectiveness in conserving 
forests soon questioned both on theoretical and empirical grounds4.  
 
In opposition to command-and-control and to indirect incentives, scholars (e.g. Ferraro, 2001; 
Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Simpson and Sedjo, 1996) have increasingly advocated for the 
                                                          
4 More on the criticism to ICDPs in chapter II, section 2.5. 
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introduction or expansion of direct measures for conservation, such as “land purchases, leases, 
and easements, as well as financial incentives such as performance payments and tax relief” 
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002, p. 1718). The early literature highlighted theoretical advantages of 
direct payments over command-and-control and indirect incentive options, seeing them as 
“likely to be (a) institutionally simpler; (b) more cost-effective in delivering benefits to buyers; 
(c) more effective in generating economic growth among suppliers by improving cash flow, 
diversifying income sources, and reducing income variance” (Pattanayak et al., 2010, p. 256). 
 
Direct financial incentives linked to the performance-based provision and conservation of 
environmental services, commonly called payments for environmental services (PES) have 
dominated the scholarly and policy debate on direct incentives for forest conservation in the 
past decade. Due to the preponderant position of PES in the debate on incentive-based policies, 
the next chapter will be fully dedicated to providing a deeper discussion on its rationale, 
definition, the main policy recommendations to arise from the PES literature, and some of the 
criticism it has received. 
 
The next section will present what the dissertation is looking at, what it aims to achieve and 
why it is relevant to the debate on incentive-based forest conservation in the Amazon.  
 
5. Study objects, objectives, and justification  
 
This dissertation will analyze the political processes that led to the adoption and design of three 
government-led, incentive-based forest conservation programs in Latin America, namely the 
Programa Nacional de Conservación de Bosques para la Mitigación del Cambio Climático 
(National Program of Forest Conservation for the Mitigation of Climate Change – Programa 
Bosques) in Peru, the Socio Bosque program, in Ecuador, and the Sistema de Incentivo a 
Serviços Ambientais (System of Incentive to Environmental Services – SISA), in the state of 
Acre, Brazil. It is relevant to explain the choice of this research object, and, especially the terms 
‘political processes’, ‘adoption and design’, ‘government-led’, and why we chose those three 
specific programs. 
 
Political processes: As we will describe in detail in the next chapter, much of the research done 
on PES has focused on the technical aspects of designing payments, focusing on providing 
recommendations on how to make them cost-efficient in conservation terms. Those 
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recommendations, however, often downplay the fact that policy-making is rarely a purely 
technocratic process, in which policies would originate outside of the politico-institutional 
system. PES programs, especially large-scale, government-led ones are, however, the result of 
interactions that involve a larger spectrum of concerns, rather than simply technically correct 
guidelines. Studies on these political processes that shape how PES programs are ultimately 
adopted and designed are rare in the research landscape, as we will show in the following 
chapter. 
 
There is, however, an increased recognition that political processes matter. As a report by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) put it, “whatever the policy area, there is no single 
formula applicable to all circumstances; policies’ effectiveness depends on the manner in 
which they are discussed, approved, and implemented. […] the processes of discussing, 
negotiating, approving, and implementing policies may be at least as important as the specific 
content of the policies themselves” (IDB, 2006, p. 3). Understanding the processes of policy-
making helps to capture how they generate different provisions, and ultimately outcomes.  
 
Adoption and design: Policies have been traditionally seen as a cycle comprised of separable 
stages or phases (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). Two of the initial parts of that cycle, agenda-setting 
and policy design (or policy formulation), are commonly assumed by the PES literature as 
being largely based on technical assessments. These stages, however, tend to be more complex, 
encompassing a wide spectrum of forces leading to policy definition. Taking into consideration 
the importance of understanding policy-making processes, the objective of this dissertation is 
to analyze how those policies were introduced into selected governments’ agendas and why 
specific design features were chosen. Insights from governmental agenda-setting theories and 
from policy instrument design theories will serve as the bases for the analytical framework to 
be used in the analysis. 
 
Government-led: PES programs can be theoretically carried out by a wide range of actors, from 
individuals, through NGOs and private companies, to governments. To date, governments have 
been the driving force behind the largest PES programs, both geographically and financially, 
despite not leading the numerical amount of schemes. Arguably, due to the scale of 
governmental programs and to the possibilities for integration with other sectoral policies, 
governments are at the forefront in tapping into PES’ potential as a tool for deforestation 
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reduction. Part of the PES literature, however, states that government PES are less likely to be 
efficient that private schemes (Wunder et al., 2008).  
 
One of the reasons singled out for that inefficiency is the existence of “major political-economy 
obstacles” (Wunder, 2005, p. 11), a “need to accommodate political pressures” (Pattanayak et 
al., 2010, p. 260) , and “a variety of political pressures” (Engel et al., 2008, p. 666). No study, 
however, has systematically analyzed what those obstacles and pressures are why they occur. 
Very few examples are found in the literature of research on the political process of PES 
schemes from a policy theory perspective (Hrabanski et al., 2013; Le Coq et al., 2015) 
  
Case studies: After recognizing the importance of researching the political processes of PES 
programs, it was important to define which cases would be the focus of the dissertation. Many 
such initiatives are currently being developed in the Amazon region, but not all of them have, 
at the same time, the consolidated organizational structure, the geographic and demographic 
scale, the degree of government involvement, and the high profile with scholars and policy 
makers as the selected projects. Analyzing three cases allows for the detailed examination of 
diverse contexts, providing a denser understanding of different decision making processes on 
similar policies. We chose the Amazon region because of its relevance for biodiversity, carbon 
storage, and regional climate regulation, because of the increased relevance of incentive-based 
policies for the region’s governments, and because of the researcher’s own experience with 
work and research on the region. Some other cases that also present those characteristics (e.g. 
the Bolsa Floresta program in the Brazilian state of Amazonas) have already been the focus of 
other studies, and the ones here presented remain largely under-researched. Based on those 
factors, the dissertation will focus on Programa Bosques in Peru, the Socio Bosque program, 
in Ecuador, and SISA, in the state of Acre, Brazil. We provide a thorough description of the 
programs in Chapter V. 
 
6. Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a literature 
review on PES, focusing on its rationale and definition and, especially, on the 
recommendations for cost-efficient schemes provided by the ecological economics literature. 
It also discusses some of the alternative views of PES arising from other intellectual approaches 
and some of the criticism faced by PES.  
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Chapter III presents the theoretical framework used in the analysis. The chapter initially 
reviews the unique features of the environment as policy domain. Then, it proceeds to present 
the theoretical framework used for analyzing cases, based on a combination of theories and 
frameworks present in the public policy literature. The chapter also presents the guiding 
hypotheses and research questions that motivated the research. Chapter IV describes the 
methodology used for the analysis, explaining how we collected and analyzed the data. 
 
Chapter V thoroughly describes the programs’ characteristics, institutional structures, and 
dynamics, as understanding how the programs are structured and how they operate is vital for 
the analysis here intended. Chapter VI describes and analyses the processes which lead to the 
adoption of the programs. It traces back the motivations, interests, and relations of the actors 
and institutions involved in the decisions that lead the governments to engage in incentive-
based conservation programs. Chapter VII describes and analyses the design process of the 
programs. It deals with the specific decisions related to the programs’ main design features, 
focused on the ones that have featured more prominently in the PES literature, as reviewed in 
Chapter II, as well as some features that are relevant for the specific programs. We concentrate 
our attention on how the programs’ provisions diverge or not from the policy recommendations 
present in the literature.  
 
Chapter VIII concludes the dissertation, drawing from the analyses performed in the previous 
chapters, generating insights on the political processes of PES programs and providing policy-
relevant conclusions aimed at increasing the visibility of political aspects in PES research and 
practice. 
 
  
 10 
 
II. Overview of the science-based policy recommendations for cost-efficient PES 
 
This chapter will focus on payments for environmental services, explaining its main rationale, 
its most commonly cited definition and, centrally, discussing the main policy recommendations 
that arose from the literature. We do not aim to provide a full literature review on PES but to 
explain the main components of a cost-efficient PES scheme in accordance with the 
environmental economics view of PES. Another large branch of the literature on PES draws 
on other social sciences, such as anthropology, sociology, psychology and political science 
(Wunder, 2007) and focuses on issues other than the cost-efficiency of schemes. We provide a 
brief description of the main themes dealt with by this branch of the literature at the end of the 
chapter.  
 
It is relevant to justify the selection of the environmental economics literature as the school of 
thought on which we base most of the chapter’s discussion. The first reason is chronological. 
The political processes discussed in this dissertation have all occurred between 2007 and 2010 
(see the timeline in chapter VII, section 3). At the time, most of the literature on PES focused 
on the environmental economics conceptualization, and the critiques were not yet widely 
published. Since the core objective of the dissertation is to understand how academic 
recommendations for PES have or have not been adopted by the programs, it is logical that the 
focus should be on the rationale that was more widely publicized at the time of the projects’ 
adoption and design. The second reason is that much of the economics-based literature provides 
specific design recommendations for PES, while the other branch builds around, complements, 
and criticizes the economics-based literature, meaning that the earlier works remain the core to 
the understanding of PES. In the words of a PES critic, “the ‘pure’ market mechanism remains 
the ideal type amongst the primary promoters and funders of PES in the global south: 
multilateral lending institutions and multinational environmental organizations.” (Shapiro-
Garza, 2013, p. 6), which exemplifies the fact that the economics-based PES rationale remains 
the most policy relevant.   
 
It is also worth noting that, due to the topic of this dissertation and because “payments for the 
conservation of standing forests are the most frequent of such programs in developing 
countries” (Alix-Garcia et al., 2008), this chapter refers mostly to forest conservation PES, 
although some of the works cited deal with PES in general or with other sectors, such as 
watersheds and biodiversity. 
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1. Payments for Environmental Services: rationale and definition 
 
The current concept of environmental5 services (ES) originated in the 1970s and was slowly 
but steadily adopted as a tool for several authors to stress societal dependence on natural 
ecosystems and biodiversity. It found its way into the policy arena at the end of the 1990s and 
beginning of the 2000s, gaining a major push with the publication of the influential Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). Concomitantly, a multitude of 
initiatives to put the concept of ES into policy practice, also through direct economic incentives 
for their provision and conservation, were being attempted. In a 2002 publication, Landell-
Mills and Porras (2002) had already identified and analyzed “287 cases of emerging markets 
for four forest environmental services, including carbon sequestration, biodiversity 
conservation, watershed protection and landscape beauty” (p. 2). 
 
Those many initiatives shared the idea of providing direct incentives to ensure the provision or 
conservation of ES but were variedly defined as “payments”, “markets”, “rewards”, 
“compensations” for “environmental” or “ecosystem” services. Despite the different 
implications of each wording (see Wunder (2005, p. 5) for a discussion), the one that with time 
became the most widely used and debated is payments for environmental services, which will 
also be the one used throughout this dissertation. 
 
Building upon the accumulating experience of early PES programs and the growing interest of 
practitioners on the potential of PES, scholars have systematized their understanding of what a 
PES scheme is and how it should work. The most influential conceptual works on PES 
stemmed from the field of environmental economics and concentrated on the cost-efficiency 
of PES schemes.  
 
1.1 - Rationale 
 
Engel et al. (2008) provide a succinct explanation of the basic rationale behind PES schemes 
aimed and maximizing conservation cost efficiency, illustrated in Figure 1 below. Any 
ecosystem manager or land user receives an amount of benefits from the ecosystem services 
provided by forests. Those benefits, however, tend to be smaller than the ones they could 
                                                          
5 Also sometimes named ecological, ecosystem, or nature's services. 
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receive from alternative land uses, commonly agriculture and cattle raising. Managers would, 
therefore, be better off by converting those forest lands into croplands or pastures. 
Deforestation, however, produces negative externalities to other users, both at local and global 
levels. Paying ecosystem managers to conserve their forests would thus make conservation 
more attractive, as the forgone benefits of conservation would be covered by the payments. To 
be efficient, those payments should, at least, amount to the difference between the potential 
benefits of land-use changes and the benefits already accrued by conservation and, at most, the 
costs of the externalities faced by the other actors.  
 
Figure 1 - The basic rationale of PES 
 
 
Source: Engel et al. (2008, p.665) 
 
The key, overarching aim of a cost-efficient PES program is to make sure that the scheme 
produces what the literature refers to as additionality. Additionality in PES means, in sum, “the 
difference in service provision between the with-PES scenario and the without-PES baseline” 
(Wunder, 2007b, p. 51). In other words, an efficient PES scheme is one that generates 
environmental benefits that would not occur if the scheme was not in place. As a clear example, 
a scheme that occurs in an area with zero deforestation risk would generate no additionality, as 
deforestation will not occur anyway, with or without the program. All the design 
recommendations discussed in the following section, thus, converge towards the need for a 
PES scheme to be additional.  
 
1.2 - Definition 
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The systematization effort to understand what constitutes efficient PES has also generated a 
widely6 adopted definition of PES. Wunder (2005) defined PES as “a voluntary transaction 
where a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a 
(minimum one) ES buyer from a (minimum one) ES provider if and only if the ES provider 
secures ES provision (conditionality)” (p. 3). Wunder’s definition, despite being admittedly 
narrow, in the sense that most initiatives implemented at the time the definition was devised 
did not (and still do not) comply with it, has set the tone for much of the debate on the cost-
efficient design of PES (Goldman-Benner et al., 2012, p. 55) and served as the starting point 
of other attempts at re-conceptualizing PES, including Wunder’s own, which we will present 
at the end of this chapter.  
2. Specific recommendations for cost-efficient PES 
 
The efforts of those scholars did not stop at providing a general rationale for the advantages of 
PES or at a generally accepted definition of PES. They also produced a relevant body of work 
on how PES projects should be designed to be cost-effective in generating environmental 
additionality. Several issues related to the design of PES must be addressed to ensure that they 
reach their intended environmental objectives in a cost-effective manner. The following sub-
sections describe those issues and review the main recommendations provided in the literature. 
We summarize the discussion in Table 1 below.  
 
This review does not address all issues covered in the literature. Some of the subjects are not 
centrally relevant to the cases covered here and were left aside to maintain the review more 
closely connected to the objectives of the dissertation. Among the issues not covered is the 
discussion of who are the most efficient buyers of ES (see Engel et al., 2008), left out because 
in all our cases the buyers are governments. Auctions and reverse auctions were also 
recommended as a way to increase the efficiency of PES, as they help reducing information 
asymmetries by revealing private willingness-to-accept and opportunity costs (Ferraro, 2008). 
We do not discuss auctions because they have not been widely applied in Latin America and 
this research had the assumption that they were not discussed as a possible approach to the 
cases researched.  
 
                                                          
6 The CIFOR working paper that initially presented the definition  (Wunder, 2005) , has been cited, as of 
February 2016, 1405 times, according to Google Scholar. 
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The last caveat is that the categorization of issues proposed is unavoidably somewhat artificial 
since many of the recommendations will clearly affect more than one of the PES issues cited. 
This is, however, not problematic for our purposes because most of the literature has also 
discussed design recommendations using the terminologies and categorizations used here, as 
they facilitate a clearer understanding of PES design elements. 
 
Table 1 – Summary of the main recommendations for the design of cost-efficient PES 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
Conditionality 
Payments should only be made if the targeted ecosystem service (or 
related land use) is actually being provided. 
Baselines 
Constructing explicit baselines is required to understand pre-
intervention conditions and behaviors and to evaluate how a PES 
scheme will or will not provide additional ES or desired land use, 
aiming to ensure that program resources will be additional. 
Monitoring 
Monitoring is required to understand if the PES scheme is actually 
providing additional ES and ensuring the desired land uses, and also to 
gauge impacts in all program aspects. 
Sanctioning 
Schemes should establish sanctioning mechanisms, such as payment 
suspensions or cancellations, to strengthen compliance by program 
participants. 
Land tenure 
Potential PES beneficiaries must have the, at least de facto, ‘right to 
exclude’, or the right to not allow external agents to occupy their lands. 
Spatial targeting 
Payments should be spatially differentiated. Schemes should target 
areas with high environmental service provision, high risks of ES loss, 
and low (opportunity, transaction, and protection) costs. 
Recipients of payments 
Recipients should be those who pose a high deforestation threat, 
considering they have positive but numerically small (relative to the 
financing available) opportunity costs. 
Payment structure and amounts 
Payments should, at a minimum, cover the opportunity costs of scheme 
participants, or provide the minimum amounts of participants’ are 
willing to accept. 
ICDP-like components 
Direct payments tend to be more cost-efficient than ICDPs because 
they are based on conditionalities, on less dubious assumptions, are less 
costly and administratively simpler. ICDP-like activities can be 
improved by adding conditionalities to its design. 
Leakage and Permanence 
Increase the scale of programs, track deforestation nationally or 
regionally instead of using a project based accounting system to 
mitigate leakage. Temporary crediting, favoring perpetual contracts 
over time-specific ones to foster permanence. 
Poverty reduction 
PES schemes should not be developed primarily as a tool for poverty 
reduction, which should only be a subsidiary objective. Poorer 
landowners are often not the most efficient providers of ES. 
 
2.1 - Conditionalities, baselines, monitoring and sanctioning 
 
Conditionality is arguably the most fundamental characteristic of a PES program, the one that 
distinguishes them from more traditional subsidy programs (Wunder et al., 2008). It means that 
a payment should only be made if the targeted ecosystem service (or related land use) is actually 
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being provided. Conditionality is “the most innovative feature of PES vis-à-vis traditional 
conservation tools” (Wunder, 2005, p. iv) because instruments like ICDPs consist of upfront 
payments or previously scheduled payments, not conditional on the actual achievement of 
environmental objectives. 
 
For conditionality to be effective, it is necessary that PES initiatives dispose of effective 
monitoring systems (Pattanayak et al., 2010; Wunder, 2005). Working monitoring systems are 
required to understand if the PES scheme is actually providing additional ES and ensuring the 
desired land uses, and also to gauge impacts in all program aspects, including equity issues. 
Monitoring activities are necessary but not sufficient to ensure compliance. Schemes also 
require appropriate enforcement capacities (provided by the scheme itself or by broader 
governmental institutions) to ensure program efficiency (Honey-Rosés et al., 2009; Wunder, 
2006; Wunder, 2007). Together with enforcement schemes, sanctioning mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with contracts by participants, such as the temporary or permanent suspension of 
payments, are also important. 
 
One of the bases for the construction effective monitoring (and ultimately sanctioning) schemes 
is the estimation of what would happen without the existence of the program (Wunder, 2005) 
so that impacts on effectiveness and equity can be verified (Wunder, 2007). To achieve that, 
PES schemes must construct explicit baselines. Baselines “measure pre-intervention conditions 
and behaviors, and thus control for initial conditions that may affect measures of program 
effectiveness” (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006, p. 0484) and are required to understand and 
evaluate how a PES scheme will or will not provide additional ES or desired land use. They 
help to ensure that program resources will not be used for goals that would be achieved anyway 
without intervention (Wunder, 2005). Variations in the setting of the baselines have a big 
importance for the evaluation of the environmental impacts of PES (Wunder, 2007) and may 
also circumvent potential sources of inefficiency (e.g. the expansion of environmentally 
destructive activities prior to the program to obtain higher payments later on, avoidable by 
setting a baseline from a period prior to the design of the program (Engel et al., 2008)). 
 
2.2 - Land Tenure 
 
The existence of land- and resource-use decision rights has been identified as a core 
prerequisite for direct payments for forest conservation (Simpson and Sedjo, 1996; Wunder, 
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2005). Most importantly, potential PES beneficiaries must have the ‘right to exclude’, or the 
right to not allow external agents to occupy their lands (Wunder, 2005). Those rights do not 
necessarily have to be de jure, since sometimes informal land claims may also guarantee access 
control and tenure recognition (Wunder, 2007). In addition, sometimes legal issues hinder the 
implementation of PES programs in areas where inhabitants do not have secure land rights.  
 
2.3 - Spatial targeting and recipients of payments  
 
PES cannot be considered “as a silver bullet that can address any environmental problem” 
(Engel et al., 2008, p. 665) and its conservation-efficiency ranking at a specific context, as 
compared to other alternatives, may be highly variable (Wätzold and Dreschler, 2005; Wunder, 
2005). Since funds for PES schemes are not unlimited, it is crucial to carefully determine where 
interventions will take place and which actors will participate in them. 
  
Regarding the spatial selection, it would be intuitive to think that resources should be targeted 
to areas with high ES provision potential. Measuring or even estimating ES, however, can be 
an extremely complex task, marred with uncertainties (Costanza et al., 2014; Mitchell et al., 
2013), and in some cases, as in watershed programs, it is “difficult to demonstrate service 
provision because the underlying biophysical linkages are complex and remain largely 
unexplored” (Pattanayak et al., 2010, p.260)7. Another recommendation present in the literature 
is that PES targeting should focus on deforestation risk. PES schemes should estimate the areas 
where future deforestation is a legitimate threat and use the scheme’s resources for the 
conservation of those areas, thus increasing additionality and financial efficiency (Wünscher 
et al., 2008). Areas with low deforestation risk may not be the most suitable for PES schemes 
since “it is a waste of money to pay for amenities that are not at risk of being lost” (Alix-Garcia 
et al., 2008, p.376), thus generating little or no additionality.  
 
Geographical and ecological criteria are not the only ones relevant for targeting. Resources for 
the conservation programs are often scarce. Therefore, targeting crucially involves selecting 
which payment recipients will be the most cost-efficient providers of ES. The key concept 
recommended to guide the efficient targeting of participants in PES schemes is opportunity 
                                                          
7 In other cases, however, like in “carbon sequestration projects, the link between land use (growing trees) and 
services (sequestering carbon) is generally well established and easily monitored.” (Pattanayak et al., 2010, p. 
260) 
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cost (Chen et al., 2010; Wünscher et al., 2008). Actors with high opportunity costs for 
conservation8 (i.e. highly capitalized farmers able to efficiently produce valuable crops) will 
require very high payments, which will probably exceed potential conservation funding and 
potentially the economic value of the ES provided (Alix-Garcia et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005; 
Wünscher et al., 2008). PES interventions should also, and crucially, avoid the enrolment of 
landowners who would have conserved forests in the absence of payments (Persson and 
Alpízar, 2013; Wunder, 2007). PES, therefore, “can really make a difference in the 
intermediate range of positive but numerically small opportunity costs (e.g., on degraded 
pastures, marginal croplands, hillside forests in slow-moving agricultural frontiers)” (Wunder, 
2007, p. 56), and should be paid to “a critical mass of agents that both bear some current or 
projected conservation opportunity costs and have credible, site-specific claims” (Wunder, 
2005). 
 
For that reason, payments should, from a cost-efficiency perspective, be differentiated 
according to the criteria above, instead of fixed or area-based. Paying according to opportunity 
costs also recognizes differences in ES costs provision, making its use as an equitable way of 
distributing payments (Wunder, 2007). Part of the literature, however, recognizes the 
challenges involved in payment differentiation, including that “the administrative costs of such 
differentiation may be significant, and objections based on equity or legal concerns may cause 
political problems in implementing heterogeneous payments” (Wätzold and Dreschler, 2005, 
p.74). Indeed, spatial targeting is more common in private than in public PES schemes as 
governments are usually reluctant to differentiate participant access throughout space (Wunder, 
2008b, p. 283). 
 
2.4 - Payment amounts 
 
Closely related to the discussion on targeting is the definition of how much participants should 
receive in a PES scheme. Here again, opportunity cost is the main concept guiding the 
discussion. Within the range of actors to whom the participation in PES schemes is cost-
efficient, one may still find large variations in opportunity costs. Therefore, to be efficient, 
payments should be at least equal to the opportunity costs of activities that could be 
                                                          
8 Additionally, schemes should also take into consideration transaction and protection costs for the actors 
involved (Wünscher et al., 2008). 
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alternatively performed instead of forest conservation9, otherwise participants would not be 
willing to change their behavior (Engel et al., 2008). Calculating opportunity costs of can be 
done, i.e., by estimating forgone profits from alternative activities, the amount of payment 
participants are willing to accept, and the amount participants expect to obtain if their land was 
rented out (Kosoy et al., 2007). 
 
2.5 - Efficiency in comparison to ICDP-like programs 
 
PES have been conceived as “alternatives to the more indirect pro-poor investments for 
transforming livelihoods such as ICDPs” (Lambin et al., 2014). ICDPs, and similar 
interventions such as ‘gestion de terroirs’ and ‘community-based natural resource management 
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002), aim at promoting conservation by providing “alternative sources 
of products, income, or social benefits (schools, wells, clinics, etc.) as a means of encouraging 
communities to cooperate” (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002, p. 1718).  Those initiatives have been 
significantly widespread since the 1990s, but have shown a mixed track record, at best, in terms 
of achieving their proposed conservation objectives (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Simpson and 
Sedjo, 1996; Wells et al., 1999). They are set from a questionable intention to link conservation 
and poverty reduction agenda  (Wunder, 2005), tend to incur high costs (Weber et al., 2011), 
very high administrative intensity (Ferraro, 2001), “complex implementation needs, and […] 
lack of conformity with the temporal and spatial dimensions of ecosystem conservation 
objectives” (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002, p. 340).  
 
In face of those shortcomings, the provision of direct payments has been suggested as a more 
cost-efficient way to achieve conservation objectives. Direct payments are administratively 
simpler (as practitioners have fewer design tasks to perform), less costly (as they do not require, 
for example, paying a large staff to provide training and following up project activities), avoid 
ICDPs’ questionable ‘less poverty, therefore less deforestation’ assumptions and, crucially, 
compensate behavior conditionally to the objectives set (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2001; 
Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wunder, 2005) . That is not to say that the ‘PES-positive’ literature 
sees no place for ICDP-like activities, only that they can be approached in more direct forms, 
especially adapting conditionalities to its design (Wunder, 2005).  
                                                          
9 In addition, the payment “must be less than the value of the benefit to ES users (or users would not be willing 
to pay for it)” (Engel et al., 2008, p. 668) 
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2.6 - Leakage and Permanence 
 
The existence of a PES scheme might be highly effective in the intervention area, but relocate 
land uses that are detrimental to ES to a different area where no intervention is present, causing 
the so-called leakage (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2007). The cessation of payments may cause 
detrimental land uses to resume, meaning that the ES provision lacks permanence10. Reducing 
leakage or its effects (e.g. increasing the scale of programs (Wunder, 2008a), tracking 
deforestation nationally or regionally instead of using a project based accounting system (Alix-
Garcia et al., 2012)) and fostering permanence (e.g. by temporary crediting (Dutschke and 
Angelsen, 2008) and favoring perpetual contracts over time-specific renewable ones (Wunder 
and Albán, 2008)) are also relevant issues when considering the design of PES schemes. 
 
2.7 - Equity (poverty reduction and welfare) 
 
Likely due to reported correlations between forests and high poverty rates (Sunderlin et al., 
2007), PES has been seen as a potential tool to both reduce deforestation and reduce poverty 
(Rodriguez et al., 2011). The literature on PES, however, has stressed that the rationale of PES 
was not (and PES schemes should not be) developed primarily as poverty reduction tools11 
(Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008b). In other words, “poverty alleviation 
is an important side objective, which can be pursued through timely interventions (targeting, 
transaction-cost reduction, pro-poor premiums and subsidies), but it should never become the 
primary objective.” (Wunder, 2005, p. 22)12.  
 
                                                          
10 In theory, a private scheme, voluntary for both buyers and providers, would incur in no permanence 
problems unless external conditions change, since the scheme’s conditions are renegotiable and would, thus, 
always remain satisfactory to both sides. If conditions are not satisfactory, it would mean that the scheme is no 
longer socially efficient, and it would be desirable that it stops (Engel et al., 2008). In the cases here presented, 
however, financing is based on budgetary decisions from governments, and impermanence becomes a real 
risk.  
11 Although they recognize that it can be a subsidiary objective, as long as poverty reduction provisions are well 
thought out, local conditions are favorable and efficiency concerns are primarily contemplated (Engel et al., 
2008; Pagiola et al., 2005) 
12 Potential effects of PES on poverty may occur “among program participants and, indirectly, nonparticipants 
in areas where PES programs are implemented” (Pagiola et al., 2005, p. 239). In this dissertation, the focus is 
placed on program participants and on the direct effects of PES, thus excluding potential indirect effects on 
food, labor and other local markets. 
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From an efficiency perspective, those who should receive payments are the ones who pose a 
credible (or at least credibly projected) threat to the provision of ES (Wunder, 2005; Wunder, 
2007). For that reason, several researchers note that poor land users, who usually have small 
plots and commonly have no means to seriously threaten their environment, will many times 
not be the most efficient providers of ES (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 
2005). Additionally, the transaction costs of a program that enrolls a multitude of smallholders 
will likely be much higher than one enrolling (usually better off) large land owners (Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005). Therefore, programs that provide payments for poorer populations risk 
having higher costs and negligible environmental additionality. 
 
Some authors, however, observe the existence of interdependencies between effectiveness and 
equity concerns (Pascual et al., 2010; Pascual et al., 2014), and that poverty reduction may be 
a necessary condition for ES provision (Greiner and Stanley, 2013). Likewise, negative equity 
outcomes, such as disrupted social relations and elite capture of benefits, may negatively affect 
program effectiveness (Pascual et al., 2014). PES programs may also strengthen land tenure 
security by mapping and demarcating lands and by demonstrating income generating activities 
in the areas and may improve community organization through both learning or training 
(Wunder, 2005). 
 
Poverty reduction is, however, only a part of a much a broader debate about equity within the 
PES literature. Pascual et al. (2010) and McDermott et al. (2013) identify two main dimensions 
of the term equity in the PES debate: procedural justice, which refers to the participation in 
decision making, and distributive justice, which refers to the distribution of benefits and costs 
in PES schemes13.   
 
Procedural justice is related to the political processes for resource allocation. It involves issues 
such as recognition, inclusion, representation, and participation in decision-making and 
strategic management decisions (Corbera et al., 2007; McDermott et al., 2013). As it deals with 
mostly non-economic considerations, it has been less prominent in the efficiency-oriented PES 
literature. Procedural justice is seen as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
                                                          
13 McDermott et al. (2013) identify a third dimension, contextual equity “which incorporates the pre-existing 
conditions that limit or facilitate people’s access to decision-making procedures, resources and, thereby, 
benefits” (p. 416). We will not address this dimension in our discussion, as the elements of contextual 
dimension are fundamentally external to any PES scheme, and, in the vast majority of cases, cannot be 
influenced by the institutions and individuals directly responsible for the design of PES schemes.  
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program success (Bixler et al., 2015; Cooke and Khotari, 2001)14. Nonetheless, participatory 
decision-making processes in PES programs has been a concern of practitioners involved in 
PES, especially from the civil society and international organizations (Daviet et al., 2011; 
UNECE, 2007). 
 
Distributive justice represents the economic dimension of equity. The literature on distributive 
justice is vast, present in debates in i.e. philosophy, economics, law, and politics. McDermott 
et al. (2013), writing in the context of PES, identify six principles of distributive justice, related 
to different theoretical traditions. Utilitarianist thinkers see equity as the greatest good for 
greatest number. Libertarianism understands equity as equal rights and opportunities, while 
egalitarianism understands it as “equality in the distribution of benefits from a productive 
activity without regard for any preexisting inequities”. Modern welfare economics sees it as 
the “the maximisation of individual utilities, aggregated according to a ‘social welfare 
function’” (p. 418). The merit-based understanding of equity, which together with the one in 
welfare economics, underpins much of what the mainstream literature on PES has to say about 
equity, holds “that rewards should be proportional to individual productive contributions or 
sacrifices made (i.e. opportunity costs)” (p. 418). Finally, the need-based understanding of 
equity, a perspective shared by philosophers such as Rawls and Marx, see equity should take 
account of “different needs arising from the inherent disadvantage suffered by some groups” 
(p. 418).  
 
Poverty reduction and welfare improvement relates to that final conceptualization of equity and 
is, therefore, only one of the aspects of the debate on the distributive justice dimension of 
equity. It is, however, avowedly the most salient one in the programs we have picked as case 
studies. The first article of the legal decree that creates Socio Bosque states that one of the 
program’s three objectives is to “contribute to the improvement of living conditions of 
inhabitants of rural settlements” (MAE, 2008, p. 2) and its preamble affirms that “the high 
poverty rates in rural areas in Ecuador induce deforestation as a survival strategy, […] it is 
necessary to adopt measures that contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of its 
inhabitants” (p. 1). Similarly, one of the three main stated objectives of the Bosques Program 
in Peru is to “promote the development of sustainable forest-based productive systems, for the 
                                                          
14 Although “stakeholder participation at an early stage may decrease monitoring and enforcement costs later” 
(McCann et al., 2005, p. 533). 
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generation of income in favor of the poorest rural populations” (MINAM, 2010, p. 2). Finally, 
Acre’s SISA program states “combating poverty and raising the population’s living standards” 
as one of its objectives15 (Acre, 2010a, p. 6). More information on the programs’ objectives is 
provided in Chapter V. Additionally, some of the early, seminal texts that laid the groundwork 
for the following debate on PES prominently addressed the relations between PES and poverty 
alleviation (Asquith et al., 2002; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005; Wunder, 2008b). For that reason, our discussion in the 
remainder of the dissertation will focus on the relation between PES and poverty reduction16. 
 
3. Beside efficiency: complements and criticism of the economics-based work  
 
Another branch of the PES literature focuses less on encountering the most efficient design 
aspects of PES and recommending specific courses of action for policy-makers. Part of that 
literature takes the economics-oriented literature as a starting point for their arguments on why 
broader conceptualizations and definitions of PES are required (the most commonly refered to 
alternative definitions being Muradian et al., 2010; Sommerville et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2012). 
The definitions proposed frame participants as more than economic actors (e.g. “social actors”, 
“providers” instead of “buyers and sellers”), phrase the relations between those actors in non-
economic terms (“transfer of resources”) and, in the case of Muradian et al. (2010) define the 
objective of schemes beyond pure environmental aims (e.g. “social interest” instead of “ES 
provision”). 
 
Apart from definitions, this branch of the literature emphasizes aspects of PES that they deem 
as overlooked by the environmental economics literature. Corbera et al. (2009), Muradian et 
al. (2010), van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010), Vatn (2010), van Noordwijk and Leimona 
(2010) among others, place emphasis on the institutional settings in which PES take place and 
                                                          
15 SISA is the only of the programs that also presents another dimension of equity among its objectives, stating 
“fair and equitable distribution of the economic and social benefits arising from the sustainable development 
public policies” (Acre, 2010a, p. 7). 
16 Even with this restricted approach, our focus on poverty will also not address the multiple dimensions of 
poverty identified in the vast literature on the issue. Most of the discussion on PES focuses on the income and 
consumption dimensions of poverty, and we will follow suit in understanding poverty from that perspective.  
Angelsen and Wunder (2003) provide a summary of the evolution of the debate on poverty, from the 
traditional, narrower focus on income, to the addition of more complex dimensions such as food security, 
education, health, empowerment, freedom of choice and enhanced identity. 
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the social relations in which they are embedded, looking at them as more than market 
transactions, requiring broader collective approaches other than individual decision-making.  
 
The mainstream PES concepts are also criticized by authors who question the superiority of 
the efficiency-oriented PES rationale. Corbera et al. (2007) and Pascual et al. (2010) highlight 
interdependencies between efficiency and equity in PES schemes. Other critics affirm that an 
excessive focus on PES may undermine ‘old-style’ conservation policies that are appropriate 
in some situations (Redford and Adams, 2009)17. Some authors point out the potential of PES 
schemes for “crowding-out” intrinsic motivations to conserve forests, meaning that financial 
incentives could become the single reason for conservation, replacing pre-existing, non-
utilitarian values (Fisher and Brown, 2014; Muradian et al., 2013; Rode et al., 2015).  
 
Another common critique of the efficiency-oriented PES rationale that is especially relevant 
for this dissertation relates to procedural justice. The efficiency-oriented literature largely 
discusses three dimensions of participation in PES programs, namely eligibility, desire and 
ability to participate (Kosoy et al., 2008). Other authors focus on the importance of a 
participatory decision-making process as crucial to PES, especially relating to equity in benefit 
distribution (McDermott et al., 2013), awareness of program features and requirements (Krause 
et al., 2013) and risks of increased non-cooperation (Pascual et al., 2014). 
 
Authors such as Kosoy and Corbera (2010), Lohmann (2010) and Norgaard (2010), more 
fundamentally, see an oversimplification of social, political and environmental relations in the 
environmental economics approach, and relate that to what they see as the commodification of 
ES. Also criticizing PES at a more fundamental level, some critics frame PES as an extension 
of the ‘neoliberal’ approach to public policies into forest conservation (McAfee and Shapiro, 
2010; Milne and Adams, 2012), questioning what they see as the oversimplification of 
communities as single, homogenous entities, of land-use practices as market transactions, and 
of the real voluntary nature of conservation contracts. In a stronger wording, more radical 
authors denounce incentive-based policies for what they see as a neo-colonial mechanism to 
enclose lands and undermine forest-dependent communities (Cabello and Gilbertson, 2012).  
 
4 - Current state: Wunder’s new definition, PES, and public policy 
                                                          
17 Although this point is also made by mainstream authors like Engel et al. (2008) and Wunder (2007). 
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In face of the complements and criticisms, and especially of the increasingly mature 
experiences on the ground, the debate how PES should be implemented is today much more 
complex than at the time of its first consolidation in the mid-2000s. Recognizing these 
developments, Wunder (2015) proposes a revision of his definition of PES. The new definition 
is relevant for this work, as is carries elements which are important conceptual bases for the 
work here developed. 
 
Wunder redefines PES as “voluntary transactions between service users and service providers 
that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite 
services” (Wunder, 2015, p. 241). The new definition excludes terms such as buyers and sellers, 
thus de-emphasizing the market-like character of PES. We interpret this change in the direction 
of a stronger recognition that PES have developed in the past decade not as strict market-like 
transactions, indirectly recognizing the increased centrality and scale of governments in PES 
schemes worldwide. We also understand the use of “agreed rules of natural resource 
management” as a move towards a view of PES that incorporates more complex institutional 
relations than those of market-like transactions. 
 
The definition maintains the focus on environmental efficiency of the initial definition 
(‘generating offsite services’) and on the core characteristics of PES that differentiate them 
from other policies (‘voluntary transactions […] conditional on’). This is, here, also interpreted 
as showing the relevance of looking at efficiency-oriented recommendations for PES design, 
since PES’s main aim should still be generating additional ES provision through payments 
made on a conditional basis. 
 
The conceptualization that underlies this dissertation, that PES can be understood and 
researched as governmental public policies, is thus fostered by this revisited definition. As this 
chapter briefly showed, this is one of the several angles from which we can study PES. The 
increased, and increasingly recognized, role of governments in PES ensures it is an important 
one. For that reason, we will now turn to exposing the dissertation’s conceptual framework, 
which recurs to elements of public policy theories to explain the adoption and design processes 
the three selected PES programs.  
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III. A conceptual framework for the analysis of environmental policy adoption and 
design 
 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework used in the dissertation. The first section of 
the chapter singles out the environment as a differentiated public policy domain. This 
distinction is important as a starting rationale for the selection and development of the 
analytical approach adopted by the dissertation. The second section describes the Multiple 
Streams Framework (MSF), a widely applied framework for the analysis of agenda-setting 
processes, which was chosen to guide the analysis of the adoption of the programs in the cases 
studied. The third section develops and explains the conceptual framework used for the analysis 
of design decisions in the cases. We combine insights from selected theories and frameworks 
used in public policy analysis, designed to fit the context of our case studies. Finally, we present 
the guiding hypotheses and research questions of the dissertation. 
1. Environment as a public policy domain  
 
Several policy theorists agree that most policymaking occurs within specialized policy domains 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Environmental public policy-making is no different from other 
sectors in that sense. Environmental problems and the policies that try to address them, also 
like in other sectors, have a unique18 set of characteristics, which may yield specific policy-
making dynamics. Some of those characteristics are described in the paragraphs below. 
 
Carter (2007) identifies several characteristics that distinguish the environment as a policy 
problem. Some of those characteristics relate to the natural aspects of the problems. Many 
environmental resources are public goods and significant collective action problems may arise 
from efforts to protect them. Environmental problems are frequently transboundary, requiring 
concerted action from the international community. The complex and uncertain 
interdependence of environmental problems may also affect policy-making, since it is many 
times difficult to address individual problems in isolation, as shown by the classical example 
of installing catalytic converters in cars to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions ending up 
increasing fuel consumption and, consequently, carbon dioxide emissions (Carter, 2007). Many 
environmental problems are irreversible, such as the exhaustion of resources or the extinction 
                                                          
18 Not individually unique, but unique when taken as a set of issues. 
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of species, putting pressure on policy-makers for early preemptive action, since delays and 
mistakes may be impossible to correct.  
 
Other characteristics of environmental issues are more closely related to their political and 
administrative unfolding. Temporal and spatial issues affect the perception of environmental 
problems. They are often ‘non-sensorial’, meaning that they are not always as easily visible as, 
for example, a faltering hospital or a school lacking teachers. Environmental problems, thus, 
often require scientific knowledge to be realized. While some issues, such as urban air and 
water pollution, are easily noticeable, others, such as massive biodiversity losses, ozone 
depletion, and climate change, only came to public attention after careful scientific scrutiny. In 
developing countries, it is especially challenging to communicate the gravity of some 
environmental issues (Martinez, 1999). The impact of environmental problems is often long-
term, while remedial actions have to be taken in the short term, before their effects are fully 
felt, as the case with climate change. This characteristic has major political implications, as the 
long-term effects may constrain politicians from taking appropriate action, as they “tend to 
have short-term concerns – tomorrow’s papers, forthcoming opinion polls or the next election 
– and they know how difficult it is to persuade people to accept self-sacrifice today in order to 
protect those who are not yet born” (Carter, 2007, p. 179). The location of environmental 
problems may also complicate political action on them. While the pollution of urban sections 
of rivers is felt by large numbers of cities’ inhabitants, other problems, like most deforestation 
in the Amazon, occur outside densely populated areas, hence perceived as detached from the 
lives of many voters. Those characteristics make environmental problems especially hard to 
‘market’ politically. 
 
Most policy-making is currently done by specialized ministries, secretariats and sectors within 
governments and international organizations. Environmental issues are especially, and often 
negatively, affected by decisions made by other ministries, such as finance, agriculture, and 
transport. Those decisions tend to follow narrow sectoral objectives, and their environmental 
consequences are often ignored. For that reason, environmental agencies must often attempt to 
coordinate action with other ministries, and in some cases engage in intra-governmental 
conflicts with other ministries.  
 
Public policy solutions to environmental problems also have a unique set of specific 
characteristics. They are often perceived as highly technical, with high levels of scientific 
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involvement and usually expensive. It is technically more challenging, for example, to reduce 
the harmfulness of chemical residues of industrial processes than to construct a major housing 
project for homeless populations. This does not mean that their implementation will be overall 
more difficult than in other sectors, since political and administrative barriers may potentially 
hinder public policy in virtually all areas. But environmental policies are perceived as being 
difficult due to their often technically and scientifically complicated nature.  
 
Solutions to environmental problems have often resorted to regulatory interventions. In other 
sectors, such as welfare and infrastructure, policy interventions take the form of positive 
measures, such as public spending in benefits and works. Regulatory measures, often in the 
shape of disincentives, “are likely to provoke howls of outrage from businesses and trade 
unions about the dangers of reduced competitiveness or jobs lost, or from consumers who have 
to pay higher prices for cleaner or safer goods” (Carter, 2007, p. 180). Indeed, environmental 
policies are seen by many as a hindrance to capital formation activities, potentially competing 
with other policy goals, which many times have stronger political support.  
 
In parts of the developed world, environmental issues have acquired a much more prominent 
status in political and electoral debates in the last decades. In some countries, like Germany, 
green parties have been able to gather enough votes to take part in governing coalitions and 
even head the executive in some provinces and cities. Internationally, the ozone layer, 
biodiversity and especially climate negotiations are increasingly higher in the agenda of heads 
of state19. These positive developments, however, have yet to follow suit in the internal politics 
of developing countries, where grassroots ecological movements abound, but where green 
parties and environmental agendas still fail to succeed electorally. Being a lower priority for 
politicians, however, will not always necessarily be negative for environmental policymaking. 
As stated by Rhodes and Marsh (1992), an issue being peripheral to a government’s program 
and electoral results, especially when the range of interests affected is limited, allows for its 
stakeholders to have a greater capacity to run its own affairs.  
 
The uniqueness of environment as a policy sector not only creates challenges for policymaking 
but also to policy analysis. The following sections will focus on presenting analytical options 
                                                          
19 The opening of the UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris, on November 30th, 2015, was attended by over 150 heads of 
state and government, “the largest group of leaders ever to attend a UN event in a single day” (UNFCCC, 
2015). 
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based on the large literature on public policy theory to make sense of policymaking processes 
in the forest conservation sector in Latin America. With the backdrop of section 1 of this 
chapter, sections 2 and 3 will carry out two tasks: 1) present the Multiple Streams Framework 
as the analytical tool for the adoption of the programs, and 2) present an analytical framework 
for the analysis of the design decisions in the cases, using a combination of elements from 
policy theories, explaining why those elements are especially relevant. The separation may 
appear artificial, since the processes of policy adoption and design have several overlaps, 
especially when the analysis focuses on tracing their driving forces. However, as the still 
common use of the policy cycle (Jann and Wegrich, 2007) as a way to understand policy 
processes shows, it makes analytical sense to parcel out the process, in order to provide a more 
clearly understandable explanation of the forces at play. 
 
2. Analytical framework for program adoption: the Multiple Streams Framework 
 
The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) has been developed by Kingdon (1984) mainly as an 
analytical framework for understanding agenda setting, or why specific policies are adopted by 
governments instead of others, being commonly used to analyze the introduction of  policies 
in governmental agendas (Brunner, 2008; Howlett, 1998; Le Coq et al., 2012). Essentially, the 
framework integrates “the interests, ideas, resources, and constraints of relevant actors” 
(Brunner, 2008, p. 501), and policy instruments are seen as an outcome of the interaction of 
three streams: problems, policy, and politics, which join from time to time, creating so-called 
policy windows, that can be seized by actors, or policy entrepreneurs, to push specific 
instruments towards the government’s agenda.  
 
The problem stream “consists of various conditions that policy makers and citizens want 
addressed” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 70). Problems are usually brought to the public attention 
through three main means: indicators and data; focusing events (such as disasters); and 
instances such as feedback from previous programs (Brunner, 2008; Zahariadis, 2007). The 
politics stream consists of three main elements: the national mood or public opinion, the actions 
of organized political forces (such as political parties and pressure groups) and changes of 
legislative representatives and executive personnel (Brunner, 2008; Zahariadis, 2007), 
including conflicting mandates and battles over turf between agencies (Kingdon, 1984). 
Finally, the policy stream is conceptualized as analogous to a “soup” of ideas floating around 
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that interact and combine receiving different amounts of attention due mainly to their value 
acceptability and technical feasibility (Zahariadis, 2007).  
 
When the three streams join at some point in time, a policy window is created. Policy windows 
are situations in which a ‘‘problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the 
policy community, a political change makes the right time for policy change, and potential 
constraints are not severe’’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 174). These conditions must not, however, all 
be met at the same time for a policy window to open. As stated by Kingdon (1984, p. 176), 
“basically a window opens because of change in the political stream (e.g., a change of 
administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats... or a shift in national 
mood); or it opens because a new problem captures the attention of governmental officials”. In 
addition, windows may open due to institutionalized instances, such as elections or budgetary 
cycles, or abruptly, by events that cause political attention to focus on an issue, such as disasters 
or crises (Howlett, 1998). The advocates that work to seize policy windows are called “policy 
entrepreneurs”, who “must be able to attach problems to their solutions and find politicians 
receptive to their ideas” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 74). The main elements of the MSF are illustrated 
in Figure 1 and described in Table 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 – Structure of the Multiple Streams Framework 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Le Coq et al. (2012) 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Elements of the Multiple Streams Framework 
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Element Description 
Problem stream 
Indicators Factual description of the state of affairs, and its changes. 
Focusing events 
Crises, disasters, symbols or personal experiences of policy makers that call the 
attention to a problem. 
Feedback from 
previous policies 
The operation of past programs can bring attention to policies that are or not working 
well, or new problems that may have arisen as a consequence of a policy.  
Politics stream 
National mood or 
public opinion 
‘Climate in the country’ or changes in public opinion, common lines along which 
many people in a given jurisdiction think. 
Organized political 
forces 
Interest groups pressure, NGOs, lobbies, parties, etc.  
Legislative and 
administrative 
turnover and 
jurisdictions 
“Events within government itself”: administration changes, seat changes in 
parliament, creating opportunities to push some proposals and bury others; 
bureaucratic and political battles for policy turf. 
Policy stream 
Technical feasibility The capacity of the government to actually implement a given policy. 
Value acceptability 
‘Value’ refers to the ideological positions of policy-makers in regards to policy 
themes, such their views on the role and size of government. 
Source: Kingdon (1984) 
 
We selected the MSF because it contains several elements that are conducive to a better 
understanding of why incentive-based policies were adopted. It includes analytical categories 
that guide research for policy drivers outside and, crucially, inside the government’s structure, 
accounting for the relevance of ambiguous and uncertain processes within institutions. It also 
confers relevance to concrete external elements of policy problems, such as indicators and 
events, while also taking into consideration more abstract factors, such as the national mood 
and value acceptability. Finally, the model is simple enough to allow for a clear presentation 
of the analysis, while still not missing the most relevant determinants of policy adoption20.  
 
The MSF, however, aims at examining how problems are formed and how the attention of 
policy-makers is captured (Chow, 2014), and not for understanding the very specific details of 
policy design. It would be possible to analyze the design process using the MSF, but the 
understanding here is that the analysis could miss some relevant elements of the cases. For that 
reason, devising a synthetic framework, which combines elements of some of the different 
conceptual traditions, is the most appropriate way to move forward. 
 
3. Conceptual framework for the analysis of program design 
 
                                                          
20 An evaluation of the strengths and limitations of the MSF in relation to the specific analysis done in this 
dissertation will be provided in Chapter VIII, section 2. 
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Below, we develop a conceptual framework suitable for the analysis of the cases. The aim is 
not to create a synthetic theory, which tries to parsimoniously combine elements from multiple 
theories to “make general assumptions about the causal relationships between concepts” 
(Cairney, 2013, p. 2) of policy design. Our aim is, rather, to refer to different policy science 
theories to devise a conceptual framework, which will “identify relevant concepts and help 
organize analysis and theoretical comparison” (Cairney, 2013, p. 2) or, in Elinor Ostrom’s 
words on frameworks, “provide the most general list of variables that should be used to analyze 
[…] institutional arrangements.” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 26). Figure 3 provides a summary of the 
framework. 
 
Figure 3 – Conceptual Framework 
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The framework aims at seeing policy design as more than a technical exercise of matching 
appropriate responses to given problems, but as a complex and sometimes ambiguous21 
process. The theoretical literature on public policies is extremely vast and runs through a wide 
variety of ontological and epistemological approaches. An exhaustive review of that literature 
aimed at thoroughly and fully analyzing all the most useful theoretical approaches for this 
dissertation would yield an extensive work of its own. Merely rewriting descriptions of the 
theories, a task already, and more appropriately, performed in the several policy theory manuals 
available, would be of little use here. For that reason, we decided that it would be more fruitful 
to present the elements of the framework and synthetically explain their theoretical origins. 
 
Its basic structure is adapted from Howlett (2009), who provides a framework to understand 
the design of policies in general, and applies it to environmental policies specifically. His 
framework sees public policy design as being the product of interactions and interdependencies 
in three levels of decision making. At an abstract level, we call ‘overarching preferences’ (top 
of the inverse pyramid, labelled ‘macro level’ by Howlett) the general statements of 
“government aims and ambitions in a specific policy area” and the “long term preferences of 
government in terms of organizational devices to be used in addressing policy aims” (p. 75). 
Howett sees the existence of relatively long-term policy arrangements at the macro level, which 
he defines as governance modes. They are the general, relatively abstract aims and preferences 
that will reduce the number of specific choices to be made at the other levels. The author draws 
an analogy with the arts, comparing governance modes with artistic styles, such as classic or 
baroque. In more concrete, policy-related terms, the elements that will influence policies at this 
level are, for example, preferences for state-planned economic activities vs. free-market 
oriented economic policy, and for centralized control of major organized social actors vs. the 
promotion of autonomous networked collaborations.  
 
At the ‘operationalizable policy objectives’ level (called by Howlett ‘meso level’), “the specific 
types of governing instruments to be used to address programme level objectives” (p. 75). 
Examples of the elements at this level are the choices of general policy instruments to address 
specific market or governance failures, such as mandatory participation laws to tackle 
                                                          
21 “Ambiguity is at the center of an alternative understanding of rationality and of institutional decision 
making. Ambiguity is a lack of clarity or consistency in interpretations of reality, causality, and intentionality. 
Ambiguous situations and purposes resist categorization and therefore systematic analysis. Ambiguous 
outcomes are fuzzy. In the ambiguous decision world, alternatives are hazy, objectives are contradictory” 
(Frederickson et al., 2012, p. 183). 
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freeriding, labeling for information asymmetries and personnel increases for ineffective law 
enforcement.  
 
At the ‘specific design decisions’ level (called by Howlett ‘micro level’), the one that is of 
higher relevance for the analysis of design decisions performed in this dissertation, are the 
“specific, on-the-ground micro requirements to attain policy objectives […] the settings of 
policy tools required to attain policy targets.” (p. 75). Choices at this level will define the 
specific details of how a policy instrument will be ultimately shaped, and for that reason, the 
design questions asked by this dissertation lay at this level. Examples of the criteria stated by 
Howlett as relevant at this level are political risks, constraints on state activity and degree of 
coerciveness. 
 
A deeper discussion of changes at the overarching preferences level of the framework would 
shed light, for example, on long-term changes in governance trends. In this dissertation, 
however, we are analyzing policy processes that occurred in a relatively short time span. For 
that reason, the elements of the overarching preferences level (i. e. the increased emphasis on 
social policy in Ecuador), will be present in the analysis, but understood as a given policy 
context in which design decisions are made, not as an analytical object. Similarly, the 
operationalizable policy objectives level focuses on which policy instrument is adopted to 
tackle a specific problem, a task carried out in the adoption chapter (Chapter VI) of the 
dissertation. Elements of the operationalizable policy objectives level will be explained with 
the Multiple Streams Framework (see Chapter VI), but clearly will also be influential in 
specific design decisions. For that reason, the framework here exposed concentrates on further 
developing the specific design decisions level of Howlett’s framework, strengthening it with 
elements from other theories and frameworks. The analysis will, thus, not lose sight of elements 
at the other two levels and refer to them when required. 
 
At the specific design decisions level, the framework departs from the elements of Howlett’s 
general framework for that level and presents analytical factors that we consider being the most 
relevant for the context of the cases in hand. It is important to point out that the factors 
presented below are by no means an exhaustive list of possible factors that influence policy 
making. Previous knowledge of the Latin American political and policy contexts, and of the 
three case studies, motivated the selection of these six factors as the ones which could more 
strongly and parsimoniously help informing the analysis. 
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The first factor taken into consideration are electoral opportunities and risks. This factor 
aggregates the idea that, in democratic systems, politicians will try to maximize power, 
ensuring that policies will be designed in ways to ensure the most votes possible in following 
elections. This element is one of the most important explanatory factors in the school of public 
choice theory. Public choice theory, also sometimes called rational policy analysis22 (Arts, 
2012), applies assumptions and methods developed in economics to the study of politics, 
“viewing the actions of citizens, politicians, and public servants as analogous to the actions of 
self-interested producers and consumers” (Frederickson et al., 2012, p. 193), aiming to perform 
a type of "economic analysis of noneconomic social situations" (Emerson, 1976, p. 336, in 
Zafirovski, 2003, p. 42).  
 
As in neoclassical economics, the basic unit of analysis is the individual, meaning that 
explanations of phenomena in terms of the actions of individuals are preferred to explanations 
based on social structures (Zafirovski, 2003). Those individuals are self-interested utility 
maximizers, who know their preferences and goals, can rank-order them and will perform 
choices that maximize their benefits and minimize their costs23 (Frederickson et al., 2012). 
While in economics actors seek to maximize profits and rents, politicians will want to 
maximize power, by ensuring votes in the following elections24, leading them to more 
favorably rank short-term interests rather than long-term consequences (Hindmoor, 2006). 
Bureaucrats, for their turn, will want to maximize their agencies’ budgets, ensure career 
advancement or stability, or even actually pursue favored policies (Frederickson et al., 2012). 
As clearly stated in the words of an adherent to the approach, “as stressed by the traditional 
public-choice approach to economics, economic policy, including environmental policy, is 
determined by political and economic self-interest” (Aidt, 1998, p. 1)25.   
 
                                                          
22 Here, the term public choice is used for economics-oriented approaches because, as stated by Frederickson 
et al. (2012, p. 193), “they are best known and most widely applied as rational or public choice.” 
23 Proponents of rational choice based approaches, however, understand that the utility-maximization 
assumption is not a description of human behavior, but rather “that it provides the assumption of purposeful 
behavior with greater precision, explanatory power, and simplicity” and defend it as a “deliberately simplifying 
assumption with an epistemological function to derive models of human behavior from a minimal set of 
axioms, laws or ideal typical concepts” (Zafirovski, 2003, p. 43). 
24 Public Choice theory deals mainly with liberal Western democracy, with periodic, democratic elections 
(Hindmoor, 2006). 
25 As stated by (Griggs, 2007, p. 173), however there are “divisions within rational choice theory itself over the 
boundaries to rationality and definitions of self-interest and its applicability to all areas of social inquiry” 
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Due to the shared assumptions with macroeconomics, research based on public choice theory 
benefits from the research methods developed in that discipline26. It focuses the attention of 
research on the actors’ immediate interests, which will many times be their primary motivation 
for action. Although not the single motivating factor, it will often be the single individual 
variable with the higher capacity to explain choices. Public choice (or rather, rational choice 
based approaches generally) has been the most commonly used approach to policy research, 
including on forest policies (Arts, 2012) and probably for that reason, it has been widely 
criticized (Hindmoor, 2006).  
 
Criticism focuses on the narrow nature of its assumptions, especially regarding its conception 
of human nature. The self-interest assumption is seen as ignoring the complex motivations of 
individuals involved in policy making (Griggs, 2007; Hindmoor, 2006), like other “variables 
relating to participation in organizational decision-making, the amount and quality of employee 
feedback, and the degree to which the job is challenging all affect public-sector employee 
motivations” (Frederickson et al., 2012, p. 201). It has also been criticized for overlooking 
ambiguities and uncertainties of the policy process (Griggs, 2007), ignoring that political actors 
also pursue public and group interests, that collective identities and group solidarity are 
important to politics, and for overestimating market-like exchange relations in detriment to 
relations of authority (Udehn, 1996). 
   
Agreeing with the criticism that self-interest is just part of what constitutes the complex 
individual characteristics of actors active in a policy process, who make decisions based on 
more than just electoral interests, the framework also takes into consideration what here is 
called actor identities. It refers to idiosyncratic characteristics of the actors involved in project 
design, like their educational backgrounds27, the degree of commitment to service (Lipsky, 
                                                          
26 Public choice theories have been widely applied for the study of environmental policies and several very 
often cited works are in line with the perspective, such as Baumol and Oates (1988), Hahn (1990), Keohane et 
al. (1998), Aidt (1998), Segerson and Miceli (1998) and Revesz (2001). Other policy models and analytical 
approaches, such as the instrument choice theory (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), cost-benefit analysis (Cole 
and Grossman, 2002) and smart regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998) are also based on rational 
choice approaches. 
27 “Perhaps more important than age or general socialization is the professional socialization received by 
members of an organization. Everything else being equal, we would expect individuals trained as lawyers, for 
example, to first think of using legal instruments (administered contracts, procedural guidelines, etc.) with 
which they are most familiar rather than other types of instruments […]. Likewise, economists tend to think 
first of tax and expenditure instruments, or other incentive-dependent instruments such as franchises.” (Linder 
and Peters, 1989, p. 53). 
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2010) or personal relations. Those identities are both carried by the individuals from their lives 
outside of the organizations for which they work, but also shaped by the organizational identity 
into which they are socialized (Frederickson et al., 2012). This aspect is especially relevant in 
the Latin American context, where institutions are relatively weak in comparison to their 
counterparts in most developed nations (IDB, 2006; Levitsky and Murillo, 2009), conferring 
central importance to the individuality of actors. This factor also relates to the understanding 
that actors’ behaviors are more than just rational and goal oriented, but also “associated with 
assumptions of rules, identities, situations and actions” (Frederickson et al., 2012, p. 181).  
 
Shifting the focus from individual actors, the third factor, political, administrative, and 
technical feasibility, relates to the institutional context in which decisions are made. A stated 
by Webber (1986, p. 550), “[an] unfeasible policy proposal, no matter how technically sound, 
will seldom achieve that [‘improvement of policy performance’] goal”. Policy-makers are 
aware of the importance of a policy’s political feasibility and will factor it in their design 
decisions as a guide to action, or at least as an excuse or an explanation for previous behavior 
(Galston, 2006). Policies also vary in terms of their administrative costs and the simplicity or 
difficulty of operational tasks that will have to be performed by bureaucrats, leading 
administrations to prefer policies that are less costly to design and run (Linder and Peters, 
1989). In addition, most agencies, especially in low-priority sectors such as environment, have 
to carry out their tasks with limited resources and personnel and will tend to favor operationally 
simpler policies. This category is also linked to the relation between the technical requirements 
of a policy (e.g. costs, technology availability, and qualification of personnel) and the perceived 
ability of the government to be able to carry out that policy. In the words of MacRae and Wilde 
(1979, p. 219, in Webber, 1986, p. 548), technical feasibility “involves our capacity to design 
and produce devices that will perform the given tasks”, differing from political feasibility, 
“which depends on the actions and interactions of human beings”. 
 
This factor relates to institutional constraints to the actions of policy actors, deriving, thus, from 
the concerns espoused by the institutionalist tradition of policy analysis. Institutionalist policy 
analysis places its focus on rules and norms. Political action would not be performed solely 
aiming at attaining the highest expected utility, but according to what is a appropriated in a 
certain institutional setting (Arts, 2012). Emphasis is placed on the “institutional context in 
which political events occur and […] the outcomes and effects they generate” (Schmidt, 2006, 
p. 98). Institutions serve as mediators of social behavior and, as put by North (1990, p. 3) in 
 37 
 
the most commonly used definition of institutions “are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction”. 
 
More specifically, institutional approaches28 understand that actors are not decision-makers in 
a vacuum and that their behavior is mediated, constrained or stimulated by ‘rules of the game’. 
Interests, strategies, and motivations of actors occur within an institutional setting, which is 
embedded in historical developments. It understands that actions also follow an institutionally-
bound ‘logic of appropriateness’29, instead of only a more rationalist ‘logic of 
consequentiality’, which affect individuals, but is not a basic defining characteristic30. 
 
The fourth factor of the framework refers to the relations between the formal organizations that 
design and carry out policies, called here bureaucratic dynamics. Institutional interplay, 
broadly defined as “how a set of institutions affect one another” (Corbera et al., 2009, p. 746) 
is an important analytical domain for the understanding of policy processes. Such interplay can 
take several forms, but considering the specifics of the cases discussed in this dissertation, 
namely the intra-executive nature of the design process, the analysis will concentrate on 
bureaucratic dynamics, or the relations between governmental agencies involved in a given 
policy area. Especially in the Latin American context, coordination capacity, internal turf 
battles and jockeying for influence among agencies will often be very influential in policy 
design processes (IDB, 2006). Cox and McCubbins (2001, p. 36) call the lack of coordination 
between governmental agencies a process of ‘balkanization’, meaning the “pursuit of 
inconsistent policies by different sub-governments”. Divergences and convergences between 
agencies may have ideological sources, as well as be based on sectoral, regional or party 
differences, and coordination tends to be enhanced with political stability and the appointment 
of nonpolitical civil servants to senior positions (IDB, 2006).  
 
                                                          
28 Institutionalism is a large label to describe a wide range of intellectual approaches to policy analysis, with 
varied objects, goals, and standards of explanation. The understanding of institutionalism here espoused takes 
elements from the whole spectrum of that range. 
29 Actors seek not to exclusively follow an individually defined self-interest but “to fulfill the obligations 
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, 
and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for 
themselves in a specific type of situation” (March and Olsen, 2006) 
30 Self-interest itself is “socially constructed and culturally and historically contingent. It is defined by cultural 
institutions which set the limits of the imagination, establishing basic preferences and identity” (Schmidt, 
2006, p. 107) 
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Policy design is also influenced by similar experiences in different periods of time or 
jurisdictions. Lesson-drawing is also an influential process by which policy decisions are made. 
Rather than abstract relations between design and objectives, policymakers will often look at 
other jurisdictions that have designed similar policies or to previously implemented policies to 
draw ‘tried and tested’ policy options. Terms such as policy convergence, policy diffusion, and 
policy transfer31 are also used to describe similar processes “in which knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or 
present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.5). Lesson-drawing occurs in 
different degrees from a more or less intact adoption of a program already in effect in another 
jurisdiction, through the combination of several policies from other places, to simple 
inspiration, with programs from elsewhere used as intellectual stimulus for developing a novel 
program (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1991). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) point out that 
more intact adoptions of policies tend to occur when governments are pressured to provide 
‘quick-fix’ solutions for urgent problems since the adaptation of policies might take some time 
to be completed. 
 
The sixth category is beliefs, which relates to the ideological and ideational principles that 
might limit or spur government activity, interfering with other considerations such as quality 
and cost (Linder and Peters, 1989). They are more easily identifiable at the overarching level 
of policy-making through the discourses of parties and political leaders, but are also key for 
the definition of specific policy design features, as project designers may also be biased to 
choose different courses of action based on their beliefs. Design-level beliefs are “related to 
specific instruments or proposals dealing with only a territorial or substantive subcomponent 
of a policy subsystem” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 195) and are, i.e., “detailed rules and 
budgetary applications within a specific program, the seriousness and causes of problems in a 
specific locale, public participation guidelines within a specific statute” (Sabatier and Weible, 
2007, p. 195). 
 
The importance of beliefs is recognized in its centrality at the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF). The ACF is a network-based approach to policy analysis that “has probably been as 
                                                          
31 Lesson-drawing is used here as it better conveys the idea that the ‘recipient’ of the policy actively adopted a 
policy previously existing somewhere, instead of a coincidental rapprochement of policies (convergence) or a 
process initiated by the ‘originator’ of the policy (transfer).  
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influential in the policy sciences as the entire family of policy network theories” (Arts, 2012, 
p. 4). It sees policy occurring within subsystems, which are affected by the broader political 
and socioeconomic system. Actors are driven by belief systems, which are the bases for the 
formation of advocacy coalitions, which in turn compete with each other in pluralist political 
systems. The competition between coalitions, as well as external and internal32 events, would 
then generate policy outcomes (Arts, 2012; Sabatier and Weible, 2007).  
 
After describing the elements of our framework, it is important to explain why some potential 
explanatory factors of policy design are not present in it. Some concepts that commonly feature 
in policy analyses are embedded in the analytical factors described above. Public opinion, for 
example, has not been singled out as a separate policy determinant. The perceptions of 
politicians and policy makers of what the public opinion is are part of their perceptions of 
political feasibility and will be more relevant than what the actual public opinion is, for the 
definition of policy prescriptions. Power relations, in turn, are not present as an analytical 
factor, except within the dynamics of intra-bureaucracy power relations. That has been decided 
due to our initial knowledge of the policy making process. That process has explicitly excluded 
several non-governmental stakeholders, concretely showing an imposition of the government’s 
power and interests over those of the other stakeholders (Peru and Ecuador), or at best creating 
a government-sanctioned arena for stakeholder consultations (Acre).  
 
Discourses are another underlying force influential in policy decisions (Böcher, 2012). 
Discourse analyses, however, depart from the positivist ontology of most PES literature. While 
it is undeniable that such departures provide enriching research perspectives, they also require 
a thorough questioning of the very object under study, which would open new research 
channels that could potentially convolute the analytical results of the dissertation. The very 
policy recommendations provided by PES scholars, which are the basis of the arguments in the 
following chapters, could be framed as a “specialist scientific discourse” (Böcher, 2012), 
instead of concrete, technical guidelines, as they are framed here, and that would bring a whole 
new set of questions to the dissertation. For that reason, after balancing the potential knowledge 
generation of analyzing the discursive elements of policies and the differentiated 
methodological challenges required by discourse analyses, we decided that they would remain 
outside the scope of the dissertation. 
                                                          
32 External and internal to a given policy subsystem. 
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We understand that leaving discourses (and other factors) outside of the analytical framework 
means missing out on some answers that could be valuable for the broader debate on incentive-
based conservation policies. The analysis here performed, therefore, is not exhaustive, but, 
perhaps inescapably, a perspective. And, as pointed out by Udehn (1996, p. 11) “Every 
perspective involves a choice, and every choice is a loss of something”. 
 
4. Research questions and research approach 
 
To guide the analysis of the political processes that lead to the adoption and design of those 
programs, several research questions were devised, alongside guiding hypotheses that served 
as the bases for the interviews and documental research that unveiled the information used for 
the analysis. It is important to highlight that the hypotheses below are not strict, i.e., they will 
not be formally tested. They serve as the guiding ideas for the research. 
 
Q1. - What aspects of the public opinion and characteristics of political organizations inside 
and outside the government led to the adoption of incentive-based conservation policies?  
 
H1 – International funding opportunities (e.g. REDD+) combined with domestic pressure for 
social assistance programs created a favorable policy window for the introduction of incentive-
based conservation policy instruments in the governments’ agendas.  
H2 – The historical/ideological connection of leaderships with forest-dwelling groups led to a 
stronger political clout for environmental issues within the government’s agendas.  
H3 – Organized domestic interest groups outside the government tend to be too politically weak 
to influence policy choice in the present political setting in South America.  
 
Q2. - How did existing policies influence the programs' introduction in the governments' 
agendas? 
 
H4 – The previous success of Conditional Cash Transfer programs both domestically and 
internationally has helped to raise the profile of policy instruments with a direct cash transfer 
component. 
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H5 – Existing policies, including small-scale PES schemes (up-scaling), influence both agenda-
setting processes and instrument design. PES programs are also part of broader strategies for 
the construction of jurisdiction-wide environmental policy systems. 
 
Q3 - How important are individual "policy entrepreneurs" in agenda-setting processes and 
what strategies do they pursue? 
 
H6 – Successful entrepreneurs in incentive-based policy instruments tend to be part of high-
level decision making groups inside the government, sharing priorities, political affiliations, 
and ideologies.  
H7 – Policy entrepreneurs use the “win-win” discourse of incentive-based policy as a leverage 
to ensure support from opposing political groups. 
 
Q4 - Why are design recommendations / good practices highlighted in the PES literature so 
rarely considered in government-led incentive-based conservation schemes? 
 
Additionality by targeting high-pressure areas and assuring conditionality 
H8 – Policymakers are aware that conservation tradeoffs (including political repercussions) 
tend to be harder in high-pressure areas and thus prefer to initially target low-pressure areas, 
where relatively low payments are sufficient to cover low conservation opportunity costs.  
H9 – Conservation effectiveness is of lower priority to domestic policymakers in comparison 
to social benefits that are eventually linked to voter behavior. As a result, government-led 
schemes tend to be less monitoring-intensive and characterized by weak sanctioning 
mechanisms.    
H10 - Policy designers perceive that ensuring that the programs provide additionality demands 
high administrative costs, larger and highly qualified staffs, and more complex rules, and at the 
same time they also perceive that it can jeopardize the willingness of participants to enroll in 
the programs, as they would not be able to choose areas under conservation. 
 
Targeting according to opportunity costs to increase efficiency 
H11 - Perceived political risks of adopting efficiency over fairness concerns are common 
reasons for the non-adoption of opportunity costs as a criterion for payment modalities. This is 
of particular importance in contexts where deforestation has been largely illegal but tolerated 
historically.   
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H12 - The continuous expansion of geographical areas eligible for project implementation, 
mostly going beyond previously defined “priority” areas, was motivated by welfare and equity, 
over concerns for a more environmentally efficient use of program’s resources. 
 
Q5 – Does participation in the design of incentive-based schemes help policy makers in 
achieving their policy goals? 
 
H13 - Politically stable governing groups tend to rely more heavily on participatory instrument 
design processes, which can help them to create more sustainable institutional mechanisms for 
the implementation of incentive-based policy instruments in the long run.  
H14 – Participation makes policy processes more complex and time-consuming and less well 
established governing groups, thus, shy away from it, to guarantee action within shorter policy 
windows.  
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IV. Methodology 
 
This chapter will present the methodology used in the dissertation. The first section deals with 
data collection, describing both how it was planned and how it was implemented in the field. 
The second section discusses the process of data analysis, also first explaining the methods 
planned for the analysis and how it was carried out after the collection of the data.  
1. Data collection: interviews and document research methods 
 
1.1 – Interview planning 
 
The main method for data collection have been interviews with people in current or past 
decision-making or leadership roles in the programs themselves and other institutions involved 
in them, as well as representatives of the programs’ staff, who all “have special insight into the 
causal processes of politics” (Beamer, 2002, p. 87). In the political science literature, the 
method is known as elite33 interviewing. Elite interviewing has some distinguishing 
characteristics as compared to interviewing the general population and other stakeholders who 
are not in a decision-making or institutional leadership position. In elite interviewing, the 
researcher is more often interested in letting the respondent frame the problems, questions and 
situations at hand in their own terms (Leech, 2002), as elite respondents are usually hostile to 
structured formats and closed-ended questions, requiring a degree of trust that goes beyond 
simply ensuring anonymity and data protection, but involving even behavioral appropriateness 
and displays of knowledge on the research subject (Harvey, 2011). 
 
Defining data needs and constructing the questions: Elite interviewing, thus, relies more often 
on open-ended questions. Aberbach and Rockman (2002), provide three arguments favoring 
open-ended questions in elite interviews. First, they argue that when there is a not a very high 
degree of prior research on a topic, it is hard to define questions and response options with 
clarity, both required for closed-ended questions. Second, open-ended questions can maximize 
response validity, as they provide “a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their 
answers within their own frameworks” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p. 674), and they work 
best for the kind of exploratory, in-depth research as the one aimed for here. Finally, open-
                                                          
33 The term “elite” is not used in the socioeconomic connotation, but rather meaning persons in high-level 
political positions, with high visibility or expert knowledge (Leech, 2002).  
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ended questions increase the receptivity of elite respondents, who are more at ease with 
providing explanations in their own terms than being restricted by structured questionnaires 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Harvey, 2011). 
 
Open-ended questions do not mean, however, that planning prior to the interviewing process 
is not necessary. On the contrary, in addition to the obvious point that only well-prepared 
researchers can pose relevant questions, better understand responses and guide the interview to 
obtain desired answers, poorly prepared open-ended questions will yield poor information and 
are likely to stray the inquiry away from the focus of the researcher and into the stream-of-
consciousness and biases of the respondent (Beamer, 2002). In addition, well-prepared 
interviewers tend to be more trustworthy to respondents and more swiftly recommended to 
further respondents (Berry, 2002; Harvey, 2011). Therefore, a previous definition of the 
information needs and of the expectations for each interview was necessary, which are 
described in table 3 below. 
 
Therefore, instead of a closed questionnaire, a series of guiding questions was prepared for 
each interview. Since the type of information intended to be acquired in each interview varied 
depending to the respondent, the guiding questions also varied. Respondents involved in the 
initial stages of the programs were asked to recollect the processes of design and adoption, as 
well as to provide their takes on the political questions surrounding the project. Generally, high-
level project and implementing agency staff members were asked about the current state of the 
program, both on implementation and on its space within environmental and other policies in 
their jurisdictions. Technical staff members were asked to describe their functions, especially 
in comparison to the provisions of the program manuals.  
 
Sampling respondents: The sampling of respondents was based on the previous knowledge by 
the researcher of key decision makers in the programs (reputational criteria) and on the 
selection of institutional positions (e.g. Program Director) whose occupiers play key roles in 
the programs (positional criteria), to be complemented with further names to be suggested in 
the interviews (snowball/chain referral approach). Such strategy is in line with the sampling 
methodology suggested by Tansey (2007) for interviewing elites. It has several advantages 
over other strategies, such as random probability or stratified sampling, because the set of 
actors involved in the decision-making process is relatively limited, because the aim is to obtain 
accounts and information from the individuals more closely involved in highly specific events 
 45 
 
and processes, and because it is less likely to by-pass crucial respondents (Beamer, 2002; 
Tansey, 2007).  
 
1.2 – Interview implementation 
 
In the three research areas, initial contacts have been established with the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) offices involved with the programs. Due 
to GIZ’s involvement in the implementation of the programs, the pre-identified roles and actors 
to be interviewed have been presented and discussed with the GIZ staff, after which an initial 
list of respondents have been prepared. As the interviews progressed, new names and functions 
have been added. Table 3 summarizes the information needs and possible functions of the 
respondents. 
 
In all three cases, many of the requests for suggestions of additional respondents tended to 
point to the direction of the same individuals, especially relating to the political aspects of 
adoption and to key design decisions. That indicates that the assumption of a limited number 
of actors being relevant for the decision-making process was correct.  
 
In Peru and Acre, it was possible to reach respondents at the highest level of sectoral politics 
(Minister/Secretary) at the time of design. In the Ecuadorian case, the former minister was at 
the moment of the field visit still working at a high level in the government’s cabinet, deeming 
an interview not possible. Regarding current and former program directors, it was possible to 
interview most of them, with two short-term directors of Programa Bosques not contacted and 
a second (recorded) interview with the Socio Bosque director not possible due to a lack of 
schedule availability during the period of the field visit, including two cancellations. At the 
technical staff level, all planned interviews were achieved. 
 
Most of the changes in the interview plans occurred regarding respondents outside of the 
programs’ staffs. Some of the changes were done due to suggestions to add categories of 
respondents not in the initial list and others due to the lack of response from potential 
respondents to the contacts made. Table 3 also indicates the changes that occurred to the initial 
list of planned responses.  
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Table 3: Planned information needs, requirements developed/dropped during data collection 
phase, contacts reached or not34 
Information needed Institution/Position 
Socio 
Bosque 
Programa 
Bosques 
SISA 
Current policy priorities of the 
program 
Program Director    
High-level political representative    
Opposition group political 
representative35 
   
Policy objectives and priorities of 
the government at the time of 
project design, role of policy 
entrepreneurs 
High-level political representative 
at the time of design 
   
Non-government institutions that 
assisted the design process 
   
Relevant technical staff at the 
time of project design 
   
Opposition group political 
representative at the time of 
project design36 
   
Political history of ruling political 
group37 
High-level political representative    
Academia    
Place of the programs in the 
context of national/state forest 
protection strategies 
Environment Ministry/Secretariat    
Academia/Civil Society38    
Role of rural production 
institutions in the project 
Agriculture-related institutions    
Role of economic governmental 
agencies in the project39 
Finance Ministry    
Government-led poverty-
reduction policies in program 
areas (policies not led by 
environmental institutions) 
Social Policy Ministry/Secretariat    
International funding objectives 
and strategies 
International Donors/ Technical 
Assistance 
   
International NGOs    
In-depth description of program 
design features (incentive levels, 
costs, targeting, additionality, 
monitoring, etc.) 
Program Director    
                                                          
34 Interviews done in white, contacts not reached in shade. 
35 Category dropped because no party-level discussion on the programs was carried out. 
36 Idem 
37 Interviews not done because of lack of suggested contacts or contacts not reached 
38 Category added because of opportunities in the field 
39 Idem 
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Information needed Institution/Position 
Socio 
Bosque 
Programa 
Bosques 
SISA 
Relevant Technical Staff    
Participation issues in 
environmental policy 
Civil Society representatives    
Academia40    
Program Director    
High-level political representative    
Links between design features 
and policy objectives 
Program Director    
Relevant Technical Staff    
Relevant technical staff at the 
time of project design 
   
Non-government institutions that 
assisted the design process 
   
 
In addition to the interviews with individuals involved in the policy process, we performed a 
field visit to one of the indigenous communities participating in Programa Bosques in Peru. 
The visit was not aimed at providing information directly useful for the analysis, as program 
beneficiaries did not take part in the adoption and design processes. It was moved by an interest 
to witness the type of actions implemented by the program and to have a short interaction with 
the beneficiaries.   
 
At the end of the field visit, 41 interviews, mostly lasting about over one hour, have been 
performed. One of them has not been recorded and two recorded interviews have been lost due 
to the theft of the cell phone used to record them. One of the lost interviews, however, was a 
repeat interview with a respondent. The interviews have not been transcribed, as an analysis of 
textual subtleties (e.g. specific wording, tone) was not aimed. Detailed summaries of the 
interviews, highlighting the contents of the responses were prepared instead. List 1 below 
provides a breakdown of the respondents by their position, currently or at the time of program 
adoption and design. Finally, to ensure trust from the interviewers, since it was possible that 
some politically sensitive information would be provided, the sources were all informed that 
                                                          
40 Interviews not done because of lack of suggested contacts or contacts not reached 
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they would be kept anonymous and that only their institutional positions would be disclosed in 
all products to come out of the research, including this dissertation. 
 
List 1 – Who was interviewed?  
 
Ecuador 
 
1. Foreign technical cooperation staff  
2. Socio Bosque staff  
3. Socio Bosque staff  
4. Socio Bosque staff  
5. Former high-level environmental ministry decision maker  
6. Former high-level environmental ministry decision maker  
7. NGO staff  
8. NGO technical cooperation staff  
9. NGO technical cooperation staff  
10. NGO staff  
11. Local NGO Staff  
12. Environmental Policy specialist  
13. Former high-level environmental ministry decision maker, twice  
14. Environmental Policy specialist  
 
Peru 
 
15. Foreign technical cooperation staff  
16. Foreign technical cooperation staff  
17. Bosques program staff  
18. Bosques program staff  
19. Bosques program staff  
20. Bosques program staff  
21. Bosques program staff  
22. Former Bosques program director  
23. Former Bosques program staff  
24. Former high-level environmental ministry decision maker  
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25. Former Bosques program staff  
26. Finance ministry staff  
27. Social Development ministry staff  
28. High-level environmental ministry decision maker  
 
Acre 
 
29. High-level decision maker  
30. High-level decision maker  
31. SISA staff  
32. SISA staff  
33. SISA staff  
34. Foreign technical cooperation staff  
35. NGO staff  
36. SISA staff  
37. Environment secretariat staff  
38. SISA staff  
39. Family production secretariat staff  
40. Family production secretariat staff  
41. Local NGO Staff  
 
1.3 - Documental Analysis 
 
In addition to the interviews, we performed extensive research in the program-related 
documentation. The documents initially searched for were the formalization of programs’ 
decisions, earlier versions of project documents when available, the interventions of project 
design participants in decision-making meetings, as well as other types of concrete information. 
They allowed for a better understanding not only of the programs’ design but also on how they 
are inserted in broader government strategies. Table 4 below displays what types of information 
were found, what types were not, and what types of documents provided help in inferring 
information. Most of the documents were available online, on-site or at request to government 
staff. 
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The majority of the obtained documentation consists of descriptions of program rules and 
procedures. They were, therefore, used as the main basis for the chapter on the description of 
the programs. There was limited access to previous versions of documents and drafts of final 
texts prepared by the design teams, as there was no systematic file keeping of those versions, 
and only a few, unorganized files have been provided by one of the respondents (Interview 22), 
who coincidentally had them on his computer. Therefore, the documental analysis as a basis 
for reconstructing the negotiation process had a more limited impact than initially planned.  
 
Table 4 – Types of documents found and analyzed  
 
Type of Document Socio Bosque Programa Bosques SISA 
Initial legal document     
Operational manuals   Detailed description 
Progress report (last covered year) 2013  2014 
List of enrolled/sanctioned 
beneficiaries 
Only total 
enrollment 
numbers 
  
Budgets    
Templates of beneficiary 
agreements 
   
Financial sustainability strategy    
Baseline methodology    
Monitoring methodology manual    
Monitoring report    
Labor performance evaluation 
directive 
   
Agreements with regional 
Governments 
   
Oversight commission regulations    
Stakeholder engagement process 
report 
  Self-reporting 
Safeguard criteria and indicators    
Safeguard monitoring manual    
Safeguard monitoring report   Self-reporting 
Non-permanence risk report   Self-reporting 
 
2. Data analysis 
 
2.1 – Method for the analysis: Process tracing  
 
Process tracing (PT), as defined by (Collier, 2011, p. 824), “is an analytic tool for drawing 
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part 
of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena”. Such definition is, however appropriate, too 
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broad. Beach and Pedersen (2011) define PT more narrowly in their separation of the method 
in three variants: theory-testing, theory-building and explaining outcomes. This definition of 
the variants will be used here to more clearly explain how data was analyzed. 
 
Theory-testing PT “deduces a theory from the existing literature and tests whether there is 
evidence that a hypothesized causal mechanism is actually present in a given case” (p. 6). It is 
more often used when previous research has found a strong correlation between an independent 
variable and an outcome, but there is uncertainty on how that correlation works and if there is 
a causal mechanism between them, or in situations where theoretical conjectures are well 
developed, but empirical support is missing. The focus of theory-testing PT is to conceptualize 
a theory-based causal mechanism41 and test if it is they can be “treated as middle-range theories, 
[…] expected to be present in a population of cases” 42 (p. 7). 
 
Theory-building PT, on the other hand, builds up from the empirical evidence to infer a 
conceptual framework, instead of only deducing it from previous theoretical knowledge. 
Theory-building PT can be, like theory-testing PT, commonly used when there is a reliable 
correlation between independent variables and outcomes and uncertainty on the mechanisms 
linking the two, but also when the outcome is known, but not its causes. Theory-building PT is 
a more iterative process, as “hunches of what to look for that are inspired by existing theoretical 
and empirical work are investigated systematically, with the results of this search then forming 
the background for further searches” (p. 19), allowing the researcher to continuously refine the 
causal mechanisms as the research advances. 
 
Explaining outcome PT is likely the most common variant, aiming at explaining case-specific 
outcomes of a historical or political process. It focuses not on theory, but rather on the case at 
hand, with theory (or theories) being useful as guides for crafting a sufficient explanation for a 
particular outcome. An important aspect of explaining outcome PT is that it does not aim, 
principally, at finding generalizable (systematic) causal mechanisms, but rather at finding 
detailed, complex causal mechanisms that are suited to the case in hand (non-systematic).  This 
does not mean that explaining outcome PT has no value outside of the specific case study. 
                                                          
41 The authors conceptualize causal mechanisms as “a system that transmits causal forces from X to produce 
Y” (p. 8). 
42 A more detailed explanation of how the three variants of PT are operationalized is present in the sub-section 
“Operationalization”, below. 
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While generalization is not the main focus, the authors point out that “a good explaining 
outcome PT study will point to potential systematic factors that can be investigated further by 
future studies, or that can act as building blocks for future attempts to build generalizable causal 
mechanisms that can explain outcomes across the population of relevant cases” (p. 28). As it 
will be explained in more detail in section 2.3 below, explaining outcome PT is operationalized 
as a mix between deductive and inductive reasoning, according to what is deemed more suitable 
for providing a sufficient explanation for the case in hands.   
 
2.2 - Advantages of the method  
 
PT is especially useful in small n research designs, where a historically specific explanation 
for an outcome produced by a chain of causal factors is sought (Hall, 2006). It is also a 
systematic way of explaining qualitative arguments. Summarizing the usefulness of process 
tracing, Collier (2011) points out that it “can make decisive contributions to diverse research 
objectives, including: (a) identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically 
describing them; (b) evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses, and 
assessing these new causal claims; (c) gaining insight into causal mechanisms; and (d) 
providing an alternative means – compared with conventional regression analysis and inference 
based on statistical models – of addressing challenging problems such as reciprocal causation, 
spuriousness, and selection bias” (p. 824). 
 
Other methods that could be used were excluded for not fitting the objectives as well as process 
tracing. Grounded theory, for example, is in a way similar to theory-building PT, as it seeks to 
induce theoretical arguments from empirical observations. However, it is not its purpose to 
provide descriptions or apply existing theories (Silverman, 2011), which may limit the 
explanatory possibilities of the research. In addition, grounded theory is focused on concepts, 
coding and categorizations (Corbin and Strauss, 1990), and it puts less emphasis on 
descriptions and processes, which, are more relevant in inducing explanations of causal 
mechanisms, like the ones searched for in this dissertation. Discourse analysis, as stated in the 
theory chapter, could shed an interesting light on some aspects of the research, especially on 
the role of ideational factors and informal power relations in politics. However, discourse 
analysis draws from a constructivist epistemology, while PT leans towards the positivist 
approach. To use the insights of discourse analysis properly, it would be necessary to introduce 
 53 
 
a whole new group of concepts, which would make research conceptually crowded, without 
bringing absolutely vital contributions to an analysis based on a PT methodology. 
 
2.3 – Operationalization of process tracing 
 
Beach and Pedersen (2011) also explain how one engages is process tracing in practice. The 
operationalization of the three variants is also different, and the three ways will be described. 
In the following section, we explain the choice of the explaining outcome variant as the one 
more suitable for the dissertation. 
 
In theory-testing PT, illustrated in figure 4 below, the first step is to conceptualize a causal 
mechanism linking and independent variable (e.g. environmental ideology) and an outcome 
(e.g. environmental legislation)43, based on existing theorization. A causal mechanism is 
composed of several parts, each one containing entities (e.g. social movements) who engage in 
activities (e.g. protests). The second step is to make case-specific predictions of what 
observable manifestations should occur in case the conceptual mechanism is to be present in 
the case. The step three is, finally, to collect evidence to increase our confidence if the causal 
mechanism was present in the case and if all parts functioned as expected in the conceptual 
mechanism (Beach and Pedersen, 2011, p. 10)   
 
Figure 4 – Theory-testing PT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Beach and Pedersen (2011) note that, in the case of theory-testing PT, the correlation between the 
independent variable and the outcome should have been already shown in the literature, so that theory-
testing PT is to have explanatory power. If the correlation is not reliable, it would be difficult to tell if the 
conceptual mechanism is not appropriate or if the correlation is simply not there. 
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Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2011) 
 
In theory-building PT, illustrated in figure 5 below, the process of inference goes in the 
opposite direction. First, the independent variable and outcome have to be conceptualized. 
Then, the researcher should proceed to collect empirical evidence for the specific case. Step 
two is to infer, based on the evidence collected, observable manifestations of a plausible 
underlying causal mechanism. It should be noted that this step will also count with previous 
theoretical knowledge to help the researcher make inferences. As noted by Beach and Pedersen 
(2011) “here existing theory can be thought of as a form of ‘grid’ to detect systematic patterns 
in empirical material, enabling inferences about observable manifestations to be made” (p. 18). 
Step three is, finally, inferring from data, observable manifestations and existing theory, a 
plausible underlying causal mechanism linking independent variable and outcome, which 
could plausibly be generalizable to other contexts (systematic causal mechanisms). It is also 
relevant to cite the authors’ point on how theory-building should proceed: “In reality, theory-
building PT is usually an iterative and creative process. Hunches of what to look for that are 
inspired by existing theoretical and empirical work are investigated systematically, with the 
results of this search then forming the background for further searches. This means that steps 
1 and 2 are often repeated before step 3 is reached” (p. 19). 
 
(eg environmental 
ideology 
(eg social 
movements) 
protests 
(eg government) (eg environmental 
legislation) 
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Figure 5 – Theory-building PT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2011) 
 
 
In explaining outcome PT, explained in figure 6 below, the focus is less on the theory and more 
on coming up with a minimally sufficient explanation of a specific outcome. For that reason, 
the method is useful when there is little theorization in the literature on if or how an independent 
variable is linked and on possible causal mechanisms. In explaining an outcome, the researcher 
will use some kind of mix between deductive and inductive explanatory facts, paying close 
attention to causal mechanisms that could work specifically for the case in hand, with less 
concern for its generalizability for other contexts (non-systematic causal mechanisms). The 
deductive path is similar to the steps described for theory-testing PT, and the inductive path 
similar to theory-building PT. The tendency is that an initial explanation will not be sufficient, 
so the researcher, informed by the results of the initial explanation, will choose an appropriate 
path to look for more evidence and conceptualizations until a sufficient explanation is reached 
(see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 – Explaining outcome PT 
 
(eg environmental 
ideology) 
(eg environmental 
legislation) 
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Beach and Pedersen (2011) 
 
The burning question of how to know if such sufficient explanation was reached is answered 
by Beach and Pedersen in a very pragmatic way: “There is no foolproof answer to this question; 
instead the decision that we have a minimally sufficient explanation is based upon a subjective 
assessment of whether all of the relevant facets of the outcome have been accounted for 
adequately, while at the same time ensuring that the evidence is best explained by the developed 
explanation instead of plausible alternative explanations. We can never confirm a theory with 
100% certainty; instead, we stop when we are satisfied that the found explanation is able to 
account for the outcome beyond any reasonable doubt” (p. 26). 
 
3 – Implementation of the analysis 
 
Considering the objective of explaining the policymaking processes of the cases, and in light 
of the characteristics of the process tracing variants described above, the analysis pursued to 
carry out an explaining outcome PT. Initially, the policy recommendations categories to be 
analyzed have been defined, and guiding hypotheses have been conceived (see Chapter III for 
research questions and their related guiding hypotheses). Those guiding hypotheses have also 
been the basis for the preparation of the interviews’ guiding questions.  
 
After gathering interview and documental data, an initial timeline for the policy-making 
process and a list of possible explanatory factors for decisions on each of the policy 
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recommendations have been prepared. After reviewing the interviews and documents, an 
explanation for the selection of the specific policy characteristics of each case has been 
constructed, based on the theoretical frameworks presented. We present results of this analysis 
in chapters VI, VII and VIII. 
 
A secondary objective has been to identify potential mechanisms that could yield research paths 
for further studies in the area (e.g. generating hypotheses). It is not the main objective of the 
dissertation to look for generalizable findings, which could be claimed to apply to other 
incentive-based programs, but the findings of this dissertation can certainly be taken into 
consideration as possible issues occurring in other contexts, as it will be further explained in 
the conclusions at Chapter VIII. 
 
One challenge of the interview process was the difficulty in cross-checking the reliability of 
the information provided due to the small amount of actors involved in the processes 
researched. Although expected to some extent, in the course of the interviews we realized that 
in many instances, only one or two actors were deemed sufficiently qualified to provide reasons 
for some decisions. We took that challenge into consideration. Interviews, especially elite 
interviews, cannot be understood as a complete representation of the facts, but as the attempt 
of actors who participated in the process to provide their recollections. That means that 
interviews regarding past events might be subject to questioning regarding their overall 
reliability. Respondents may post-rationalize their actions and present them as more consistent 
than they were when the processes actually happened. Details may be under- or overstressed, 
and some relevant factors may be under- or overstated. That is a common occurrence for 
processes that rely on elite interviewing and we have attempted to question the reliability of 
the information provided, while still considering it as the main source of data for the 
construction of the explanations.  
 
There is no fail-proof way to solve the reliability issues inherent to small sample elite 
interviewing. We have relied on previous knowledge, and on knowledge acquired during the 
interviewing and on documental research to critically assess the answers provided by the 
respondents. In analytical chapters of the dissertation, the aspects in which the information 
from the interviews is insufficient, or seem to contradict evidence from other sources, are 
explicitly mentioned. That assessment, however, will have an inescapable subjective 
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component, and the attempt was to ground the conclusions made in the most solid amount of 
evidence possible.  
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V. Case studies: describing the programs 
 
This chapter will describe the features, institutional arrangements, and dynamics of the 
programs. Its objective is to lay the bases for understanding the analysis of the policy adoption 
and design processes in the two following chapters.  
 
Map 1 – Where the regions studies are located 
 
 
1. Socio Bosque – Ecuador  
 
The Socio Bosque program was created in November 2008, through the Ministerial Agreement 
169 of the Ministry of the Environment of Ecuador (MAE). The main objectives of the program 
are: a) to conserve forests, páramos44, and other types of native vegetation45 all around 
continental Ecuador, b) to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses caused by deforestation 
and c) improve life conditions of the populations living in those areas (MAE, 2008). The overall 
aim stated in the project’s operational manual (MAE, 2009) is to conserve more than 3.6 
million hectares of forests, with the participation of between 500,000 and 1.5 million 
beneficiaries.  
 
                                                          
44 Páramos are high altitude grasslands typical of Andean regions of South America. 
45 For simplicity, this dissertation will use forests when referring to all those types of vegetation, making 
differentiations when necessary. 
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Socio Bosque is implemented by the MAE. Implementation is centralized within the ministry, 
which has established a project implementation unit for the program, with no direct 
participation of provincial or local governments. Financing for the program comes mostly from 
the federal government’s budget, with the main additional financing from the German 
International Development Bank (KfW) (MAE, 2015b). Additional technical cooperation 
resources come from the GIZ, Conservation International (CI) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). As of 2015, the yearly budget of the program was at around US$ 
12.5 million, 84.8% of which dedicated to the payment of incentives, 12.9% for program 
administration and 2.2% for capacity building activities (MAE, 2015b)46.  
 
Individual landowners and communities whose lands are located in forests and other native 
vegetation areas in Ecuador are eligible to participate in the program. Enrollment in the 
program, as stated in the article two of the program’s creation agreement, is voluntary. The 
mechanism foreseen by the program to achieve those objectives is the provision of incentive 
payments to participants, conditional to the compliance of environmental and administrative 
conditions (more on the payments system and conditionalities below).  
 
The program foresees a targeting mechanism for the program, literally called geographical 
prioritization (priorización geografica). The targeting mechanism is organized according to the 
criteria explained in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 – Targeting criteria of the Socio Bosque program47 
 
Main variables Sub-variables Observations Points 
Level of threat 
Closeness to access 
alternatives 
Considers the closeness of the 
area to access alternatives and 
their inclination 
High Threat = 9 points 
Medium Threat = 6 points 
Low Threat = 3 points Historical 
Deforestation Patterns 
Only applied in case of available 
information 
Environmental 
Services 
Biodiversity Refuge 
Native vegetation formations 
already protected in the National 
System of Protected Areas (SNAP) 
have lower priority 
Points range from 1 to 4. The 
lower the presence of the 
vegetation in SNAP, the higher 
the punctuation 
                                                          
46 This information was acquired from a financial strategy document prepared by the program’s staff, not from 
official financial reporting, which was not available.  
47 The table represents the index for forest areas and other vegetation types except páramos. For páramos, 
higher weight is given to hydrological services variables and demographic pressures are considered as threat 
levels.    
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Main variables Sub-variables Observations Points 
Hydrological 
Regulation 
Importance for hydrological 
regulation 
High Importance = 3 points 
Medium Importance = 2 points 
Low Importance = 1 points 
Carbon Storage 
Defined in function of the 
biomass 
High Storage = 3 points 
Medium Storage = 2 points 
Low Storage = 1 points 
Poverty Levels --- 
Defined according to the 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs index of 
the Ecuadorian government 
> 65% of average NBI = 3 points 
< 65% of average NBI = 0 points 
Source: (MAE, 2012c)  
 
The formula for the targeting index of the program is a simple sum of the points of each area 
in each category, the higher the final number, the higher the priority of the area. It is worth 
noticing that the targeting process was not thought out to be applied from the beginning of the 
program, but to “determine the order of enrollment of landowners in situations where demand 
outpaces the supply of available funds for incentives, a situation Ecuador experienced for the 
first time in 2012” (Holland et al., 2014, p. 31). 
 
Another relevant aspect related to the spatial distribution of project activities is the selection of 
areas to be conserved within the enrolled properties. The communities and individual owners 
decide, autonomously, how much and where are located the areas within their properties which 
will be eligible for the benefits of the project, as illustrated in figure 7 below. Areas defined as 
“under conservation” cannot be deforested, or payments may be suspended. Areas defined as 
“not under conservation” may be deforested with no consequence for payments. The selection 
of the area “under conservation” will determine the total amount of direct cash transfers 
received by the community or individual, as it will be further detailed below. 
 
Figure 7 – Hypothetical illustration of conservation area self-selection by communities 
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Individual landowners and communities that wish to participate in the program must present a 
series of documents for the enrollment process. The most relevant are official land titles, to 
prove formal ownership or tenure rights over the areas, and sketches (croquis) showing exactly 
which areas of the property or community will be accounted for the payments48. Communities 
also have to show minutes of the approval of the application by the collective representation 
body of the community. If all the documents are approved, the areas are considered as pre-
selected. Afterward, MAE’s staff performs a field verification process, to confirm vegetation 
cover and the geographical limits of the areas for final selection (MAE, 2012c). 
 
Socio Bosque relates to their beneficiaries and organizes their participation in the program 
through two main documents: conservation agreements and investment plans. Conservation 
agreements are “a transparent, voluntary, and participatory alliance, in which the owners or 
administrators of a resource agree to protect the natural value of an area in exchange for direct, 
ongoing, and structured economic incentives” (de Koning et al., 2011). The conservation 
agreements specify provisions such as the area under conservation in a community or property, 
the obligations of the government, the conditions to be complied by the beneficiaries, the 
duration of the agreement, the financial amount the beneficiaries will receive and the conditions 
for suspension and termination of the agreement. In Ecuador, conservation agreements had 
                                                          
48 For official enrolment after the application’s approval, a georeferenced map must be presented. The full list 
of required documents can be found at MAE (2012c). 
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been successfully used at the Gran Reserva Chachi49 project, and Socio Bosque’s experience 
was later also replicated at the Programa Bosques in Peru, as we will see below. Agreements 
are signed for a 20 year period and can be renewed for another 20 years, without limit for 
renewals (MAE, 2009). 
 
Investment plans detail how beneficiaries are planning to use the money transferred from the 
program to carry out productive projects that can bring welfare improvements for their 
populations. Individual owners have more leeway to define how the money of the incentives is 
used, with participants having to fill a simple form how they plan to use the resources (MAE, 
2013b), usually referring to the acquisition of assets to the households, payment of debts, 
investments or savings, family consumption or conservation activities (MAE, 2016c). 
Communities, on the other hand, must prepare their plans through a participatory process 
within the community and approve them in an assembly (MAE, 2013b). Communities have 
chosen to use the incentive money mostly to foster economic development, infrastructure and 
conservation and territorial consolidation activities (MAE, 2016a). The stated rationale behind 
requesting investment plans is that they allow for more transparent decision-making procedures 
and increase the sharing of information within the communities (de Koning et al., 2011), 
reducing the possibility of misuse of the incentives by the community leaderships, as they have 
to be approved by community assemblies and strictly followed during implementation. 
 
The project’s operational manual lists 15 conditions that have to be fulfilled by the beneficiaries 
of the program. They refer to conservation (avoid deforestation and fires, and refrain from 
unsustainable economic activities and land use change) and administrative conditions50 that 
have to be accomplished. If they are not fulfilled, the sanctions may vary from a temporary 
suspension of payments to the termination of the conservation agreements (MAE, 2012c).  
 
After being accepted, individual properties and communities will receive payments if 
conditions are fulfilled. Socio Bosque’s operational manual (MAE, 2012c)  defines a 
differentiated payment system based on the size of the area defined by communities and 
                                                          
49 The Gran Reserva Chachi project, initiated in 2005, was an agreement between three community centers of 
the Chachi people and Conservation International to promote the conservation of 7200 ha of tropical humid 
forest, based on the payments for each conserved hectare, conditional to compliance (de Koning et al., 2011). 
For more information on the Gran Reserva Chachi project, see (GTZ, 2010) 
50 The full list of conditionalities can be found at MAE (2012c). 
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individuals as under conservation. It consists of six incentive level categories as illustrated in 
table 6 below. 
 
The initial idea was to provide fixed payments of US$ 20 per hectare per year, but the team 
soon realized that fixed payments would provide too little money for many individual 
participants and too much for some communities. For that reason, the area-based payment 
differentiation was devised (Interview 5). As it can be seen in the first quarter of table 6, the 
initial rules of the project differentiated payments by property size only. The current payment 
structure, established in 2011 (MAE, 2011b), adds a differentiation between individual and 
collective lands, and between páramos and other vegetation types, as well as adding a special 
category for properties under 20ha, who receive US$ 60 per hectare. The new structure 
increased per hectare payments for communities and kept original values for individual 
landowners, except in the under 20ha new category (MAE, 2009; MAE, 2011b)  
 
Table 6 – Payment calculation examples for Socio Bosque, under the previous and current 
payment structure  
 
All properties in all land types (pre-2011 
structure) 
For 450 ha under conservation: 
(50x30) + (50x20) + (350x10) = US$ 6,000 per year  
 
Category 
Area under 
conservation 
(ha) 
Payment value 
(US$/ha/year) 
1 1 – 50 $ 30 
2 51 – 100 $ 20 
3 101 – 500 $ 10 
4 501 – 5,000 $ 5 
5 5,001 – 10,000 $ 2 
6 10,001 or larger $ 0.5 
Community properties in forest lands 
(current structure) 
For 450 ha under conservation: 
(50x35) + (50x23) + (350x13) = US$ 7,450 per year  
 
Category 
Area under 
conservation 
(ha) 
Payment value 
(US$/ha/year) 
1 1 – 50 $ 35 
2 51 – 100 $ 22 
3 101 – 500 $ 13 
4 501 – 5,000 $ 6 
5 5,001 – 10,000 $ 3 
6 10,001 or larger $ 0.7 
Individual properties in forest lands 
(current structure) 
For 450 ha under conservation: 
(50x30) + (50x20) + (350x10) = US$ 6,000 per year  
Category 
Area under 
conservation 
(ha) 
Payment value 
(US$/ha/year) 
1 1 – 50 $ 30 
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Sources: (MAE, 2009; MAE, 2012c) 
 
There was no established forest monitoring strategy for Socio Bosque at the beginning of the 
program, and its system has been developed concomitantly with the start of project activities, 
with its implementation starting in 2010 and the preparation of a monitoring methodology 
manual in 2011 (MAE, 2011). The main objective of the system is to verify forest cover, and 
therefore environmental conditionality compliance, in the enrolled areas. The program uses an 
area-specific baseline, prepared before the signing of the Conservation Agreement, and 
evaluates the current state of the forest cover through the analysis of satellite and photographic 
images, in situ verification of the areas, and other methods according to appropriateness and 
availability. The frequency of monitoring is determined by the estimates of deforestation 
pressures in the specific areas (MAE, 2011). In the latest monitoring report available (MAE, 
2015c), field verifications were done in 729 enrolled areas (out of a total of over 2500 
agreements), of which 70.5% were approved, 22.9% approved with observations and 6.6% not 
approved. The non-compliance cases were, at the time of the report, being analyzed for the 
application of the appropriate sanctioning mechanism. 
 
The system also aims at identifying threats to the areas as a basis for preventive action. 
Additionally, the program intends to build capacities for participatory control and vigilance in 
the areas (MAE, 2011). The methodology manual also foresees the possibility of adaptations 
as further technological, administrative and financial resources become available. Finally, 
related to the monitoring activities in the context of Socio Bosque, MAE also aimed to prepare 
a historical deforestation map of Ecuador and the national forests evaluation, with the objective 
of obtaining historical data on the dynamics of the deforestation processes in Ecuador, and 
2 51 – 100 $ 20 
3 101 – 500 $ 10 
4 501 – 5,000 $ 5 
5 5,001 – 10,000 $ 2 
6 10,001 or larger $ 0.5 
Community properties in páramos (current 
structure) 
For 450 ha under conservation: 
(50x60) + (50x40) + (350x20) = US$ 12,000 per year  
 
Category 
Area under 
conservation 
(ha) 
Payment value 
(US$/ha/year) 
1 1 – 50 $ 60 
2 51 – 100 $ 40 
3 101 – 900 $ 20 
4 901 – 3,000 $ 10 
5 3,001 – 10,000 $ 4 
6 10,001 or larger $ 1 
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provide updated information on the state of the country’s forests, respectively (MAE, 2011). 
Both aims were reached; in 2012 and 2015, respectively (MAE, 2012b; MAE, 2014d; MAE, 
2015a). Administrative conditionalities are verified by the evaluation of compliance reports 
prepared by the participants. Participants must report the implementation of the investment 
plans twice a year, in templates provided by the program. The program’s team may check the 
veracity of the information in field visits (MAE, 2012c).  
 
The perceived success of Socio Bosque (see Chapter VIII) has triggered the expansion of the 
program beyond its original scope. In 2013, MAE published an agreement that framed Socio 
Bosque as a national program of incentives for conservation and sustainable use of the natural 
heritage (MAE, 2013a). The program has, in 2014, added mangroves to its conservation 
component (MAE, 2014c) and introduced components (capítulos) for the implementation of 
biocommerce (biocomercio), forest restoration (MAE, 2014a) and forest management (MAE, 
2014b) activities. Those components, however, will not be covered in this dissertation, as their 
introduction happened after the field visit and the interviews did not cover aspects related to 
their adoption and design. 
 
As of November 2015, Socio Bosque had enrolled 2,775 areas, with a total of 1,489,542 
hectares (MAE, 2016b). Out of that total, 190 agreements were done with communities and the 
remainder with individual owners. The enrolled area of enrolled communities, however, 
corresponds to 88% of the total. The program reaches 187,634 beneficiaries, 86% of which in 
communities and disbursed a total of US$ 12,468,713.43 in 2015, 84.8% of which directly used 
for the payment of incentives (MAE, 2015b). 
 
2. Programa Bosques – Peru 
 
Officially established in July 2010, Programa Bosques has as its overarching aim to contribute 
to the conservation of tropical forests and to generate income for vulnerable and poor 
populations in Peru. The program’s general objective is to conserve 54 million hectares of 
tropical forests, as a contribution to climate change mitigation and sustainable development. 
Its specific objectives are to develop sustainable, forest-based production systems to generate 
additional income for poor populations; to identify and map areas for forest conservation; and 
to strengthen the capacities of regional and local governments, as well as communities, for 
forest conservation activities (MINAM, 2013).  
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The core of the program’s implementation is performed by a program management unit within 
Peru’s Ministry of the Environment (MINAM). In addition, the program also established 
agreements with regional governments, the Interior and Public Ministries as well as with the 
country’s Protected Areas Service (SERNANP) to strengthen the program’s capacity to combat 
environmental illegalities. Finally, the program also has partnerships with a series of 
international organizations, including the GIZ, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (MINAM, 
2016). The budget for the program in 2016 is of close to US$ 6.975 million, i.e. 33.8% for the 
payment of incentives, 10.6% for conservation monitoring, and 25.2% for program 
administration (PNCB, 2016). 
  
Similar to Socio Bosque, Programa Bosques provides payments conditional to environmental 
and administrative conditions (more on the Programa Bosques’ payments system and 
conditionalities below). Participation is also voluntary and participants also must sign 
conservation agreements and prepare investment plans as prerequisites for enrollment. Unlike 
Socio Bosque, however, the scope of Programa Bosques is limited to communities, with 
individual landowners not eligible to participate. While Socio Bosque focuses on a variety of 
ecosystems, Programa Bosques is solely focused on the Amazon forests and tropical dry forests 
of Peru (MINAM, 2013). 
 
The targeting process at Programa Bosques, named focalization (focalización), is divided into 
two steps. The first is the selection of which provinces are the priorities for conservation 
(focalización de províncias). Three criteria are considered at this stage, a) the total area of 
primary forests, b) deforestation rates and c) poverty incidence rate. The second is the selection 
of which communities should take priority in participating in the program (focalización de 
comunidades nativas). The indicators used in this phase are a) the total area of primary forests, 
b) percentage of conserved primary forests and c) closeness to access alternatives. In addition 
to those variables, the program also aims at involving indigenous organizations in the region 
with the aim of potentially including communities initially not contemplated in the targeting 
process (MINAM, 2011).  
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It is also worth noticing that the enrollment of communities is subject to the signing of 
cooperation agreements with regional governments, achieved alongside the implementation of 
the program (Interview 16). Communities located in regions without a cooperation agreement 
could initially not be enrolled, thus reducing the possible application of the targeting strategy. 
 
Also following the lines established in Socio Bosque, the communities enrolled in Programa 
Bosques also define themselves which parts of their lands will be considered for conservation, 
and which areas will not, in a process named zoning (zonificación). The zoning process is 
performed after the completion of the enrollment process (see below). Initially, the Programa 
Bosques’ team provides the communities with maps and satellite images of the community 
areas, and assists the community members in the identification and demarcation of the zones 
enrolled for conservation. The size of the selected area within the total area of the community 
will, thus, determine the total amount of direct cash transfers received by the community, like 
in Socio Bosque. The managing committee of the community then receives training to 
independently read and understand maps and basic satellite imagery and, finally, a conservation 
map with the area demarcated for conservation must be approved by the community assembly 
(MINAM, 2011). 
 
After the identification of a community, the enrollment process also involves two parts. The 
first is a series of workshops with local authorities and communities, to disseminate 
information on what participation in the program consists. A community assembly must, then, 
approve the participation of the community in the program. Concomitantly, the community 
must present the legal documents required for enrollment. Those documents include the land 
tenure rights title and the minutes of the meeting of the community assembly that approved 
participation51 (MINAM, 2011).  
 
Programa Bosques also has Conservation Agreements and Investment Plans as the basic 
documents relating the program to its beneficiaries. After enrollment and zoning, the 
community proceeds to the elaboration of the Investment Plan. The plans are to be drafted 
based on decisions taken by the communities, with the support of project design specialists to 
work with the community in the plan’s creation. The construction of the plan is done through 
workshops in which the communities’ management committees and the specialists identify 
                                                          
51 The complete list of documents can be found at MINAM (2011). 
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priority actions and potential project areas, in accordance with the communities’ intentions 
(MINAM, 2011). The specialists, in addition to helping with the technical specifications, also 
provide suggestions, i.e., for the community to match the intended productive activities with 
the potential for production and market access of products in the specific localities of the 
communities (Interview 15). After the draft of the plan is ready, it must be approved by the 
community assembly. 
 
With the conservation maps, the investment plans and the minutes stating community assembly 
approval, the communities may the sign their Conservation Agreements. In Programa Bosques, 
Conservation Agreements are also the documents that establish the obligations of the 
government and the conditions to be fulfilled by the participants. The duration of the 
agreements is 5 years, with an annual ratification based on the fulfillment of conditionalities.  
  
One important difference between the provisions of Programa Bosques and those of Socio 
Bosque is the payment structure. While the Ecuadorian program has an area- and beneficiary 
type-based payment differentiation, the Programa Bosques has an undifferentiated area-based 
method. The Peruvian program provides 10 Soles (approximately US$ 3 in May 2016) per 
hectare of enrolled area per year, irrespective of the total size of land enrolled. As stated above, 
the payments must be used for the implementation of sustainable productive activities (called 
by the program Public Investment Projects), in accordance to the Investment Plans, with the 
aim of contributing to poverty reduction in the communities (MINAM, 2013). One of the 
program’s components has been established to assist with the preparation of the plans and the 
actual implementation of the foreseen activities, providing technical assistance during 
implementation and follow-up (MINAM, 2011). 
 
Conditionalities in Programa Bosques are also based on environmental and administrative 
requirements and are more loosely defined than in Socio Bosque. Environmental conditions 
are the avoidance of deforestation in the areas to be conserved and the absence of illegal logging 
and illegal crops in the whole community area. Investment plan-related conditions involve 
checking the implementation of planned activities, financial accountability and community 
evaluation of activities (MINAM, 2011)52. To assist communities in ensuring the conservation 
                                                          
52 The full list of conditionalities can be found at MINAM (2011). 
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of their forests, the program includes a component of capacity development for forest 
conservation (MINAM, 2013).   
 
Peru did not have, at the start of the program, a complete and updated baseline of the state of 
the country’s forests. For that reason, Programa Bosques had to identify the physical and 
biological state of participating areas during implementation. The program aims at providing a 
diagnosis of the state of the tropical forests of the country and the threats to them, as well as 
socioeconomic, demographic and cultural aspects of the populations that can be enrolled in the 
program. Georeferenced baselines for monitoring each enrolled community have been 
developed, based on satellite images and field verification (Interview 17). The program also 
aims at evaluating the program, understanding its management results and impacts at the 
national, regional and local levels. It intends to carry out periodic evaluations of the state of 
natural resources and evaluate socioeconomic impacts in intervention areas (MINAM, 2013). 
 
Programa Bosques has an implementation horizon of 10 years, after which a general evaluation 
of the program will be performed. Currently, the management of the program is attempting to 
ensure an extension of the implementation horizon of the program (Interview 20). As of 
December 2015, 75 communities had participated in the program, with 5,941 families receiving 
benefits and 723,475 hectares enrolled (MINAM, 2015). 
3. SISA – Acre  
 
The Sistema de Incentivos a Serviços Ambientais (System of Incentives for Environmental 
Services – SISA) differs sharply from the other two programs in its format. It was created in 
2010 by the state of Acre in Brazil. Instead of being a payments-providing program with 
specific activities, similar to Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques, SISA organizes the 
financing and implementation of ecosystem service-related programs and projects in the state 
of Acre (see Figure 8). As it will be explained in further detail in the next chapter, SISA built 
upon the experience with previous policies within the state, such as the Ecological–Economic 
Zoning (ZEE) and the Valuation of Forest and Environmental Assets Policy (Duchelle et al., 
2014b). The program’s overarching objective is the conservation and enhancement of 
environmental services in the state (Acre, 2010a). 
  
Figure 8 – Institutional Arrangements of SISA 
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Source: IMC (2015), translated by the author 
 
The core institution of SISA is the Institute for Climate Change and Regulation of 
Environmental Services (IMC). The Institute is responsible for the overall coordination of the 
program, refining norms, defining strategies, overseeing monitoring, evaluation activities, and 
the accomplishment of policy objectives. It is also responsible for approving methodologies 
and registering projects and other activities to be implemented within the SISA framework. 
With the support of SISA’s Scientific Committee, it is also responsible for carrying out 
inventories and estimates of environmental services provision and conservation. The institute 
is an autarchy within the state’s organizational structure but it is connected to the Science and 
Technology secretariat.  
 
Another core institution established by SISA is the Commission for Validation and 
Accompaniment (CEVA). CEVA is SISA’s main link to the civil society, aiming to ensure 
transparency and social control of projects and activities carried out within the SISA 
framework, by analyzing and approving norms and other documents presented by the IMC. 
CEVA is composed of 8 members, 4 stemming from the civil society and 4 from the 
government. CEVA receives input from a “Collegiate of Councils”, which brings together 
representatives from three thematic councils (environment, science and technology; forests; 
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rural and forest sustainable development); from the Indigenous Working Group, responsible 
for representing Acre’s indigenous populations in the SISA structure; and from Acre’s 
government’s Ombudsman, who is responsible for receiving complaints from citizens and 
institutions regarding the implementation of SISA (Acre, 2013). 
 
The third core institution of Acre, and arguably the most innovative in SISA’s structure, is the 
Company for the Development of Environmental Services (CDSA). CDSA’s main functions 
are to raise funds for activities within the SISA and head the interaction with potential private 
project implementers (Interview 35). Such function entails more than going after potential 
donors, but also being the executive agency of projects and placing SISA’s activities within 
potential markets for environmental services, managing and marketing potential credits 
generated by SISA’s initiatives. CDSA is also responsible for managing Acre’s Forest Fund, 
which aims at concentrating financial resources for forest-related policies in the state (Acre, 
2013). CDSA is defined as a public company (empresa pública), regulated by private law, 
having more legal flexibility to do business than public agencies. 
 
Legal advice on the SISA is provided by the State Attorney General’s Office (PGE), which 
also participates in CEVA and hosts SISA’s ombudsman. In addition to the structure described 
above, SISA entered a multitude of agreements with partners ranging from local NGOs, to 
federal government agencies to international organizations to support SISA’s activities. 
 
As stated above, SISA is a general institutional framework for the support and execution of 
activities on the conservation and generation of environmental services. Since its enactment, it 
has supported already existing activities carried out by the government, such as the 
aforementioned ZEE and Valuation policies (Duchelle et al., 2014b). It will also provide 
support for activities implemented by non-governmental and private institutions in the state. 
SISA will be ultimately composed of a series of thematic programs, focused on priority areas, 
namely water resources conservation, sociobiodiversity conservation, carbon and climate 
regulation, the valorization of traditional knowledge, and soil conservation and improvement. 
Each of those areas will be covered by a program, composed of subprograms and projects, to 
be detailed in accordance with future developments in the state’s policies (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9 – SISA Implementation Structure 
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The program related to reducing greenhouse gasses (GHG) emissions from deforestation and 
degradation within the planned SISA structure, named ISA-Carbono, was the first to be created 
and is currently the one undergoing the initial stages of implementation.  
 
SISA intends to generate tradable carbon credits as one of the means to finance its execution. 
IMC and the Markit Environmental Registry will be responsible for a system that will register 
emissions reductions resulting from both individual projects and state policies implemented 
within the context of SISA. Acre intends to validate their emission reductions through the 
application of independent auditors such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and the 
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) (WWF, 2013). 
  
Monitoring activities within the SISA framework will be carried out by the Central 
Geoprocessing and Remote Sensing Unit (UCEGEO), which, with the support of SISA, intends 
to “monitor deforestation occurring at a smaller scale than the Brazilian national monitoring 
institution, the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), can detect […] particularly 
important in Acre, where most deforestation occurs at a small scale.” (Duchelle et al., 2014b, 
p. 36).  
 
Acre is among the smallest and poorest states in Brazil, so raising funds for conservation 
activities in the state has been one of the motivations and is one of the main concerns of SISA. 
The first funding source achieved within the context of SISA came from the KfW, within the 
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context of their REDD+ supporting funds53. As an example of how the funds raised by the 
program will be used, SISA has agreed with KfW that 70% of the resources must be directly 
provided to beneficiaries and that the remaining 30% may be used for project’s structuring 
activities (Duchelle et al., 2014b). The program has decided to use the beneficiary-related 
resources to further finance the rubber-tapper subsidy program (for more on this program see 
Sills and Saha (2010)) and to the productive restructuring of properties activities. The 
remaining resources will be applied to human resources, structuring the registry system, 
auditing requirements and beneficiary capacity-building (CEVA, 2013). 
 
  
                                                          
53 More on SISA’s integration with the REDD+ debate in chapter VII. 
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VI. Why were upscaled incentive programs for forest conservation adopted? 
Comparing policy choices in Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru 
 
This chapter aims at analyzing the determinants of the adoption of the three incentive-based 
forest conservation policies studied by this dissertation. The analysis is based on the Multiple 
Streams Framework outlined in Chapter II. A summary of the findings can be found in Table 
7 at the end of this chapter. Further aspects of the analysis of the policy adoption process will 
be espoused in Chapter VIII. 
 
This chapter is the main analytical part of a paper published by the author in 2015 at the 
Ecosystem Services journal, as Rosa da Conceição et al. (2015). 
 
1. Socio Bosque – Ecuador 
 
1.1 - Problem Stream 
 
By the time of Socio Bosque’s design, there was no countrywide assessment of the country’s 
deforestation rates. Guestimates were based on FAO data and punctual studies, many of which 
revealed alarming deforestation hotspots (Interview 12). That, however, was enough to 
convince president Correa of the importance of combating deforestation (Interview 12). More 
recent estimates from the Ecuadorian government place deforestation at around 77.000 hectares 
per year (MAE, 2012a), driven mostly by commercial agriculture and cattle ranching. The 
current national development strategy (Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir - PNBV) targets a 30% 
reduction in deforestation. Poverty rates are high in rural areas of the country (around 52%) 
especially in the Amazon region where indigenous populations are the poorest ethnic group 
(Mideros, 2012). The government perceived poverty as an indirect driver of deforestation in 
Ecuador. 
 
The respondents did not identify specific events which were directly influential in the creation 
of Socio Bosque, but a new force for environmental action in the country can be traced back to 
the new constitution adopted in 2008, which legally acknowledges ‘nature’s rights’ and 
incorporates the concept of ‘good living’ (Buen Vivir), which can be broadly understood as a 
harmonious living with other people and nature. The government promoted policies that could 
accomplish the aim set in the PNBV. Command-and-control policies, especially their 
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monitoring, were perceived as ineffective and hard to implement in the country, mainly because 
government institutions were weak (Interview 12). Concomitantly, several small scale 
incentive-based initiatives were being implemented in Ecuador. Notably relevant for Socio 
Bosque was the Gran Reserva Chachi program, carried out by Conservation International and 
the German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The Chachi program and was built 
around PES-type conservation agreements (GTZ, 2010), which also became one of the pillars 
of Socio Bosque (Interviews 5, 8, 12). 
 
1.2 - Politics Stream 
 
The perception among respondents in Ecuador was that environmental issues were not of high 
priority for voters and that social welfare policies for sparsely populated areas were, albeit 
higher in the agenda, still a diffuse interest. There was, therefore, no substantial perception of 
pressure from the general public opinion to create Socio Bosque. The decision-making and 
design processes were, like in Peru as it will be seen in section 2.2, made within the executive, 
with no debates in Congress. The program’s legal basis is a ministerial agreement, which does 
not require congressional approval, nor public debate involving political parties. The 
respondents also did not identify pressure from local NGOs for the creation of the program but 
they were, from the outset, very critical of the non-participatory character of the program’s 
design. Conservation International has, however, lobbied within the government for the 
creation of the program (Interview 13).  
 
Under Correa, it has become more common that new policy proposals come directly from the 
president’s office. That was the case with Socio Bosque, which was motivated by a direct 
demand from the president, who wanted an incentive-based response to deforestation 
(Interviews 5, 6, 12). The current Ecuadorian government has promoted the use of incentive-
based policies, not only for environmental themes but in all areas of government policy making 
(Interviews 5, 12). The strong role of the executive also helps explain the quickness in program 
design. The request from the president was made in March 2008, and the project agreement 
was signed in November 2008. There was no formal deadline for the design to be completed, 
but respondents mentioned a general understanding that direct requests from the president 
should be completed as soon as possible, due to Correa’s philosophy of quick changes54  
                                                          
54 The government’s motto is Revolución Ciudadana, the Citizen’s Revolution. 
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(Interviews 5, 8, 12). Thus, relatively little new research was conducted to base the design 
process, which used the scarce, already available information on the state of the Ecuadorian 
forests and design aspects of the Chachi program. Participation was also limited, as it could 
greatly enlarge the time span of the design process55. 
 
1.3 - Policy Stream, Policy Window, and Entrepreneur 
 
As stated above, Ecuador lacked technical means and institutional structures to effectively 
implement command-and-control policies in its forests. The president and Socio Bosque’s 
design team believed that incentive-based policies had a higher chance of presenting fewer 
technical hindrances to successful implementation, due to the perceived success of small-scale 
schemes in the country, such as the Chachi program and to the exchange of experiences with 
other countries (Mexico and Costa Rica). Value acceptability within the government was not 
an issue in the Ecuadorian case, as the program’s creation was a direct demand of the president. 
The creation of Socio Bosque was congruent with the sustainability discourse that permeated 
the new administration and was also present in other major government initiatives, such as the 
new constitution, which was approved concomitantly with Socio Bosque’s proposal. The 
influence of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs has not been often mentioned, but a key 
respondent hinted at some possible relation, stating that the initial idea was to have a “type of 
forest Bono”, in reference to the country’s Bono de Desarollo Humano CCT program 
(Interview 5). Interview partners generally agreed that President Correa was the key policy 
actor in this process. 
 
The adoption of a nationwide conservation program in Ecuador was, thus, driven by a direct 
request from the presidency, due to a perceived need to reduce deforestation rates in the 
country, seen as alarming according to the scarce data then available. The specific choice of an 
incentive-based program was motivated by the interest of the government in extending its 
social policy network to forested areas through a direct cash transfer program, by the 
executive’s preference for incentive-based public policies and the existence of previous 
experiences with incentive-based conservation programs in the country, such as the Chachi 
project. The decision process was entirely done within the executive, without formal 
discussions in the congress or with the civil society. 
                                                          
55 A detailed analysis of the design process will be provided in the next chapter. 
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2. Programa Bosques – Peru 
 
2.1 - Problem Stream 
 
The main direct drivers of deforestation in Peru are agricultural expansion and cattle ranching 
(Zelli et al., 2014). The main indirect drivers are the population growth in forested regions, an 
increase in the demand for products that can be cultivated in forest areas, government support 
for business sectors that push the agricultural frontier, and institutional and legal weaknesses. 
Poverty rates are high in forest areas (37% in 2010), albeit lower than in the mountain regions 
(Che Piu and Menton, 2013). 
 
Peru has only created an environment ministry in 2008. Previous forest conservation policies, 
carried out by the National Environmental Council (CONAM) and the National Institute of 
Natural Resources, were mostly command-and-control measures aimed at protecting wildlife 
and containing illegal deforestation. Policies were perceived as having limited effectiveness 
since both institutions lacked ministerial powers and political clout.  
 
The movement towards strengthening the environment sector in Peru was boosted with the 
creation of MINAM in 2008. Before the creation of the ministry, general environmental 
responsibilities in the country were held by CONAM, while the mandate on forests and water 
was held by the Agriculture Ministry (MINAG). The process of negotiation for the creation of 
the ministry and the definition of mandates on forest areas was complex and, in the end, it was 
decided that the MINAM would have a mandate on protected areas, but that the national forest 
authority would remain at MINAG. Recollecting on this process, one key respondent stated 
that this development showed the low priority given by the government to environment issues 
and exemplified the challenges faced by the newly created MINAM (Interview 23)  
 
The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed between Peru and the United States in 2007 was cited 
(Interviews 21, 23, 24) as one of the triggers for forest sector reforms, e.g. vis-à-vis timber 
trade and command-and-control policies (OUSTR, 2006). The government promulgated a 
series of decrees that regulated the agreement. Indigenous leaders perceived those as opening 
up the Amazon region to the exploration of natural resources by foreign interests (Melendez 
and Leon, 2010) and opposed the decrees, by roadblocks and occupations around the Amazon 
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in  2008. On July 5th, 2009, protestors and police forces clashed near the city of Bagua, leaving 
33 people dead and 200 wounded (Melendez and Leon, 2010). The violent conflict, known in 
Peru as Baguazo, caused changes in the cabinet and, especially relevant to the adoption of 
Programa Bosques a necessity to appease the relations with indigenous groups (Interviews 21, 
23). 
 
The strengthened Peruvian participation in international climate negotiations, with the aim of 
attracting attention and potential financial sources for environmental policies, was also a 
noteworthy factor for the creation of Programa Bosques. The MINAM team concluded that 
forest conservation had the largest potential, and offered during the UNFCCC’s 14th COP in 
December 2008 to commit to conserving 54 million hectares of forests, as a Peruvian 
contribution to the international climate change mitigation efforts. Peru’s COP 14 commitment 
triggered the beginning of the design process of Programa Bosques (Interview 23). 
 
2.2 - Politics Stream 
 
In Peru, like in most of Latin America, the environment is perceived as a low-priority issue by 
voters. In the case of Programa Bosques, it was not different; none of our respondents 
identified public environmental concerns as a central factor in its creation. Social welfare 
programs, on the other hand, are perceived as very relevant to public opinion and to the political 
acceptance of governments by benefited populations (Layton and Smith, 2015). The strain in 
government’s relations with indigenous people favored the idea of fostering a program that 
could provide direct cash transfers to indigenous communities. This was a major driver for the 
approval of the Bosques program, especially by the Ministry of Finance (Interviews 23, 24). 
 
Peruvian environmental policy-making, including Programa Bosques, is largely concentrated 
within the executive. The program’s legal basis was, like in Ecuador, built through presidential 
and ministerial decrees, which are not subject to legislative processes. The program was thus 
not discussed in Congress, and party politics played no direct role, nor did local and provincial 
governments. There was also no pressure for the creation of an incentive-based program 
emanating from local NGOs (Interviews 23, 24). NGOs called for stronger policies towards 
forest conservation and welfare of forest populations and were highly involved in the 
indigenous protest movement, but not in the creation of Bosques itself. Hence, they were highly 
critical of the executive-dominated, non-participatory fashion of the program’s design.  
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The structure of Peruvian policy making and the negotiation processes between ministries had 
a major influence in the Bosques Program, especially the influence of MEF and, to a smaller 
extent, MINAG. The discussion on the program within the Council of Ministers lasted 
throughout most of 2009. MEF, which ultimately decides on the allocation of budgets in Peru56, 
was not convinced of the importance of a ‘pure’ conservation program and pleaded for some 
type of direct economic returns arising from it. MINAG initially contested the idea of the 
program, saying that it could represent a barrier to the expansion of the country’s agricultural 
frontier (Interview 23). There was also a conceptual conflict since the MINAG had an approach 
that favored forest management aimed at economic gains from timber products (Interviews 20, 
23). However, after the Baguazo, both MEF and MINAG recognized the importance of 
improving the relations with the Amazon indigenous groups. The idea of providing conditional, 
direct cash transfers to indigenous communities became attractive to both ministries, which 
agreed to the creation of a conservation-aimed program, if it was designed with a poverty 
reduction component and, at least initially, a strong focus on legally recognized indigenous 
territories (Interview 23).  
 
2.3 - Policy Stream 
 
Despite the recent existence of the ministry and the perceived low of capacity of the 
government institutions to generate reliable indicators, enforce current policies, and provide 
reliable monitoring, the exchange of experiences between the MINAM-based program design 
team and other Latin American countries where national incentive based schemes were being 
implemented, such as Costa Rica, Mexico and Ecuador, led the Peruvian government to believe 
that a similar scheme could also be technically feasible in the country (Interview 23). The 
Ecuadorian experience was especially relevant, influencing Programa Bosques to adopt 
conservation agreements, investment plans, and other similar features. As stated previously, 
key respondents mentioned that the MEF and the MINAG staff involved in the negotiations for 
the creation of the Bosques program did not have forest conservation as a core value, so the 
introduction of a cash transfer component made the program more acceptable to their agencies.  
                                                          
56 Indeed, it is common in Latin America that the Finance Ministry has a disproportional influence on policy 
decisions. As stated by the IDB (2006, p. 64), “An important feature of Latin American cabinets has been the 
central role of the finance ministry […] The finance ministry has dominated the budget process and been able 
to prioritize its goals on the presidential agenda. Thus it has been in a privileged position in respect to other 
ministries” 
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Another governmental policy that relates to the creation of Programa Bosques was the 
existence, since 2005, of the Programa Juntos CCT program. Juntos pays 100 Soles per month 
to families for the compliance with health and education-related conditionalities. The program 
was perceived as successful in poverty reduction efforts in the Andes region, and ‘inspired’ the 
idea of conditional transfers for indigenous peoples, with conservation as the condition. In the 
initial drafts, the Programa Bosques was even called Conservando Juntos (Interview 15)57.  
 
2.4 - Policy Window and Entrepreneur 
 
Respondents (Interviews 20, 22, 23) identified that the policy window for the creation of 
Programa Bosques was opened after the signing of the forests annex of the FTA, which played 
an important role in focusing government’s attention towards the forest sector, which was 
strengthened by the creation of the environment ministry. The policy entrepreneur for the 
Bosques program was the environment minister Antonio Brack. He was already a famous 
environmentalist, who ran a TV show about the environment, and was a respected biologist. 
Before being invited to become the minister, he had no relations with the president or presence 
in the country’s political arena. Brack led the formation of the team that designed the program 
and the negotiations within the Council of Ministers that ultimately led to the program’s 
approval (Interview 24). 
 
Therefore, the adoption of Programa Bosques was rooted in the increase in deforestation in the 
country, in the high poverty rates in the country’s forest areas and by the recent creation of the 
Environment Ministry. The approval of the program by non-environmental agencies in the 
Council of Ministers was motivated by the interest in improving the relations between the 
government and indigenous peoples of Peruvian Amazon following the Baguazo. Bosques was 
also perceived as a way to extend the country’s direct monetary transfers policies to indigenous 
communities, as part of the effort to mend relations with them, while concomitantly introducing 
a large-scale conservation program. Additionally, the newly created Ministry of the 
Environment wished to strengthen Peru’s role in international climate negotiations and 
understood that the country’s main contribution would come from forest conservation 
activities, and pledged an increase in conserved areas in the country. Like in Ecuador, the 
                                                          
57 Further discussion on the role of CCTs can be found in chapter VII, section 4.1 and chapter VIII, section 1. 
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decision-making process occurred exclusively within the executive, with no legislative debate 
and negligible participation from the civil society. 
 
3. SISA – Acre 
 
3.1 - Problem Stream 
 
Most of the deforestation in the state occurs in small-scale settlement areas along roads in the 
southern, more populated part of the state (Acre, 2010b). Currently, around 12% of the state’s 
original full forest cover has been lost to deforestation (Acre, 2011), and around 80% of the 
deforested area is currently occupied by cattle ranching (Acre, 2010b). Despite recent 
improvements, Acre is still one of the poorest states in Brazil, with 20.8% of its population 
living in extreme poverty in 2008 (IPEA, 2010).  
 
No specific event was identified as especially relevant for the creation of SISA. As opposed to 
the Peruvian and Ecuadorian cases, where incentive-based conservation was a novelty in the 
government’s public policy toolbox, the government of Acre has been an early adopter of 
integrated environmental and development policies. Starting with the creation of multiple-use 
reserves in the state by the federal government, the state’s government has implemented 
activities that attempt to foster environmentally sustainable activities by actors involved with 
forest areas, such as a minimum price for native rubber, the Valorization of the Environmental 
Assets and the Certification of the Family Rural Property for smallholders. SISA was created 
to financially and technically consolidate these initiatives, which were perceived by many 
respondents as being effective and in need for further strengthening and expansion (Interviews 
28, 29, 34, 35, 37).  
 
3.2 - Politics Stream 
 
There was no perception of pressure from the public opinion for the creation of the SISA. There 
is, however, a perception that environmental policies tend to be historically well-received by 
the electorate (Interview 28). Repeated re-elections of the ruling party show longstanding 
support from the population, despite a few tight races such as in the 2010 elections.  
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SISA was approved as a state law in October 2010. The proposal originated at the executive 
and, like previous environmental laws, passed without much opposition (17 votes in favor and 
2 against (Acre, 2012)). NGOs had a strong participation in the design process of SISA. The 
consultation process started in August 2009 and received 357 recommendations from civil 
society organizations. It sharply reshaped the initial idea of the program, from a project-based 
approach to a structural program, organizing an institutional structure for regulating new 
activities from the government, private sector, and civil society (Acre, 2012)58.  
 
The design process of SISA was different from the ones of Ecuador and Peru, due in part to 
specific characteristics of the administrative structure of Acre. First, as previously mentioned, 
environmental issues in the state are unusually high in the executive’s priorities, greatly 
facilitating the percolation of environment-related proposals within the government 
(Interviews 28, 37). Second, respondents identified cooperation between government agencies 
of different sectors on environmental themes and attributed this (i) to the high importance of 
those themes for the cabinet, and (ii), to the relatively small and stable pool of high-level civil 
servants in the government, making up a decision-making staff comprised of trusted 
participants of the governing team for years, which respondents considered conducive to a 
higher cohesion between them (Interviews 28, 32, 33, 35). Finally, unlike in Peru and Ecuador, 
there was no perceived threat of a closing window of opportunity for SISA, leaving ample 
scope for its proponents to carry on with the design process for how long they deemed 
necessary. The main coordinators of the policy process were long-term allies of the governor 
and occupied high-level political positions (secretários, the state equivalent of a minister).  
 
3.3 - Policy Stream 
 
Acre has been benefiting from deforestation data provided by the national government and 
building upon the existing systems to tailor them to the state’s specific needs. There is also a 
perception from actors inside and outside of the state that Acre has a small, but highly effective 
administration with qualified and committed technical and administrative staff (Interview 33). 
Moreover, the state has accumulated experience in implementing policies that reach out to the 
state’s smallholders and traditional populations. For that reason, there was a widespread 
perception that SISA would be technically feasible and that it can help the state to further 
                                                          
58 More details on the participation process in chapter VII, section 3. 
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strengthen its capacities for environmental research, monitoring and public policy outreach 
(Interviews 28, 35, 40). Finally, as stated above, environmental policies have high value 
acceptability within the government, as they are at the core of the governmental discourse. 
Despite this discourse, deforestation in Acre has remained relatively high also after 1998, both 
in relative and absolute terms.  
 
3.4 - Policy Window and Entrepreneur 
 
It is difficult to identify the opening a specific policy window for the SISA program, as forest 
policies have been continuously implemented in the state for over a decade. Respondents 
identified the increased profile of PES and REDD discussions in the international arena, and 
the ensuing potential for increased financial flows for forest protection policies, as a possible 
new factor for the introduction of the PES project proposal that would later develop in the SISA 
(Interview 28). As for entrepreneurs, there is no clear individual force behind the creation of 
the program, as it has been sponsored by the governor’s cabinet, his main aides and the 
secretários of environment-related agencies.  
 
SISA’s adoption, therefore, built upon the experiences accumulated by Acre in the forest 
conservation sector. Initially thought out to be the state-wide PES program, it morphed into an 
institutional structure created to accommodate all incentive-based forest conservation activities 
in the state, including REDD+. SISA benefited from a more stable and favorable political 
context, in which environmental issues were perceived as high on the government’s agenda, 
and was approved as a state law in the legislative assembly. Crucially, the major changes 
undergone by the program from its inception to the final version were the result of a relatively 
long consultation process, which was open for the state’s civil society, some external 
institutions, and environmental specialists. 
 
4. Summary 
 
All governments perceived deforestation pressures as a concern in their jurisdiction, both with 
consistent data, as in Acre, or with more scattered but convincing evidence, such as in Ecuador. 
All regions also shared high poverty rates in their forested regions and successes in recently 
created or expanded CCT programs. In all three cases, there was also the perception that 
command-and-control policies to reduce deforestation were ineffective. Finally, while in Acre 
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no specific events or major political changes were linked to the introduction of the programs, 
Peru and Ecuador experienced focusing events that influenced the creation of the programs. In 
Peru, disagreement with free-trade agreements with the USA led to protest by indigenous 
peoples, which culminated in violent clashes with government forces, known as the Baguazo. 
The Baguazo worsened relations between indigenous peoples and the government, which 
ultimately approved a proposed incentive-based forest conservation program as a way to 
improve those relations. In Ecuador, the then recently elected Rafael Correa was proposing a 
new constitution, which increased the powers of the executive to promote social policies and 
increased, at least discursively, the importance of environmental issues in the country’s basic 
legislation. Additionally, incentive-based public policies were being promoted in other sectors 
as well. 
 
On the political situation of the countries, respondents in Ecuador and Peru did not consider 
environmental issues a priority among voters and did not see the existence of any pressures 
from the civil society for the specific creation of incentive-based forest conservation programs. 
In Acre, there was wide agreement among respondents that forest conservation was high on the 
agenda of the government, at least in comparison to other jurisdictions, and an understanding 
that the population received environmentally minded policies well. Organized political forces, 
such as political parties or NGOs were absent from the discussion in Peru and Ecuador, as the 
decision-making process happened within the executive. In Acre, the decision to adopt the 
program was voted in the state’s legislative assembly and passed with ease. Civil society was 
consulted during the design process, which will be described in detail in the following chapter. 
In Peru, debates on the program within the Council of Ministers were crucial to shaping 
Programa Bosque’s concept. MEF, who ultimately decides on budget allocations, was not 
strongly convinced of a ‘pure’ conservation program and took a positive stance on Programa 
Bosques only after it introduced the cash transfer and productive activities component. In 
Ecuador, there was not so much discussion on the political feasibility of the program, as the 
request for it came directly from the president’s office. In Acre, the general opinion among 
respondents was that the administrative environment in the state was conducive to the 
mainstreaming of environmental policies in the state. 
 
Consultations with other Latin American countries with active large-scale incentive-based 
policies, as well as smaller-scale initiatives already happening in Ecuador, showed Ecuadorian 
and Peruvian teams that the programs would be technically feasible. In Acre, previous 
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experience with state-wide conservation programs, as well as a wealth of data originated from 
the federal government, confirmed the perception that SISA would be technically feasible. 
Finally, the introduction of environmental provisions in the proposed new constitution, and the 
drive of the new administration for strengthening social policies in general and of incentive-
based policies specifically were the main reason given by respondents for the opening of a 
policy window in Ecuador, where president Correa was identified as the policy entrepreneur. 
Developments after the Baguazo were identified as the main determinant of the policy window 
opening in Peru, and the then environment minister Brack was seen as the policy entrepreneur. 
In Acre, no specific policy window opening was recognized, as environmental policies have 
been steadily implemented in the state for over a decade, and respondents did not identify an 
individual policy entrepreneur.  
 
Table 7 below summarizes these findings in accordance with the elements of the MSF. 
 
Table 7 – Summary of findings 
 
 Programa Bosques - Peru Socio Bosque - Ecuador SISA - Acre 
Problem stream 
Indicators Deforestation pressures from 
small-scale actors, high 
percentage of carbon emissions 
from LULUCF, high poverty 
rates in forest areas 
Deforestation pressures from 
agriculture and cattle ranching, 
high poverty rates in forest areas 
Deforestation in small-scale 
agricultural settlements, high 
poverty rates 
Focusing events Trade agreement with the USA, 
creation of Environment 
Ministry, indigenous conflicts 
No specific events, but 
innovative environmental 
clauses in the new constitution 
None identified 
Feedback from 
previous policies 
Ineffective command-and-control 
policies  
Ineffective command-and-
control policies, small-scale PES 
projects in implementation 
Array of integrated 
environmental and development 
policies in place for several 
years and perceived as effective  
Politics stream 
National mood  Perception of low electoral 
priority for environmental issues, 
no direct pressure for the creation 
of an incentive-based program 
Perception of low electoral 
priority for environmental 
issues, no direct pressure for the 
creation of an incentive-based 
program 
Perception that environmentally 
friendly policies are well 
received by the population, 
continuous re-elections of the 
ruling group 
Organized 
political forces 
Environmental policy-making 
concentrated in the executive, no 
legislative debate for Programa 
Bosques creation, limited 
influence of NGOs in program 
creation 
Environmental policy-making 
concentrated in the executive, 
no legislative debate for Socio 
Bosque program creation, 
limited influence of local NGOs 
in program creation 
Swift approval of SISA law in 
the state assembly, NGOs had a 
relevant role in SISA’s design 
process 
Political and 
administrative 
structure and 
changes 
Need to gain MEF’s approval 
influenced the addition of direct 
transfer component 
Policy proposal came directly 
from the president’s office, need 
for a quick design, wide use of 
incentive policies by the 
government  
Environment comparatively 
high in the government’s 
agenda, cooperation between 
government agencies and its 
members facilitates 
mainstreaming of 
environmental policies 
Policy stream 
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 Programa Bosques - Peru Socio Bosque - Ecuador SISA - Acre 
Perceived 
technical 
feasibility 
Similar experiences in other 
Latin-American countries 
influenced the perception that the 
program could be technically 
feasible. Perceived success of 
Juntos. 
Similar experiences in other 
Latin-American countries and in 
smaller scales within Ecuador 
influenced the perception that 
the program could be technically 
feasible 
Federal and state level 
monitoring systems in place and 
being improved, experienced 
and qualified high-level staff 
Perceived  value 
acceptability 
The introduction of a cash 
transfer component made the 
program more acceptable to non-
environmental government 
agencies 
Direct request from the 
president downplays the 
importance of value 
acceptability as a variable within 
the administration 
Environmental issues are at the 
core of government’s discourse 
 
Policy Window Window opened with the signing 
of the FTA 
Environmental discourse 
introduced with the new 
constitution  
Forest policies have been 
continuously implemented in 
the state for over a decade 
Policy 
Entrepreneur 
Antonio Brack Rafael Correa None identified 
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VII. Better bend than break? Designing policies 
 
This chapter explains the factors that played the most relevant roles in defining the specific 
policy design decisions taken in each of the cases. The chapter is organized along the lines of 
the main recommendations for incentive-based policies identified in Chapter II and 
summarized in Table 1. After describing the decisions on each type of recommendation, in 
accordance with the literature review performed in Chapter II, an analysis of the processes 
based on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter III will be provided. The final section 
will discuss the findings of the chapter. 
 
1.  Presidential influences, drawing lessons and learning during implementation: 
designing Socio Bosque in Ecuador  
 
Socio Bosque’s design process has been led by MAE’s staff, with the support of specialists 
from Conservation International (Interview 5). Among the main influences in the design, was 
the experience with the Gran Reserva Chachi project, from which the idea of implementing 
direct payments based on conservation agreements was drawn (de Koning et al., 2011). The 
design team also held workshops with representatives from international organizations, such 
as the World Bank, and representatives from countries such as Mexico and Costa Rica, with 
experience in PES (Interview 8).  
 
1.1 - Conditionality, monitoring, and baselines 
 
As a reminder of the discussion of Chapter II, we will present the summary table of that chapter 
(Table 1), divided according to the sections concerned. 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
Conditionality 
Payments should only be made if the targeted ecosystem service (or 
related land use) is actually being provided. 
Baselines 
Constructing explicit baselines is required to understand pre-
intervention conditions and behaviors and to evaluate how a PES 
scheme will or will not provide additional ES or desired land use, 
aiming to ensure that program resources will be additional. 
Monitoring 
Monitoring is required to understand if the PES scheme is actually 
providing additional ES and ensuring the desired land uses, and also to 
gauge impacts in all program aspects 
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It was clear from the beginning of the design process that the incentive should not be perceived 
as a gift, but an outcome-oriented investment; hence conditionalities and sanctions were 
considered necessary to make the program effective. Much of the program’s design team 
shared this motivation for the decision, and the definition of what conditionalities and sanctions 
were to be applied was swiftly agreed upon (Interview 5). It was also agreed that 
conditionalities should be as clearly understandable as possible, as they believed that most 
potential beneficiaries were not used to long administrative procedures (Interview 5, 12). In 
addition, it was not clear, by the time the program was being designed, to what extent the 
implementation team would have the administrative capacity to enforce conditionalities, 
further strengthening the case for an administratively simple program. 
 
At the start of the program, no nation-wide forest monitoring system was available. 
Establishing such system before the beginning of Socio Bosque’s activities was deemed 
unfeasible, as there was pressure from the president’s office for timely implementation. The 
design team, therefore, decided to proceed, setting up an extensive monitoring system as one 
of the program’s core activities to be performed during implementation (Interview 5).  
 
No country-wide emission or land cover change baseline existed at the time of Socio Bosque’s 
design phase59 as well. Reliable information on past deforestation in Ecuador was scarce, with 
the design team relying on extrapolations from punctual studies (Interview 12). Therefore, the 
program had to develop property/community specific baselines as a requirement for 
enrollment, to allow for compliance monitoring. The baselines are constructed through field 
verification of the vegetation cover of the area, complemented by satellite imagery or aerial 
photography when available. The participants decide which parts of their territory they want to 
conserve (see sections 1.3 and 1.5 below) and the vegetation cover at the date of the field 
verification will be considered for conditionality compliance (MAE, 2011).  
 
1.2 - Leakage and Permanence 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
Leakage and Permanence 
Increase the scale of programs, track deforestation nationally or 
regionally instead of using a project based accounting system to mitigate 
leakage. Temporary crediting, favoring perpetual contracts over time-
specific renewable ones to foster permanence. 
                                                          
59 The baseline has been later completed and published (MAE, 2012b). 
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Socio Bosque’s design has no explicit provisions to avoid leakage. The theme came up during 
the design process, but just as an argument in favor of a national program, in the case an 
eventual national accounting of carbon credits would happen in the future (Interview 5). The 
conservation agreements are set to last for 20 years, with the possibility of renewal. During the 
design phase, there was some discussion about the duration of the contracts. Suggestions varied 
between open-ended contracts to five-year contracts (Interview 5). The decision to set the 
contract for 20 years was made because it was perceived that a five-year contract would not 
generate a real commitment for people to conserve their forests and that a 20 year contract 
would give the program more political sustainability, as the 20 year contracts are longer than a 
government term, reducing the risk of program cancellation by a future administration 
(Interviews 5, 8).   
 
1.3 – Poverty reduction and participation 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
Recipients of payments 
Recipients should be those who pose a high deforestation threat, 
considering they have positive but numerically small (relative to the 
financing available) opportunity costs. 
Payment structure and 
amounts 
Payments should, at a minimum, cover the opportunity costs of scheme 
participants, or provide the minimum amounts of participants’ are 
willing to accept. 
Spatial targeting 
Payments should be spatially differentiated. Schemes should target areas 
with high environmental service provision, high risks of ES loss, and 
low (opportunity, transaction, and protection) costs. 
Poverty reduction 
PES schemes should not be developed primarily as a tool for poverty 
reduction, which should only be a subsidiary objective. Poorer 
landowners are often not the most efficient providers of ES. 
Land tenure 
Potential PES beneficiaries must have the, at least de facto, ‘right to 
exclude’, or the right to not allow external agents to occupy their lands 
 
 
Poverty reduction was a central concern in Socio Bosque’s design. The very existence of the 
program stems from a presidential request for a program that would tackle deforestation and 
poverty at the same time (Rosa da Conceição et al., 2015). For that reason, several of the design 
decisions taken were aimed to ensure benefits to poorer populations. The decision to include 
communities in the program was driven by the possibility to provide them with cash transfers 
(de Koning et al., 2011). Welfare concerns also guided the definition of a poverty parameter 
for targeting, and the interest in fostering potential income generating activities also motivated 
the inclusion of ICDP-like activities (Interview 8). The program, however, was not able to 
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reach many poor inhabitants of forests because, for legal reasons, it can only sign agreements 
with participants with formal land titles (Interview 5). 
 
The concern with possible perceptions of interference with land use rights was, in turn, an 
important factor in deciding that enrollment in the program would be voluntary and that 
participants themselves would define which areas of the property/community count for 
payment purposes. The design team understood that a non-voluntary program, or one that 
externally defined which parts of the community or individual lands, would be under 
conservation could foster opposition of potential participants to the program, ultimately risking 
its viability (Interview 5). 
 
The design process itself was done with limited formal participation of national actors outside 
of the government (Fehse, 2012; Krause et al., 2013), except for the close partnership with 
Conservation International (CI) throughout the design process and informal contacts with some 
potential beneficiaries to exchange ideas about the program, as well as local governments with 
previous PES experiences, such as the Pimampiro60 project (Interview 5). Respondents justified 
the lack of participatory planning with the voluntary nature of the program, which allegedly 
caused the participation of civil society actors in the design to be unnecessary (Interview 5). 
That also had to do with the fact that the design had to be finished quickly, and the design team 
understood that a consultation process would hinder the program’s feasibility by extending the 
design process phase, as there were pressing requests from the president’s office to get the 
project started quickly (Fehse (2012), Interviews 5, 12). 
 
1.4 - Payment levels and opportunity costs 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
 
Recipients of payments 
Recipients should be those who pose a high deforestation threat, 
considering they have positive but numerically small (relative to the 
financing available) opportunity costs. 
 
Payment structure and amounts 
Payments should, at a minimum, cover the opportunity costs of scheme 
participants, or provide the minimum amounts of participants’ are 
willing to accept. 
 
                                                          
60 The Pimampiro PES project was established in 2000, for protecting native vegetation around the Palaurco 
River upper watershed, aiming at safeguarding water quality and dry-season water quantity. An analysis of the 
project can be found at (Wunder and Albán, 2008).  
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Opportunity costs were not calculated for the definition of payment levels. The project team 
considered that “different levels of incentives depending on the specific location of a landowner 
would be a cause of intense social debate and would not be politically viable” (de Koning et 
al., 2011). It was also affirmed by respondents that calculating opportunity costs would entail 
a long process, requiring the generation of new data, raising fears within the design team that 
the project design phase would be greatly extended, reducing the political momentum for 
program adoption (Fehse, 2012). Specialists invited to take part in a workshop with the design 
team tried to make a case for opportunity cost calculations, including the proposal of a road-
based zoning system that would provide simple opportunity costs estimates. Their suggestions, 
however, were not taken into consideration (Interviews 2, 13). Additionally, the design team 
perceived that using opportunity costs as a basis to define payment levels would mean that poor 
populations, which tend to pose smaller deforestation threats, would be excluded from the 
program or receive very low payments (Interviews 5, 12, Fehse (2012)), showing again the 
influence of poverty reduction concerns in program design.  
 
The area-based payment differentiation at Socio Bosque, however, was devised as a proxy for 
opportunity costs, with the “assumption that opportunity costs decrease when the area 
increases, since access becomes more difficult in larger areas”, but “was also a political 
decision to maximize the limited budget that was available”61 (Krause and Loft, 2013, pp. 
1173-1174). As it can be seen in the first quarter of Table 6 (Chapter V, section 1), the initial 
rules of the project differentiated payments by property size only. The current payment 
structure, established in October 2011 (MAE, 2012c), adds a differentiation between individual 
and collective lands, and between páramos and other vegetation types, as well as adding a 
special category for properties under 20ha, which receive US$ 60 per hectare (see Table 6  in 
Chapter V, section 1). The new structure increased per hectare payments for communities and 
kept original values for individual landowners, except in the under 20ha new category (MAE, 
2009; MAE, 2012c). The change in the incentive structure was in part due to a decrease in the 
rhythm of new participants signing up, especially in páramos areas, which “have high 
opportunity costs, because these areas are fertile and easy to access and the original incentives 
were not sufficient” (Krause and Loft, 2013, p. 1174). With the new incentive structure, total 
payments experienced an average increase of 40.2%, with wide variations between regions and 
                                                          
61 Maximize here means not increasing the amount of money available, but reaching more beneficiaries with 
the same budget. 
 93 
 
tenure types, from a 0.3% for individual contracts in the Amazon region, to a 116.9% increase 
for community areas in the Andes (mostly páramos) region (Krause and Loft, 2013). 
Concerning payments per beneficiary, there are also large variations in the amounts paid. 
Individual contracts received on average almost four times more per beneficiary per year than 
collective contracts, US$ 458.32 versus US$ 129.91 respectively (Krause and Loft, 2013)62.  
 
The definition of the specific monetary amounts of the incentive was intended to be kept simple 
and straightforward, as it was believed that more complicated systems would be hard to 
implement and difficult for the communities to understand. The initial values were loosely 
based on the incentive values of the programs presented in the design workshop and on the 
budgetary possibilities of the program (Interview 5). 
 
1.5 - Spatial Targeting 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
Spatial targeting 
Payments should be spatially differentiated. Schemes should target 
areas with high environmental service provision, high risks of ES loss, 
and low (opportunity, transaction, and protection) costs. 
 
As stated in Chapter V, section 1, the targeting system was not planned to be applied from the 
beginning of the program, but only after there was more demand for participation than the 
supply of funds for new enrollments (Holland et al., 2014). Another relevant aspect related to 
the spatial distribution of project activities is the selection of areas to be conserved within the 
enrolled properties. Respondents closely involved in the design progress mentioned that the 
decision to allow communities and individuals to define those areas themselves was taken to 
maintain coherence with the voluntary nature of the program (Interview 5, 8). 
 
In spite of the lack of targeting and the voluntary decisions on which areas should be conserved, 
a recent study (Jones et al., 2016) on conservation impacts of Socio Bosque found that the 
program “reduced average annual deforestation by 0.4–0.5% between 2011 and 2013 for those 
enrolled, representing as much as a 70% reduction in deforestation attributable to Socio 
Bosque” (p.1). The study, however, is restricted to “smallholders that live along “the western 
boundary of Cuyabeno Faunal Production Reserve, in Sucumbíos Province, northeastern 
                                                          
62 The difference is high, but the changes in the payment structure in 2011 reduced them. Before that, Socio 
Bosque paid on average US$ 451.44 per beneficiary per year for individual contracts and US$ 72.91 per 
beneficiary per year for community contracts (Krause and Loft, 2013). 
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Ecuador” (p. 2), in Amazon region of the country, encompassing only 63 program participants 
(all landowners) with and average enrollment of 49ha, or 77% of their parcels.  
 
1.6 - ICDP-like components 
 
Issue Main recommendations  
ICDP-like components 
Direct payments tend to be more cost-efficient than ICDPs because 
they are based on conditionalities, on less dubious assumptions, are less 
costly and administratively simpler. ICDP-like activities can be 
improved by adding conditionalities to its design. 
Poverty reduction 
PES schemes should not be developed primarily as a tool for poverty 
reduction, which should only be a subsidiary objective. Poorer 
landowners are often not the most efficient providers of ES. 
 
Socio Bosque requires communities (but not individual landowners) to develop ICDP-like (see 
Chapter II, Section 2.5) projects, with the stated aim of fostering income generating activities 
within the community. The motivation for that decision was, again, the intention from the 
design team that the incentive should not be perceived as a gift and to ensure that the whole 
community could benefit from the payments, avoiding, for example, capture by community 
leaders and consumption related uses (Interview 5). Research on program implementation, 
however, shows that investment plans have not always ensured transparent and informed 
decision making in communities (Krause et al., 2013), that “some communities are having 
difficulties distributing the costs and benefits of participation in Socio Bosque fairly” (Collen 
et al., 2016, p. 8), and reports evidence of “intracommunal power imbalances and elite capture” 
(Krause and Loft, 2013, p. 1180). 
 
2. Addressing conflicts and adapting lessons: designing Programa Bosques in Peru 
 
Programa Bosques’ design process was performed by a team from the MINAM and, as stated 
in Chapter VI, sections 2.2 and 2.4, influenced by discussions within Peru’s Council of 
Ministers. Like in Socio Bosque, the design team held meetings with representatives from 
countries with experience in PES, technical experts, and international researchers. Socio 
Bosque’s input was especially influential as it will be seen below.  
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2.1 - Conditionality, monitoring, and baselines 
 
The general rationale for the definition of the conditionalities was also to ensure that 
communities would not perceive the incentive as a hand-out and that they should be transparent 
and easily understandable (Interview 23). Additionally, as stated in Chapter VI, section 2.3, the 
creation of Programa Bosques has been inspired by the Juntos CCT program, so the inclusion 
of conditionalities for payments was integral to the very existence of Programa Bosques 
(Interview 23). Respondents did not report a great deal of discussion during the design process 
on what conditionalities should be applied; with the avoidance of deforestation in the areas to 
be conserved, no illegal logging and illegal crops, financial accountability and community 
evaluation of activities being generally agreed upon from the start of the process (Interviews 
21, 23).  
 
The baselines and forest cover monitoring system were not in place at the beginning of the 
program, and are being implemented as one of the program’s components (Interview 18). Peru 
did not have a ministry of environment before 2008 and no nation-wide conservation program63 
until the creation of Programa Bosques, which could have pushed for a forest cover monitoring 
system (Interview 23). While it cannot be said with certainty that Programa Bosques is the 
main driving force for the creation of such a system, it has become one of the drivers for the 
improvement of forest monitoring in the country. 
 
2.2 - Leakage and Permanence 
 
There are no specific provisions to avoid leakage or to promote permanence in Programa 
Bosques’ documents. The program’s total execution horizon is 10 years (MINAM, 2013), but 
conservation agreements have a duration of 5 years, with the possibility of renewal if 
conditionalities are met (PNCB, 2011). The duration of the agreements was not widely 
discussed during the program’s design phase (Interview 21).  
 
 
                                                          
63 At the time of Programa Bosques creation, Peru had the National Protected Areas Service (SERNANP), an 
agency rather than a program, established by the same decree that created MINAM. 
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2.3 – Poverty reduction and participation 
 
Poverty reduction concerns were also central in the design of Programa Bosques. The 
introduction of a cash transfer mechanism during the program’s design phase was a definite 
requirement for the acceptance of the program by the Ministry of Finance (MEF), which 
ultimately allocates the budget for government policies (Rosa da Conceição et al., 2015). 
Similar to Socio Bosque, poverty reduction concerns were among the factors taken into 
consideration in design decisions relating to targeting, payment system definition and the 
introduction of ICDP-like activities (Interview 21, 23). We could, however, not find evidence 
on the extent to which these design elements were thoroughly discussed by the design team, as 
opposed to a straightforward adoption of Socio Bosque’s design model. 
 
Programa Bosques also did not count with the wide participation of non-government 
stakeholders. A few meetings were held with the NGO Inter-ethnic Association for the 
Development of the Peruvian Forest (AIDESEP) to discuss some of the initial drafts of the 
program, but the respondent did not inform how much of AIDESEP’s input has been adopted 
by the design team (Interview 22). The design team reasoned that, since participation in the 
program is voluntary, a thorough participatory process would make the design process 
unnecessarily time intensive (Interviews 21, 22, 23). 
    
2.4 - Payment levels and opportunity costs 
 
The interviews and program documentation did not yield solid evidence on more specific 
reasons why an undifferentiated payment structure was chosen, or why opportunity costs were 
not considered, despite the payments structure being one important feature that deviates from 
what is done in Socio Bosque. According to the respondents, the specific amount of the 
payment was defined largely for the sake of simplicity and expected budgetary constraints, 
with the value of 10 Soles being deemed as easy to understand and communicate, while keeping 
the total amount of expenditure for the program within a realistic budgetary range (Interviews 
21, 23). 
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2.5 - Spatial Targeting 
 
Programa Bosques aims to reach all communities with land titles in forested areas in the 
country. Therefore, the program’s targeting (focalización) is more a prioritization of 
communities in which the program will intervene, rather than a selection of who participates 
or not (also called placement). The selection of the initial area of program implementation, at 
the Valley of the Apurímac and Ene Rivers (VRAE) region, however, did not follow the 
prioritization criteria, being motivated by the government’s interest to benefit a region with a 
history of poverty and political conflict (Interview 21). In addition, the program’s 
implementation requires agreements (convenios) between the central government and the 
departments64. For that reason, communities in provinces without such agreement are not 
eligible, even if both the province and the community score highly in the targeting system 
(Interview 16).  
 
Furthermore, according to information provided by the GIZ-Peru staff (personal 
communication with R. Giudice, in 10.03.2017), the criteria for prioritization of communities 
has not been homogenously followed by the program. In 2011, for example, the program 
prepared a ranking of 102 communities based on the prioritization criteria, with the first 50 
being considered priority for enrollment. In that same year, 27 communities voluntarily applied 
for enrollment, of which 17 were enrolled by the end of that year. Only 10 of those 17 were 
among the list of 50, and five were not even ranked within the list of 102 communities.  
 
The participation of the provinces was considered important as part of a general effort to 
deconcentrate and decentralize public policies in Peru (ProDescentralización, 2012), as well as 
due to implementation transaction cost concerns, given the size of the country and the 
remoteness of some of the potential intervention areas (Interview 16, 20). Participating 
communities are free to define which share of their territory is enrolled in the program. As 
described in the case of Socio Bosque, which seems to have played the role model here, this 
design choice leaves ample scope to the adverse selection of non-threatened forest areas into 
the program. 
 
                                                          
64 Departments are the highest level of subnational government in Peru, the equivalent of states in Brazil and 
the United States and of Bundesländer in Germany. 
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2.6 - ICDP-like components 
 
Again following the Socio Bosque model, the Peruvian program requires communities to use 
their payments for the implementation of ICDP-like productive activities. Considering the 
poverty reduction objectives of the program, the design team reckoned that cash disbursements 
to communities required procedures to ensure that expenditures were transparent and goal-
oriented. Concerns about local capacities to manage investments in alternative income 
generating activities led to the definition of a financial reporting system, which is untypical in 
PES schemes. However, the ability to demonstrate the investment of transfers in productive 
activities came to be an important asset in negotiations with the MEF, which was much more 
willing to approve budgets to a program with a component that stimulated economic activity 
concomitantly with conservation (Interview 23). 
 
3. Participation, innovation and late decisions: designing SISA in Acre 
 
3.1 - Conditionality, monitoring, and baselines 
 
Acre’s decision to attract long-term financing for SISA through the generation of certified 
emissions reductions required stricter methodologies for forest conservation as compared to 
the Ecuadorian and Peruvian programs. Acre already had established a deforestation baseline 
during the elaboration of its state Pilot Plan for Deforestation Control (PPCD). It remains to be 
decided, though, whether specific local baselines have to be defined for individual projects. 
Conditionalities will also be defined later, at the projects’ level (for the implementation 
structure of SISA, refer to Chapter V, section 3). 
 
The same essentially applies to land cover monitoring systems. Acre’s already existing 
monitoring activities, also described in Chapter V, section 3, form a solid base for deforestation 
monitoring of SISA’s activities. Unlike the cases in Peru and Ecuador, most of the monitoring 
infrastructure in the state had been created by previous policy efforts.  
 
The existence of baselines and a well-developed monitoring system in Acre helps explaining 
why the theme was the subject of so few recommendations in the consultation process (see 
section 3.3 below). Most of the comments related to the theme were concerned with control, 
inspection and sanctioning of illegal activities, rather than monitoring itself.  
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3.2 - Leakage and Permanence 
 
The program has also no specific guidelines for leakage avoidance. The consultation process 
raised the question of leakage, as the initial project proposal intended to work on priority areas. 
The issue has been addressed, for the carbon component, with the broadening of the program’s 
intended implementation in the whole state and with the statewide accounting of emissions 
reductions. That may avoid issues regarding within-state leakage of emissions, although not 
inter-state or international leakage.  
 
The issue of permanence has been also questioned in the consultation process, as the 
participants were concerned with the initial duration of 15 years for the program. The response 
of the design team is that they understood the concern but that there was not a lot that could be 
done (Acre, 2012). Although the final version of SISA scrapped a time limit and was turned 
into a law, which is more politically stable than a one-off project, the government understood 
that it would be unwise to make strict long-term plans at the time of design “due to the 
unpredictability of what is going to happen after four governing terms. Similarly, the 
identification of financing sources for the next 50, 100 years does not seem feasible. It [not 
presenting specific long-term plans for ensuring permanence] is a risk the program will have 
to take” (Acre, 2012, p. 63, author's translation). 
 
3.3 – Poverty reduction and participation 
 
Poverty reduction and welfare improvement concerns permeate the whole design of SISA. In 
the text of the SISA law, benefit sharing is stated as one of the guiding principles of SISA and 
one of the objectives of ISA Carbono (Acre, 2010a). Figure 10 below also shows that poverty 
and welfare issues were the second most frequent concerns of the process’ participants. 
  
Various respondents emphasized that reconciling environmental conservation with welfare 
concerns is one of the core philosophies of state policies in Acre. A common view is that forest 
conservation and the well-being of forest inhabitants of Acre are inextricably linked. Hence, 
policies that seek to conserve forests are considered incomplete if they lack a component to 
ensure that their benefits also reach forest dependent people (Interviews 28, 29, 35). 
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Unlike in the Ecuadorian and Peruvian cases, SISA performed a long (see the timeline in Figure 
11), participatory consultation process with the state’s stakeholders. An initial version of the 
project prepared by the government was made available to scientists, local, national and 
international NGOs, leaderships of potential beneficiary groups (rubber tappers, indigenous 
peoples, smallholders and farmers), fundraising and carbon market specialists, mayors, state 
and national assembly representatives, as well as other governmental agencies’ representatives 
(Acre, 2012). The initial consultation process occurred between August 2009 and April 2010. 
After two months spent in the analysis of the recommendations, reformulation of the program’s 
initial draft, and drafting of the law project, a second consultation process was performed, 
lasting from July to October 2010 (Acre, 2012).  
 
As mentioned by respondents (Interviews 28, 32, 37), the best source for understanding the 
design process in Acre is the compilation of the recommendations made during SISA’s 
consultation process (see below), as published in Acre (2012). The contents of the suggestions 
provided by the consultation process’ participants and the responses provided by the 
government’s design team formed the bases of the descriptions and analyses regarding the Acre 
case, compounded with information acquired during the interviews. Figure 10 provides a 
breakdown of the issues addressed by the consultation process.  
 
Figure 10 – Breakdown of themes addressed by SISA’s consultation process 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on Acre (2012) 
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Of the 72 invited institutions, only three produced formal, written reports commenting on the 
initial draft. Stakeholders were also involved through meetings, workshops, and a technical 
seminar, which were yielded the majority of the recommendations provided (Acre, 2012). The 
consultation process, which received altogether 357 recommendations from civil society 
organizations sharply reshaped the initial idea of the program from a project-based approach 
to a structural program, not solely aimed at creating a new activities, but at supporting existing 
ones and organizing an institutional structure for regulating new activities from the 
government, private sector and civil society (Acre, 2012).  
 
One relevant remark on the participation process is that leaders of social movements in the 
state were given work positions within the government. That, according to a respondent 
(Interview 33) and one remark made during the consultation process (Acre, 2012), might have 
generated some questioning about the allegiances of members of social movements, as they 
end up being also part of the government. That situation led some to fear a weakening of the 
role of the civil society in the state, as leaders that before pushed the civil society’s agenda 
ahead could now be discouraged to criticize the government in case of disagreement. That point 
was also raised by other organizations working in the state, which identified a “change in the 
nature of the relations of the social movements and the government”, and a “strong cooptation 
of leaderships, injection of public money in the civil society through agreements and salaries, 
generating a political and partisan binding” (IUCN et al., 2008, p. 29, author's translation). 
 
3.4 - Payment levels and opportunity costs 
 
In the technical seminar, which was part of the consultation process, participants noted the 
absence of conservation opportunity costs as a criterion for incentive design in the original 
proposal and recommended complementary research activities (Acre, 2012). The project team, 
as intended in the consultation process, contacted the Amazon Environmental Research 
Institute (IPAM) to provide an estimate of opportunity costs in the state, which was published 
in 2012 (IPAM, 2012). At the time of the study, however, the official program documentation 
of SISA and ISA Carbono lacked any reference to opportunity costs program design criterion. 
In the consultations, the program’s design team has acknowledged the importance of 
opportunity cost calculations but mentioned that they would not “commit with paying 
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opportunity costs in this moment of uncertainty about financing” (Acre, 2012, p. 60, author's 
translation). Therefore, details on the adoption of opportunity costs as a criterion for payment 
calculations will be another aspect to be defined alongside the design of specific projects 
(Interview 35). 
 
3.5 - Spatial Targeting 
 
The initial proposal for the program intended to be “implemented in 7–8 priority areas of high 
deforestation risk based on information in the state’s Ecological and Environmental Zoning” 
(Duchelle et al., 2014b). This aspect was one of the most frequently mentioned themes in the 
consultation process (see Figure 10), regarding the very applicability of the priority areas 
concept for SISA and, especially, how they would be defined and who would be excluded 
(Acre, 2012). The design team decided, then, not to use priority areas, and that the whole area 
of the state should be allowed to be eligible for activities within the SISA framework. A state-
wide approach was considered more appropriate for the accounting of potential carbon credits 
generated by the program, for the diversity of potential beneficiaries, and for the heterogeneous 
local contexts in the state (Acre, 2012). The government considered the subprogram/project 
structure in SISA more appropriate to address local contexts, under a general program that 
holds rules and standards together (Interview 35). Therefore, the spatial distribution of SISA 
supported activities will only be known when full-fledged implementation is underway. 
 
In addition to allowing for projects potentially being implemented in the whole area of the 
state, the program also intends to foster what it calls “thematic projects”. Such projects can 
focus on specific areas (e.g. Alto Juruá region in the north of the state, surroundings of the 
capital Rio Branco) or specific groups (e.g. vulnerable indigenous populations, well-off 
farmers with pasture expansion potential). 
 
3.6 – ICDP-like components 
 
ICDP-like components are very likely to be present within SISA-supported programs. As stated 
above, welfare improvement is at the core of the program’s objectives, and the design team 
was convinced that the pursuit of sustainable productive activities is central to the state’s 
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conservation strategy. During the consultation process, ICDP-like investments were broadly 
and uncritically seen as a key program component (Acre, 2012).  
 
Recommendations from the Brazilian Agricultural Research Company (EMBRAPA), for 
example, state that conservation incentives may originate “from the adoption of sustainable 
practices” (Acre, 2012, p. 57, author's translation). The SISA team implicitly agreed by arguing 
that “the term ‘payments for environmental services’ does not reveal the innovative dimension 
of the program” (Acre, 2012, p. 57, author's translation) and that it was important to make it 
clear that the project supports the adoption of production techniques that seek to have a lower 
environmental impact than traditional forms of agricultural production, while not 
compromising the income-generation purpose of the rural properties (Acre, 2012, p. 58). Also, 
potential local beneficiaries favored ICDP-type interventions: the National Confederation of 
Rubber-Tappers (CNS) worried that “the problem with incentives, for example, the rubber 
subsidy, is that the rubber tappers get complacent and, when the incentive ends, they want to 
move to the city”. In addition, local population representatives claimed that “what the people 
want are incentives to generate income and not deforest, we do not want just payments for not 
deforesting” (Acre, 2012, p. 58, author's translation). 
 
3.7 –REDD+ integration 
 
In addition to the themes above, another issue in SISA’s design worth mentioning is the planned 
integration with the REDD+ regime. The international debate on the establishment of a global 
REDD+ regime gained prominence concomitantly with SISA’s design period. The design team 
and the stakeholders consulted in the participation process took notice of the emergence of 
REDD+ as a potential tool for financing conservation activities in the state. For that reason, the 
initial proposal of a government-led PES project in the state morphed into a program with a 
strong intention to relate to the REDD+ international debate. Unlike Socio Bosque and 
Programa Bosques, SISA was intentionally designed to insert itself in a future REDD+ regime, 
incorporating much of the terminology used in REDD+ (i.e. safeguards, register, carbon 
credits) and showing commitment to generate certifiable emissions.  
 
It is likely that this possibility of drawing additional financial resources to the state is the most 
attractive aspect of integrating activities with a budding REDD+ regime for a relatively poor, 
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isolated jurisdiction like Acre. In addition, as stated in the consultation report, the design team 
understood that the term REDD+ “could bring communication benefits” (Acre, 2012, author's 
translation), furthering the state’s attractiveness for potential donors. 
 
Table 8 below summarizes our findings and figure 11 provides a timeline of the processes 
analyzed.  
 
Table 8 – How were recommendations considered in the cases? 
 
Programs 
 
Main 
Recommendations   
Socio Bosque Programa Bosques SISA Acre 
Strong degree of 
conditionality; 
monitoring system in 
place  
- Payments conditional on 
compliance with 
environmental and 
administrative conditions. 
 
- Field and image-based 
monitoring system to be 
fully developed during 
implementation. 
- Payments conditional on 
compliance with 
environmental and 
administrative conditions. 
 
- Field and image-based 
monitoring system to be 
fully developed during 
implementation. 
 
- Payment suspensions 
being carried out, mostly 
due to administrative non-
compliance. 
- SISA has no specific 
provisions on 
conditionality, since it 
has not yet included 
direct financial transfers 
as its provisions. 
Take safeguards to 
contain leakage and 
boost permanence 
- No provisions to avoid 
leakage and increase 
permanence. 20-year 
contracts to ensure some 
political stability. 
- No provisions to avoid 
leakage and increase 
permanence. 5 year 
contracts due to legal 
limits. 
- SISA’s plans to 
generate tradable carbon 
credits, which will 
require safeguards for 
leakage. The program 
intends to provide a 
framework for the long-
term implementation of 
conservation activities in 
the state, so permanence 
is core to its strategy. 
Poverty concerns 
should be secondary 
to environmental 
concerns  
- Core priority for the 
program. 
 
- Communities included 
in the program due to 
poverty reduction 
concerns. 
 
- Poverty as a parameter 
for targeting. 
 
- Use of ICDP like 
projects aimed at 
- Core priority for the 
program. 
 
- Poverty component 
required by MEF for 
program budget approval. 
 
- Poverty as a parameter 
for targeting. 
 
- Use of ICDP like 
projects aimed at 
generating income 
generation options. 
- The programs already 
supported by SISA are 
closely related to social 
and poverty reduction 
concerns. Associating 
conservation and social 
policy concerns has been 
at the core of Acre’s 
policies. 
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Programs 
 
Main 
Recommendations   
Socio Bosque Programa Bosques SISA Acre 
generating income 
generation options. 
Define baselines 
- No countrywide 
baselines before the 
program. 
 
- Property/community 
specific baselines 
developed to monitor 
compliance during the 
enrollment process. Field 
visits aided by imagery 
when available 
 
- Participatory mapping 
of areas to be conserved, 
as defined by landowners/ 
communities. 
- No countrywide 
baselines before the 
program. 
 
- Community specific 
baselines developed to 
monitor compliance 
during the enrollment 
process, based on satellite 
imagery and participatory 
field verification. 
 
- Participatory mapping of 
areas to be conserved, as 
defined by communities. 
- Acre prepared a 
historical baseline and 
has been using it as the 
basis for its 
environmental policies, 
including SISA. 
Pay according to 
landowner’s 
opportunity costs  
- No previous calculation 
of opportunity costs. Area 
and vegetation type as 
proxies to opportunity 
costs. 
 
- Differentiated payments 
per enrolled area size, 
type of vegetation and 
ownership. Payment 
structure adjusted during 
implementation to better 
reflect opportunity costs. 
- No previous calculation 
or proxies of opportunity 
costs. 
 
- Undifferentiated 
payments. 
 
- No use of OCs as they 
were perceived to not 
benefit poorer populations 
enough. 
 
- The issue was raised 
during the consultation 
process, but no 
provisions for the 
consideration or not of 
opportunity costs are yet 
in place. 
 
Employ spatial 
targeting 
- Based on assumed 
levels of threat, 
environmental service, 
and level of poverty. 
 
- Applied only after there 
were more enrollment 
requests than resources 
(from 2012). 
- Region and community 
focalization. Based on 
primary forest area 
deforestation rate and 
poverty incidence rate or 
closeness to access paths. 
 
- Initial implementation at 
the VRAE reason due to 
the region’s poverty and 
past political turmoil. 
 
- Enrollment subject to 
regional government’s 
agreements, irrespective of 
targeting scores. 
- No specific provisions 
for the consideration or 
not of spatial targeting is 
yet in place. But SISA’s 
plans to generate 
tradable carbon credits 
will require some sort of 
targeting provisions. 
Consider costs of 
ICDP-like 
components 
- Payments attached to 
ICDP like activities are 
central to the program’s 
strategy. Considered 
important to reduce 
poverty. 
- Payments attached to 
ICDP like activities are 
central to the program’s 
strategy. Considered 
important to reduce 
poverty. 
- Activities already 
supported by SISA have 
ICDP-like components 
in its structure. 
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Programs 
 
Main 
Recommendations   
Socio Bosque Programa Bosques SISA Acre 
Ensure wide 
participation in design 
process 
- Participatory process 
largely absent. 
 
- Voluntary enrollment. 
 
- Participants define 
which areas will be set 
aside for conservation. 
- Participatory process 
largely absent. Unclear 
results from AIDESEP 
meetings. 
 
- Voluntary enrollment. 
 
- Participants define which 
areas will be set aside for 
conservation. 
- SISA was built through 
an extensive 
participatory process, 
which fundamentally 
changed the initial idea 
proposed by the 
government. 
 107 
 
Figure 11 – Timeline of the design processes 
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4. Analysis of policy decisions 
 
The final section of this chapter will analyze the design decisions of the programs in the light 
of the conceptual framework espoused in Chapter II, section 3. As a reminder for the 
discussion, we present, in Table 9 below, a summary of the main explanatory elements of our 
framework.  
 
Table 9 – Reviewing elements of the conceptual framework 
 
Explanatory Element Summary description 
Electoral opportunities and risks 
In democratic systems, politicians will try to 
maximize power, ensuring that policies will be 
designed in ways to ensure the most possible votes in 
following elections. 
Actor identities 
Idiosyncratic characteristics of the actors involved in 
project design, like their degree of commitment to 
service or personal relations. 
Political, administrative, and technical feasibility 
The institutional context in which decisions are 
made; administrative costs and the simplicity or 
difficulty of operational tasks that will have to be 
performed by bureaucrats; the relation between the 
technical requirements of a policy and the perceived 
ability of the government to be able to carry out that 
policy. 
Bureaucratic dynamics 
The relations between governmental agencies 
involved in a given policy area. 
Lesson-drawing 
Policy makers will often look at other jurisdictions 
that have designed similar policies or to previously 
implemented policies to draw ‘tried and tested’ 
policy options. 
Beliefs 
Ideological and ideational principles that might limit 
or spur government activity. 
 
 
4.1 – Poverty reduction and welfare 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most outstanding deviation from the policy recommendations 
provided by PES scholars is the fact that all three programs place poverty reduction and other 
welfare concerns at the core of the programs’ objectives and design decisions. Reducing 
poverty and improving the living conditions of the poorer sectors of the population has been 
the main overarching declared objective of Latin American governments for long, and more 
markedly since the 2000s, with the emergence of leftist-populist governments all over South 
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America65 (Remmer, 2012; Seligson, 2007), which pursued “statist, nationalist, and 
redistributive political projects” (Remmer, 2012, p. 947). Even before those developments, 
CCT programs started proliferating in Latin America. Present in Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador66, 
these programs have all been expanded in the second half of the 2000s and perceived as more 
successful in alleviating poverty than previous policies (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Ordóñez 
et al., 2015). In addition, some studies found that voters tend to reward governments that 
implement targeted social assistance programs in the region (Hunter and Power, 2007; Layton 
and Smith, 2015; Sandberg and Tally, 2015; Sewall, 2008), at least in the short term (Zucco, 
2013). On the other hand, respondents agreed that conservation is a low priority for voters, 
although there were no consistent studies or opinion polls found on voters preferences to back 
that perception. There is a documented increasing trend in environmental social movements’ 
activity and public environmental awareness in the region  (Baud et al., 2011; CNI, 2012a, 
2012b; IPSOS, 2014), and that may have influenced the adoption of the programs, despite it 
not being explicitly recognized by respondents. In any case, an increased environmental 
awareness for the general public and a stronger environmentally focused civil society do not 
necessarily mean that environment would overtake poverty and other welfare issues as a higher 
priority for voters. Therefore governments will have a high interest in associating 
environmental and welfare policies, as the later will normally have a much higher resonance 
with the electorate.  
 
In Acre, the historical connection of environmental and social policies in the state adds to the 
explanation for the hybrid shape of the program. The decades-long social struggle of rubber 
tappers in Acre was initially related more to the Brazilian labor movement than to 
environmental concerns (Keck, 1995). Their struggle to ensure land-use rights and fight 
encroachment by farmers eventually led to the creation, in the beginning of the 1990s, of 
extractive reserves, protected areas where forest dwellers could still collect non-timber forest 
products and earn their livelihoods (Vadjunec et al., 2011). The strengthening of Acre’s 
grassroots social movements, “whose participants had a strong dependence on Acre’s abundant 
forest resources for their livelihoods, and a well-defined common identity as rubber tappers” 
                                                          
65 Programa Bosques was created during the government of Alan García, a politician not associated with the 
left. His election in 2006, however, was a very close contest against the leftist Ollanta Humala, showing the 
appeal of left-populist politicians in the country close to the time of Programa Bosque’s creation. Humala 
would eventually win the presidency in the following election in 2011. 
66 The main CCT programs in those countries are, respectively, Programa Juntos (created in 2005), Bolsa 
Família (2003) and Bono de Desarollo Humano (2004). 
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(Kainer et al., 2003), both in local politics and in its international image, culminated with the 
election of Jorge Viana, a forester with strong ties to the rubber tappers, as the governor of the 
state in 1998. In such a political context of strong belief in the interconnectedness between 
social and environmental policies, it could hardly be expected that an incentive-based 
conservation program in the state would follow the recommendation to have welfare issues as 
a secondary priority. 
 
For those reasons, it is fair to say that the three programs studied have been designed with the 
intention of being seen as hybrid, environmental and social policies. 
 
4.2 - ICDP-like components 
 
Closely related to the concerns with welfare issues analyzed above, is the central presence of 
ICDP-like components in the programs. One of the motivations for the emergence of direct 
payments in the forest conservation literature was the understanding that ICDPs were not 
delivering in their dual intention to promote conservation and development. In spite of that, all 
three programs place great emphasis on ICDP-like components, which they call productive 
projects or activities. As stated before, both Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques require 
communities to prepare investment plans. That means that the incentive provided will, unlike 
most CCTs, not be freely utilized by the communities, but must be invested in activities 
intended to generate income, making the programs ultimately a source to finance small-scale, 
community-led ICDPs. In Acre, although much of SISA’s ground implementation is still 
undefined, the projects that are already receiving support from the initial SISA resources are 
all aimed at economic activities expected by Acre’s government to have a low environmental 
impact. 
 
The explanation for the lingering interest in ICDP-like activities is also manifold. On the 
ideological dimension, there was the belief that the payments should not appear to be handouts, 
but to be seed funds for the construction of long-term solutions for the communities’ 
socioeconomic issues (Interviews 8, 23). From a technical standpoint, the fact that the money 
is given to a community, with a political/hierarchical structure of their own, tying payments to 
reportable productive activities was seen as the best way to ensure that the whole community 
would benefit from the program, reducing the risk of capture of the payments by the community 
leaders. An early analysis of Socio Bosque, however, “identified several potential concerns 
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with the current implementation at the community level. These concerns include low levels of 
participation in communal decision-making about the use of the incentives, a lack of 
information about the terms of the conservation agreement, and inequitable benefit sharing, 
including perceived limitations for families and a lack of direct benefits, especially for 
marginalized groups” (Krause et al., 2013, p. 12). 
 
In Peru, bureaucratic dynamics and lesson drawing were additional influences in determining 
the existence of an ICDP-like component. During the discussion of Programa Bosques in the 
Council of Ministers, the Finance Ministry stressed that the program would only be approved 
if some sort of production-related provision was included (Interview 23) and, as stated in the 
previous chapter, the budgets for all government programs needed the acquiescence of the 
Finance Ministry to be approved. That led the design team, as with other aspects of Programa 
Bosques, to find a solution in absorbing the concept of investment plan present in Socio 
Bosque.  
 
4.3 - Targeting 
 
Targeting is, politically, one of the trickiest aspects of the design of a PES program, as it will 
ultimately define who participates - and eventually benefits - and who does not. As a 
consequence, none of the programs has adopted the technical recommendations for spatial 
targeting present in the literature. Ecuador and Peru have developed focusing schemes for 
selecting participants, but, by largely ignoring them, accepted participants from a wide range 
of spatial conditions. In Acre, the initial idea of having priority areas for implementation has 
given way to a state-wide approach, still allowing for future targeting, but refraining from 
specific targeting decisions at the start of the program.  
 
The decisions regarding targeting were largely motivated by concerns about political feasibility 
and medium-term electoral strategies of the government. Targeting conservation incentives to 
maximize cost-effectiveness may generate a perception of unfairness if targeting criteria 
discriminate against poor landholders or good forest stewards. In the intervention contexts of 
the three programs, it is indeed likely that the lion’s share of avoided deforestation potential is 
concentrated among better off land users. A perception of unfairness, justified or not, may 
jeopardize program acceptance, undermine the government’s popularity in the intervention 
area and cause rifts among the population. 
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Electoral interests are also likely to have played a major role in the decision to have participants 
define what share of their land is enrolled in the programs. A top-down definition of eligible 
areas could have been erroneously perceived as a violation of land use rights, including because 
payments were not a priori designed to fully compensate for the foregone benefits of forest 
conversion. Both Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques, as discussed above, were created and 
designed as hybrid environmental and social programs, and had the political intention to allow 
for the inclusion of many participants. 
 
The design teams reckoned that, even in a context of voluntary enrollment, a perceived 
interference in land use decisions would discourage participants from enrolling (Interview 5, 
17). In Ecuador, the team was indeed aware of reports of previous activities in the country in 
which communities felt discouraged to participate when they perceived that their freedom to 
make land use decisions would be hindered by conservation incentive projects, one of which 
is described for Ecuador in PROFAFOR and GIZ (2013). Indeed, a study that analyzed the 
factors affecting desire to participate in Socio Bosque, focused on páramos areas (Bremer et 
al., 2014), found that “a fear of land expropriation” was one of the most important factors 
affecting a lack of desire to participate67, together with “insufficient incentive payments to 
cover opportunity costs where there are not pre-existing constraints on land use” (p. 128). The 
same study identified the financial motivation provided by the incentive payments, but also 
“non-monetary motivations including improved land security and the desire to continue or 
enhance water supply or biodiversity [as] also key motivations for enrolling in the program” 
(p. 128). Similar notions were reported in a study on the Ecuadorian Amazon region, where 
“program participants mentioned three reasons for enrolling in FCIs68: the financial incentives, 
environmental protection, and the paucity of alternative land uses. Most program participants 
indicated that the financial incentive was the primary reason for enrollment, with compensation 
providing an alternative source of income” (Jones et al., 2016, p. 6). Concerns with 
expropriation were also reported, with a “fear that at the end of the 20-year contracts the 
forested land would revert to the government. As stated by a male non-participant, ‘Some 
neighbours fear Socio Bosque is a trick, a way for government to take possession of your land’. 
                                                          
67 Such “perceptional obstacle” was also found in a study focused on two other local initiatives in Ecuador (the 
previously cited Pimampiro project and the Fund for the Conservation of Water (FONAG), in Quito) and 
Mexico’s nationwide PES program (Southgate and Wunder, 2009) 
68 Forest Conservation Incentives 
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This fear of expropriation was tied to respondents’ general mistrust of the national government” 
(p. 7). Additionally, the study found that “In many rural areas, poor farmers depend on trees 
and their land for emergency expenditures and our focus groups confirmed that loss of access 
to forest as an economic safety cushion was a main reason for not enrolling. The local scarcity 
of productive land and lack of access to off farm employment or credit leaves smallholders all 
the more reluctant to sign-off forest use for 20 years” (p. 8). 
 
Respondents in Peru have also added technical reasons for the non-implementation at first of 
the targeting strategy. Due to the lack of some of the necessary data for the whole country 
required to implement the strategy, the start of program implementation would allegedly have 
had to be delayed for a few months. Yet, in both Peru and Ecuador, programs were urged to 
deliver payments as soon as possible, due to political and administrative constraints and 
pressures, which are described in further detail in section 4.4 below.   
 
4.4 - Monitoring 
 
Decisions regarding monitoring systems in Ecuador and Peru also interestingly illustrate the 
relevance of political and bureaucratic contexts in the design and initial implementation of the 
programs. Both countries lacked a well-developed monitoring system at the time of program 
design, but both recognized that the programs could only be meaningfully implemented if such 
systems were in place, as clearly stated in their institutional structures and operational manuals. 
Ideally, the programs should construct a monitoring system and have it functioning by the 
beginning of payment delivery, but in both Programa Bosques and Socio Bosque, that was not 
the case. 
 
Several contextual factors explain the decision to begin delivering payments before the 
finalization of the monitoring systems in Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques. In Ecuador, 
the idiosyncratic characteristics of President Correa were relevant, as he pressured for quick 
action in various policy areas. From the beginning of his mandate, he was trying to implement 
fundamental changes in Ecuadorian institutions. One of the core changes observed in the 
country was the strengthening of the executive power’s capacity to formulate public policies, 
in detriment of other institutions, such as the congress (Acosta et al., 2010; Andrade, 2013). At 
the base of his political changes, was a new constitution. The public debate on the new 
constitution started with the beginning of Correa’s mandate in 2007 and culminated on a 
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referendum about its adoption, to be held on the 28th of September 2008 (see Timeline in Figure 
11). The public debate on the constitution, therefore, overlapped with the design process of 
Socio Bosque. To ensure support, Correa intended to demonstrate a commitment not only to 
the country’s population but also to a quick and bold action by the government, in line with his 
government’s motto of a “citizen’s revolution”. While a key respondent affirmed that there was 
initially no formal instruction from the president’s office to hurry the design process (Interview 
5), the design team believed that it must be finished as quickly as possible. Hence, the design 
team set itself an admittedly overoptimistic deadline of 2 months to complete the design of 
Socio Bosque and get the project going on the ground (Interview 5). The set deadline was then 
formalized at a policy follow-up system monitored by the presidency69, which aimed to ensure 
that Socio Bosque would be finalized within the deadline. Eventually, the design process was 
completed in 8 months (Interview 5). 
 
In Peru, a similar need for a quick completion of the design program was necessary, but 
political feasibility and bureaucratic dynamics were more relevant. First, as stated in Chapter 
VI, the government aimed to mend its shaky relations with the indigenous populations as a 
consequence of Baguazo. A dragging design process would delay the beginning of payments, 
which was understood to be potentially counterproductive to that aim (Interview 21). In 
addition, the environment ministry was a new entity in the government and sought to 
demonstrate efficiency to a somewhat skeptical Council of Ministers (Interview 23). Both 
forces, therefore, pushed the ministry to start delivering the payments while leaving the 
monitoring system to be set up later with the program in full swing. 
 
4.5 - Participation 
 
The aforementioned urge to begin program implementation led both Socio Bosque and 
Programa Bosques to refrain from involving other stakeholders in the program’s design 
processes. The perceived administrative complexity of a participatory design process is likely 
to have been factored into the decision of not carrying out such a process, as it would have 
delayed the start of payment delivery. Respondents in both Ecuador and Peru, however, 
                                                          
69 The system is called Information System for the Democratic Governability (SIGOB) and aims to “support the 
programming and management of the tasks required for the execution of the objectives defined by the 
Presidency and to provide information about their accomplishment, together with the institution in charge of 
their execution and management” (SENPLADES, 2017). 
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justified this choice with the voluntary opt-in nature of the programs, which allegedly made 
such a process unnecessary (see sections 1.3 and 2.3 above).  
 
In the Acre case, the administrative complexity associated with participatory and transparent 
processes did not seem to deter the SISA design team, and it is important to pursue an 
explanation of that difference in relation to the Ecuadorian and Peruvian cases. The whole 
design process of SISA took three and a half years, from mid-2007 to end 2010 (WWF, 2013) 
(see Timeline in Figure 11), and still left several aspects to be defined at the subprogram and 
projects levels. Acre’s governmental group has a historical association with the state’s social 
movements (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007), which have historically vied for being taken into 
account in the state’s decision-making processes (Keck, 1995). The ruling party started gaining 
political ground during the 1990s, and in 1998 it won the state’s gubernatorial race. In power, 
they proclaimed their belief in guiding ideological concepts such as “forest-based 
development” and “florestania”70 and have been continuously reelected, with landslide 
victories up to the 2010 elections. The ruling party has, therefore, been in power for almost 20 
years, providing a political continuity that is unusual for Amazonian states in Brazil. Such 
continuity and, perhaps even more importantly, the perception of electoral support by the 
population at the time of SISA design, is likely to have reduced the pressures for the quick 
delivery of benefits by the government, as it was the case in Ecuador and Peru, both 
experiencing more dynamic and unpredictable political contexts. Therefore, Acre’s political 
history and the electoral context in the time of SISA design enabled a longer design period, 
including a participatory process. 
 
4.6 - Payment levels and opportunity costs 
 
Payment levels, and the related discussion about opportunity costs as a basis for their definition, 
illustrate the importance of lesson drawing in program design processes. Ecuador had no 
nationwide forest protection program at the time of the design, so program designers found it 
vital to consult with other countries where such policies were already in place. Consultations 
with Mexican and Costa Rican representatives71 were key in defining issues related to Socio 
                                                          
70 Portmanteau formed by the words Floresta (forest) and Cidadania (Citizenship, which in Portuguese has a 
meaning also related to civic engagement),   
71 It was not possible to obtain any registry or memory of those consultations to verify what were the themes 
discussed. 
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Bosque, especially regarding the issue of payment levels. It is hard to ascertain why exactly 
the program decided against differentiating payments by opportunity costs, but one respondent 
(Interview 2) hinted at lesson drawing as a possible explanation. Scholarly specialists suggested 
several alternative ways to use opportunity costs for payment differentiation, including a 
straightforward road zoning proxy system (Interview 13). And yet, representatives of the Costa 
Rican delegation allegedly argued that the explicit use of opportunity costs could be politically 
complicated and unnecessary. As a reason, they suggested that such differentiation is hard to 
communicate and could lead to complaints about undue favoritism. The Socio Bosque team 
thus decided not to follow the recommendations provided by the academic specialists (“no les 
hicimos caso”, Interview 2) on opportunity costs. There was also no thorough answer on the 
definition of the specific payment values used by Socio Bosque. Respondents stated that the 
design team took into consideration budgetary possibilities and tried to offer the higher possible 
value considering the ambitious expansion plans of the program and, later, its strategy of area-
based differentiation (Interviews 2, 5). 
 
Lesson drawing as a basis for policy decisions was even clearer in the Peruvian case. As seen 
in Chapter 6, section 2, several of Programa Bosques’ features have been directly taken up 
from the Ecuadorian program. The non-use of opportunity cost calculations as a basis for 
payments was not different. Peruvians went even further and did not even use a rough proxy 
for opportunity costs. On the procedures necessary for payments (Conservation Agreement 
signing and Investment Plan preparation and execution), Programa Bosques adapted with little 
change the Ecuadorian provisions. As stated before, there was no explanation by the 
respondents on why the area-based differentiation used in Socio Bosque was not replicated in 
Ecuador nor on why the specific value of 10 Soles was chosen, except that it was a random, 
round value based on budgetary expectations (Interview 23). 
 
Table 10 below summarizes our analysis of the main design decisions of the programs, based 
on the elements of the conceptual framework. 
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Table 10 – Analysis of design decisions 
 
Programs 
     Themes   
Socio Bosque Programa Bosques SISA Acre 
Poverty 
Reduction and 
Welfare  
The belief that welfare improvements should be the main task of governments. Welfare 
policies have been shown to reward electoral interests of incumbent politicians in Latin 
America. In Acre, a historical interconnectedness between social and environmental 
policies was also a factor in design decisions. 
ICDP-like 
components 
The belief that program benefits should not be seen as 
handouts. From a technical standpoint, ICDP-like 
components were seen as the best way to ensure that the 
whole community accesses the benefits. In Peru, bureaucratic 
dynamics was also relevant, as the Finance Ministry required 
a production-related component for project approval. Peru 
also adapted the Investment Plan as a basis for productive 
activities, drawing lessons from the Ecuadorian case. 
Decisions for this 
theme have not yet 
been reached in Acre. 
Spatial Targeting  
Fears of potential beneficiaries misunderstanding targeting as 
undue land-use interference rendered conservation 
efficiency-oriented targeting to be perceived as politically 
unfeasible and causing electoral risks. 
Decisions for this 
theme have not yet 
been reached in Acre. 
Monitoring 
The monitoring system was 
not in place at the start of the 
program. Perception of a need 
for a quick payment delivery 
start due to shaky relations 
with indigenous peoples. 
Influence of bureaucratic 
dynamics too, as the 
Environment Ministry was a 
newly created agency that 
faced some skepticism from 
parts of the Council of 
Ministers. 
Need for quick government 
action, mostly associated 
with president Correa’s 
individual drive towards 
change, meant that the 
program should start even 
before a monitoring system 
was in place. 
Federal level 
monitoring system was 
already in place, little 
discussion at the state 
level. 
Participation  
The administrative complexity of a participatory design 
process, compounded with pressures for a quick start in 
program implementation, compelled the teams not to carry 
out such processes. 
The government 
perceived strong 
electoral support by the 
population. Institutional 
stability made a 
participatory design 
process politically and 
administratively 
feasible. Belief in the 
interconnectedness of 
development and 
conservation. 
Payment levels 
and opportunity 
costs 
Lessons drawn from Costa 
Rican and Mexican 
experiences led the program 
not to emphasize opportunity 
costs as the basis for defining 
payment levels. The payment 
structure has been later 
changed to implicitly take 
opportunity costs into 
consideration. 
The lack of emphasis on 
opportunity costs was a 
lesson drawn from the 
Ecuadorian program, but no 
further changes were made 
to the undifferentiated 
payment structure. 
Decisions for this 
theme have not yet 
been reached in Acre. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
As we have seen, contextual elements of the design processes led, in the Ecuadorian and 
Peruvian cases, to largely inefficient program designs vis-à-vis the policy recommendations 
presented in Chapter II, and to the later definition of design elements in Acre. The centrality of 
welfare and poverty reduction considerations as determinants of policy design choices has 
produced a notable deviation from PES policy recommendations in all cases. Poverty reduction 
has been a core priority of Latin American governments for decades and the more recent 
introduction of successful CCT programs in the region has rewarded the incumbents who 
implemented them with electoral support. Particularly in the case of Acre, environmental and 
social policies have, moreover, co-evolved over the past two decades, fostering a political 
discourse that disapproves of government action that seemingly prioritizes environmental over 
social policies. The studied programs thus tend to be of a hybrid socio-environmental nature 
that allows administrations to find support in both domestic and international arenas.  
 
Efficient spatial targeting criteria (high environmental service provision, high risks of ES loss, 
and optimal opportunity costs) were not strictly followed, meaning that several of the enrolled 
areas will generate sub-optimal conservation benefits in relation to the resources invested. 
Ecuador and Peru prepared schemes for prioritizing specific areas, which were not strictly 
followed, as we have seen in section 2.5. Even more problematic is the decision, in the 
Ecuadoran and Peruvian cases, to allow participants to freely define which parts of their lands 
will be eligible or not to receive payments (see Chapter 5, Figure 7). It is likely that the areas 
defined as not being under conservation are the ones participants are planning to deforest. That 
feature has clearly negative effects on additionality, as communities and individuals may 
decide not to enroll the parts of their lands that they already intended to deforest, which is 
exactly the opposite of the effect aimed for at a textbook PES program (to pay participants not 
to go ahead with their deforestation plans). The decision was taken, according to respondents, 
to be consistent with the voluntary nature of the program. It was also taken to ensure that 
participants would not have the perception that the program would affect their land use 
decision-making freedom. This backs the proposition that efficiency concerns were secondary 
if perceived as unfair. Similarly, as pointed out in Chapter 2, section 2.7, payments should be 
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directed to those who pose a credible threat to the provision of ES. The selection of 
beneficiaries in our cases did not fully consider the level of threat of participants, another 
decision that will likely lead to low conservation additionality in the programs. 
 
The existence of ICDP-like components in the programs is also questionable in regard to its 
cost-efficiency. As argued in Chapter II, section 2.5, PES have been conceptualized as more 
efficient alternatives to indirect approaches such as ICDPs. The introduction of ICDP-like 
components is, therefore, contrary to the academic rationale behind PES. Decision-makers, 
however, believed that direct monetary transfers could be misinterpreted as unconditional 
handouts and that productive activities were needed as a long term solution for income 
generation and to reduce intracommunity elite capture of benefits. The ICDP-like components 
in Peru and Ecuador are financed by payments subject to conditionalities, unlike traditional 
ICDPs financed by upfront payments. Other than that, there is no indication that those 
components will not suffer the same shortcomings of traditional ICDPs and improve 
conservation effectiveness, as they also tend to tend to incur high costs, have a very high 
administrative intensity and complex implementation needs. There are still no consistent 
studies on the impacts of productive activities on the welfare of the populations benefitted by 
the programs, but a study on the internal decision making in some communities in Ecuador 
show that their role in improving the involvement of community members in the Socio Bosque 
is questionable (Krause and Loft, 2013). 
 
Another inefficient design characteristic of the Ecuadoran and Peruvian cases, and still 
undefined in Acre, is the lack of use of opportunity costs to calculate payment amounts. In 
Ecuador, the payment structure of the program (See Chapter V, table 6) moved towards an 
implicit recognition of opportunity costs as an element to improve the efficiency of the scheme. 
Increasing the payments for beneficiaries in Páramo areas is likely to have increased the 
attractiveness of participation for potential beneficiaries who would otherwise prefer to leave 
their lands uncommitted, available for potentially profitable uses in the future. The structure, 
however, is still a rough proxy for opportunity costs, which could be further improved to better 
reflect more a specific distribution of opportunity costs in the country. The continuous 
voluntary enrollment of participants despite the changes towards a more opportunity cost 
oriented payment structure shows that the perception that payment differentiation would be 
badly received by locals on equity grounds may have been overstated. In Peru, on the other 
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hand, the undifferentiated payment structure (see Chapter V, section 2) remains unchanged. A 
recent study that proposes alternative scenarios for Programa Bosques’ payment scheme found 
that the current forest stock-based scheme “turns out to be the most cost-ineffective and second-
most unequal PES design option. The chief reason is that communities with large forest 
reserves and low population densities will receive the largest transfers, whereas communities 
with less forest and higher population densities will receive smaller transfers” and “does not fit 
well with the spatial patterns of deforestation and opportunity cost” (Börner et al., 2016, p. 7).  
 
While, as we have seen, political and administrative constraints make the design of a perfectly 
efficient PES program in the jurisdictions studied largely unattainable, some politically 
acceptable changes toward a more efficient design are also possible. The move towards the 
recognition of opportunity costs in Socio Bosque’s payment structure is an example of those 
changes. With the experience collected by the programs and the small but growing body of 
academic work on their implementation, a gradual move towards a more cost efficient, and 
concomitantly politically and administratively feasible, program design is by no means 
impossible. Börner et al. (2016, p. 6), for example, show that a scenario in which “Fixed annual 
per-household payment of PEN72 2000, adjusted for interprovincial differences on opportunity 
costs for each hectare of avoided deforestation” would yield roughly the same amount of 
conserved area as the current scheme, at a cost of 20 million Soles less, while still providing 
politically crucial net benefits to the participants, although some restructuring could possibly 
cause resistance, especially in large communities with low population densities, which 
currently receive the largest transfers. 
 
Finally, it is important to consider what aspects of the experiences analyzed here could be 
extrapolated to other areas throughout and beyond the Amazon region. The basic policy context 
of the three jurisdictions studied, consisting of democratic systems with regular and largely fair 
elections, relatively weak environmental agencies within the government’s bureaucracy, a 
majority city-dwelling voters and a sizable percentage of the forest-dwelling population being 
poor, is shared by several other developing countries in the region and around the world. We 
can thus expect that some of the design determinants we found in our cases will be present in 
the policy design contexts of other jurisdictions as well. Politicians will try to get reelected or 
make their successors, and for that reason will have to take into account the demands of their 
                                                          
72 Peruvian Soles 
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populations, so welfare considerations will tend to interfere with environmental policies aimed 
at areas that also experience widespread poverty. As we have seen, it is not realistic for 
governments to design and implement perfectly cost-effective policies if they clash with 
welfare concerns. Perhaps even more importantly, those welfare considerations will often arise 
from perceptions of fairness or unfairness. Programs with a benefit-sharing structure, for 
example, that perfectly reflects the opportunity costs of participants, might still be seen as 
unfair by many since they may not provide more money to the poorest. It seems, therefore, 
inescapable that compromises will have to be found in order to design conservation programs 
cost-effectively as possible while ensuring their political acceptance. 
 
Specific characteristics of the programs also carry valuable lessons for other countries. In many 
other forested areas, monitoring infrastructure is still not in the stage required to ensure the 
enforcement of conditionalities. The programs in Peru and Ecuador started with partial 
monitoring systems in place, and the consequences of that decision are still to be seen. 
Integration with already existing activities in forest areas where, i.e., baselines have already 
been developed, may increase the cost-efficiency of incentive-based conservation programs, 
without causing politically complicated delays in program implementation. Simple targeting 
criteria, as the ones present, but not fully implemented, in both Peru and Ecuador could also 
provide a boost in program efficiency, especially if they include some poverty-related criteria, 
to ease the acceptance of targeting both by the population involved and by non-environmental 
agencies within the government. Opportunity costs, while sometimes difficult to fully calculate 
and hard to communicate to non-specialist audiences, can be implicitly included in payment 
structures without causing the upheaval feared by some, as it has been shown by the changes 
in Socio Bosque’s payment structure. ICDP-like productive programs feature in Ecuador and 
Peru and will very likely also be part of Acre’s program, despite the slim academic evidence 
of their effectiveness. Our findings show that the decision to have those activities as part of the 
programs stems from a belief that government transfers may make people complacent or be 
used in futile expenditures, which is not backed by academic evidence, especially recently by 
evaluations of CCT programs. Other incentive-based policies could reduce their 
implementation costs and beneficiaries’ transaction costs by being more flexible in regards to 
what expenditures are allowed, instead of creating onerous structures to supervise spending. 
Finally, SISA’s structure could also be a promising innovation, as it theoretically allows for 
more specific targeting (i.e. by private actors aiming at areas that generate a large amount of 
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credits/ higher additionality), while the government may hold them accountable for welfare 
responsibilities in the areas where projects are being implemented. 
  
 123 
 
VIII. Is “optimal” always good? Political limits for forest policy-making 
 
This final chapter revisits the guiding hypotheses presented in the introduction, and discusses 
them based the findings of chapters VI and VII. We follow up the work done on those chapters 
with a critical discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of the chosen qualitative research 
approach and the conceptual frameworks used in our analysis. The final section draws lessons 
for academic policy analysis and the practice of incentive-based conservation policies in the 
Amazon and beyond. 
 
1. Revisiting the guiding hypotheses 
 
H1 – International funding opportunities (e.g. REDD+) combined with domestic pressure for 
social assistance programs created a favorable policy window for the introduction of incentive-
based conservation policy instruments in the governments’ agendas. 
 
This hypothesis identified two potential driving forces for the appearance of policy windows 
for the introduction of the programs. Domestic pressure for social assistance was present in all 
cases, although it can be argued that it is a constant characteristic of the Latin American public 
policy context in all sectors - especially in poor regions like the Amazon. Therefore it was not 
a specific contextual factor to be faced by the programs’ policy-makers, but a factor that 
permeates policy-making in many sectors of government action. As it was observed, pressure 
for social assistant programs was likely the strongest influence on program design, guiding 
several decisions on the programs’ features. 
 
The international context, on the other hand, has had different influences in the three presented 
cases. In Ecuador, no evidence was found of a direct influence of the international 
environmental regime in the creation of Socio Bosque. None of the Ecuadorian case’s 
respondents identified that influence it as a key determinant of program creation. During Socio 
Bosque’s implementation, however, agreements were signed with bilateral cooperation 
agencies, and the program was awarded a grant from the KfW to support implementation. 
Additionally, REDD+ has not been present in the discussions on the creation and 
implementation of the program. In Peru, an early indicator of the motivation to create Programa 
Bosques was to signal willingness and strengthening of Peruvian political will to work with 
forest conservation and climate change issues to the international community through the 
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creation of the ministry of environment. Like in Ecuador, the REDD+ regime has been mostly 
outside of the discussion on the creation and implementation of the program. 
 
In Acre, the situation was markedly different. SISA has the stated intention to generate 
quantifiable carbon emissions reductions (see Chapter V, section 3) that can later be negotiated 
in carbon markets or used as the basis for the receipt of grants by international organizations. 
Therefore, the REDD+ regime was a prominent influence in SISA’s design. Not only REDD+, 
but the possibility to attract international funds in general, was very relevant for SISA. Unlike 
the cases in Peru and Ecuador, which are mostly financed by the standard governmental budget, 
Acre is a relatively poor state, with fewer resources to implement an ambitious and likely 
expensive large-scale conservation program. Therefore, the attraction of additional capital for 
the state is closer to the core of the government’s priorities.  
 
H2 – The historical/ideological connection of leaderships with forest-dwelling groups lead to 
a stronger political clout for environmental issues within the government’s agendas.  
 
This hypothesis was conceived considering the context in Acre, as it was known that the 
leadership in Ecuador and Peru did not have their local constituencies in forest areas. In Acre, 
the central political leaders constructed their political careers together with the emergence of 
the Acrean grassroots movement, of which they were part of, or at least closely linked to (see 
Chapter VII, section 4.1). Much of Acre’s governing group’s political discourse built upon 
their connections with forest peoples. Respondents exemplified the relevance of environmental 
issues in the state with the fact that SISA’s legal basis is a state law instead of a weaker decree. 
However, the hybrid nature of SISA as an environmental and social policy may qualify that 
statement. This guiding hypothesis, therefore, tends to hold in the case of Acre, but the best 
way to properly evaluate it would be to conduct a comparative study with other Brazilian 
Amazon states, whose governments have had a lower degree of connection with their 
grassroots environmental movements. 
 
H3 – Organized domestic interest groups outside the government tend to be too politically 
weak to influence policy choice in the present political setting in South America.  
 
The hypothesis may not hold for every public policy sector, or even for some aspects of 
environmental policy, but the evidence showed that it holds for the cases studied. Interest 
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groups outside of the government concerned with forest conservation have mostly been 
excluded from the design of the programs. In Peru, civil society groups were central in 
denouncing and discussing the Baguazo and its aftermath, which were important for the 
introduction of Programa Bosques in the government’s agenda. The program, however, was 
not specifically demanded by the civil society, but was a response originated from within the 
government to help to placate the Baguazo crisis. In the design phase, there was some contact 
with the main NGO collective in the Peruvian Amazon, AIDESEP, but the outreach was 
sporadic at best (see Chapter VII, section 2.3). The voluntary nature of the enrollment in the 
program was seen by the design team as enough to ensure that eventual participants were in 
accordance with the program’s provisions. In Ecuador, there were no contacts with 
organizations outside of the government, during neither the agenda-setting or design phases. In 
both cases, the programs have been created by executive decrees, which also do not require 
debates in the legislative bodies of the country, therefore, also excluding the discussion with 
opposition parties. In Acre, the design process involved the participation of the civil society. 
That, however, does not necessarily show political strength of groups outside the government, 
as the process was led by the government itself, in a political arena created and sanctioned by 
the government, in a context where part of the state’s grassroots political groups have 
previously assumed roles within the government (see Chapter VII, section 3.3).  
 
H4 – The previous success of Conditional Cash Transfer programs both domestically and 
internationally has helped to raise the profile of policy instruments with a direct cash transfer 
component. 
 
The existence and success of CCT policies were relevant for the creation of direct monetary 
transfers for forest conservation both in Peru and Ecuador (see Chapter VI, sections 1.3 and 
2.3). Respondents (also in Acre) however, downplayed the further importance of CCTs in the 
introduction and design of the programs, stating that no contacts have been made with the 
agencies implementing the CCTs. It seems clear, however, that the success of CCTs has been 
important to set the stage for policies with direct payment components. CCTs have not only 
been successful, but have also generated political gains for incumbent politicians in the region 
(see Chapter VII, section 4.1).  
 
Additionally, environmental concerns were often encumbered by the necessity of programs to 
gain approval by non-environmental agencies – especially when environmental issues ranked 
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low in the respective cabinets’ agenda.  In these cases, environmental agencies were often 
dwarfed by more powerful government agencies or sectors (such as finance and agriculture).. 
Non-environmental agencies may also control budget assignments, such as the MEF in Peru, 
allowing them to impose certain policy priorities on environmental agencies (see Chapter VI, 
section 2.2). 
 
H5 – Existing policies, including small-scale PES schemes (up-scaling), influence both 
agenda-setting processes and instrument design. PES programs are also part of broader 
strategies for the construction of jurisdiction-wide environmental policy systems. 
 
Small-scale schemes have indeed been influential, especially in Ecuador. The Chachi project, 
through the technical assistance of Conservation International, has originated both of the most 
important instruments of Socio Bosque, the Conservation Agreement and Investment Plan - 
which were both later also adopted by Programa Bosques in Peru (see Chapter V, section 1 and 
Chapter VI, section 1.1). This success indicates the importance of lesson drawing as a 
determinant of policy design, and how experiences perceived as successful can be up-scaled 
within countries and horizontally spread among them (see Chapter VII, section 4.6). Both 
programs, despite being implemented across most or all of the countries’ forested areas, were 
not initially considered as parts of broad strategies for the construction of jurisdiction-wide 
environmental-policy systems in their countries. However, the pioneering attributes of the 
respective programs have helped improve aspects of environmental policy making in their 
countries. In Peru, information on the environmental state of the country, as well as 
deforestation monitoring have been strengthened through the activities of Programa Bosques, 
in addition to the cooperation of MINAM with provincial governments on environmental 
themes. Socio Bosque has also helped to improve forest data in the country, and has since 
become a blueprint for policies in other environmental themes in the country (see Chapter V, 
section 1). 
 
In Acre, on the other hand, SISA was integrally designed to be a jurisdiction-wide program, 
serving as an umbrella for forest conservation activities implemented in the state. Furthermore, 
the program built upon previous programs and was designed with the aim of providing support 
to pre-existing activities, not only of implementing new ones (see Chapter VI, section 3.1). 
Such a set up was seen by external actors as a positive innovation to come out of the state and 
has already been helping Acre attract external financing, even though many of the provisions 
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for the program’s implementation still have to be defined at a subprogram- or project-specific 
level. 
 
H6 – Successful entrepreneurs in incentive-based policy instruments tend to be part of the high-
level decision making groups inside the government, sharing priorities, political affiliations, 
and ideologies.  
 
This hypothesis is true for all three cases, as all of the actors involved were already part of 
government groups or, in the case of Peru, were integrated into them shortly before the 
conception of the program. The executive-concentrated nature of forest policy-making in the 
jurisdictions leaves little room for the influence of external actors (see Chapter VI, sections 1.2 
and 2.2). It is also interesting to note that in Acre there was no individual figure, such as former 
minister Antonio Brack in the Peruvian case, who stood out as a clear driver or enabler of the 
policy. That can be attributed to the fact that the pool of policy-makers in Acre was smaller 
and more closely connected, being mostly part of the high-level bureaucracy of the state for 
years and sharing similar priorities and ideologies (Chapter VI, section 3.2). 
 
H7 – Policy entrepreneurs use the “win-win” discourse of incentive-based policy as a leverage 
to ensure support from opposing political groups. 
AND 
H12 - The continuous expansion of geographical areas eligible for project implementation, 
mostly going beyond previously defined “priority” areas, was motivated by welfare and equity, 
over concerns for a more environmentally efficient use of program’s resources. 
 
Governments are aware of the need to control deforestation, but the notion that forested regions 
are home to poor rural populations in need of welfare improvements was influential in the 
adoption of incentive-based programs. In our case studies of conservation programs there was 
either a clear high-level demand for a program to tackle both deforestation and poverty 
(Ecuador), a political tradition of socio-environmental discourse (Acre), or the need to pursue 
secondary policy objectives as a precondition for approval by non-environmental government 
agencies (Peru) (see Chapter III). The influence of the success of CCTs and the persistence of 
ICDP-like components show that the idealized win-win solutions of incentive-based policies 
were strong determinants for both the creation and the design features of the programs. The 
joining of environmental with social motivations for policies was not necessarily used to ensure 
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the support of opposing political groups, as the creation and design of the programs did not 
involve a large amount of political debate, but was key to ensure support of non-environmental 
agencies in the jurisdictions. It was especially important in Peru, where the Finance Ministry 
was skeptical of a purely environmental program and had a key voice in approving the program 
in the country’s Council of Ministers (see Chapter VI, section 2.2).  
 
Additionally, the idea that the programs can tackle deforestation and poverty at the same time 
is very attractive to external actors, especially international donors, the general public opinion, 
and to potential beneficiaries of programs. In Peru and Ecuador, the amount of enrolled 
participants and the size of forest areas under the programs are regarded as arguably the most 
important early measure of program success, since measurements of actual deforestation 
reductions or improvements in incomes of enrolled beneficiaries are, at the time of writing, 
incipient at the very best. For that reason, attracting the largest number of participants within 
budgetary possibilities is a priority for the programs’ teams. By this logic, the design teams 
feared that efficiency-oriented participant targeting could potentially reduce the beneficiary 
enrollment speed. 
 
H8 – Policymakers are aware that conservation tradeoffs (including political repercussions) 
tend to be harder in high-pressure areas and thus prefer to initially target low-pressure areas, 
where relatively low payments are sufficient to cover low conservation opportunity costs.  
 
Several enrolled areas in both Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques are not under considerable 
deforestation pressures. Targeting areas of low pressure was obviously not specifically 
mentioned as an objective by the respondents, and it is also not present in the programs’ design 
documents. There was also not, however, a consistent effort to target the programs’ activities 
towards areas with higher deforestation pressures and, therefore, higher potential for 
additionality (see Chapter VII, section 4.3). As stated above, attracting a large number of 
participants is a priority for the programs, and for that reason, the programs did not specifically 
target areas for any reason, preferring instead to enroll the largest possible amount of eligible 
participants. As an exception, in Peru, the very first areas to be enrolled were located in the 
VRAE region, which was targeted not for environmental characteristics, but for being one of 
the poorest areas in the country, with a history of social conflicts with indigenous peoples (see 
Chapter VII, section 2.5). Also, Programa Bosques subjected the enrolment of participants 
from regions to the signing of a cooperation agreement with provincial governments; no 
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communities from regions without an agreement could participate in the program, irrespective 
of any other characteristic of the community (see Chapter V, section 2). Therefore, there was 
no targeting of specific areas with low deforestation pressures; there was actually no targeting 
according to environmental criteria in the initial years of the programs’ implementation.  
 
H9 – Conservation effectiveness is of lower priority to domestic policymakers in comparison 
to social benefits that are eventually linked to voter behavior. As a result, government-led 
schemes tend to be less monitoring-intensive and characterized by weak sanctioning 
mechanisms.    
AND 
H10 - Policy designers perceive that ensuring that the programs provide additionality demands 
high administrative costs, larger and highly qualified staffs, and more complex rules, and at 
the same time they also perceive that it can jeopardize the willingness of participants to enroll 
in the programs, as they would not be able to choose areas under conservation. 
AND 
H11 - Perceived political risks of adopting efficiency over fairness concerns are common 
reasons for the non-adoption of opportunity costs as a criterion for payment modalities. This 
is of particular importance in contexts, where deforestation has been largely illegal but 
tolerated historically.   
 
Forest conservation issues were not identified as a priority for voters according to our 
respondents. Instead, voters favored welfare policies as being of utmost priority in elections 
(see Chapter VII, section 4.1). Therefore, this set of hypotheses is consistent with the idea that 
several incentive-based conservation programs can be characterized as hybrid social and 
environmental policies. In these cases, some important environmental efficiency features tend 
to be overlooked, especially in terms of targeting and opportunity costs (see Chapter VII, 
section 4.3).  However, monitoring and sanctioning provisions are generally addressed by the 
programs. In addition to the non-implementation of targeting in the programs, another feature 
related to the importance of ensuring participation in the programs is the ability of participants 
to define which parts of their property/community land will be counted for payment purposes 
in Ecuador and Peru, which has further negative effects on the additionality of the programs 
(see Chapter VII, section 5). 
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Opportunity costs, for their turn, have largely been ignored in both the definition of participants 
and payment amounts. Suggestions of even approximate opportunity cost calculations have 
been overlooked in favor of a less administrative intensive payment structure in Ecuador, 
although the changes in the payment structure showed at least an implicit recognition of 
efficiency gains stemming from taking opportunity costs into consideration (see Chapter VII, 
section 1.4). They were, however, not even part of the debate in the design process in Peru and 
at best postponed for the subprogram and project level in Acre. 
 
H13 - Politically stable governing groups tend to rely more heavily on participatory instrument 
design processes, which can help them to create more sustainable institutional mechanisms for 
the implementation of incentive-based policy instruments in the long run.  
AND 
H14 – Participation makes policy processes more complex and time-consuming and less well 
established governing groups, thus, shy away from it, to guarantee action within shorter policy 
windows. 
 
The stability and cohesion of Acre’s governing and administrative group have been identified 
as important determinants of the participatory nature of SISA’s design (see chapter VI, section 
3.2). Additionally, when environmental issues are higher on the governments’ agendas, 
environmental agencies tend to have more cooperative relations with the rest of the 
government, and their priorities will be more in line with the work of other sectors, as in the 
case of Acre (see chapter VI, section 3.2). Nevertheless, Acre presents a less diverse set of 
economic and political actors in comparison to Peru and Ecuador, and even to some other 
Amazonian states in Brazil. This relative uniformity of interests might lead to more restricted 
pressure on sectoral agencies and, therefore, may also be an explaining factor for the perception 
of high policy coordination levels in the state. As a consequence, SISA’s implementation has 
a foundation based on the law, instead of a decree, making it more stable in principle. It is, 
however, unclear if Acre’s participatory process will necessarily mean that the institutional 
mechanisms created will be more effective or stable in the long term than in the other programs. 
 
In many countries with tropical forests, environmental policies are being designed in a data-
scarce environment, where the collection of important information, for example on reference 
scenarios, requires additional political or budgetary support. In addition to that, Peruvian and 
Ecuadorian program designers were required to demonstrate quick results in order to secure 
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political support. This pressure diverted attention away from knowledge and information 
management and stifled participatory engagement (see Chapter VII, sections 4.4 and 4.5). In 
Acre, a longer and more flexible policy choice process was possible, allowing for more 
participation, integration of data generating systems, and the future specification of site-, 
ecosystem-, and beneficiary-specific subprograms, in addition to the fact that Acre already 
benefitted from a national monitoring system (see Chapter V, section III). The identification of 
those differences, however, does not imply that a more participatory and data intensive process 
will necessarily guarantee a more successful program.  
 
2. Critical assessment of the dissertation 
 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the main methodological challenge of the dissertation was to 
figure out how to critically assess the information provided by the sources, since most of the 
processes did not yield documental evidence against which the claims made in the interviews 
could be consistently checked. This challenge contains several common issues faced by 
qualitative research.  
 
The first challenge is the validity of the data collected or, in more blunt terms, its truthfulness. 
The information provided by respondents mainly consisted of recollections of activities in 
which they were involved a few years before the interviews were conducted. Thus, these 
interviews are subject to the natural waning of memories and to post-rationalizations of 
processes. These conditions can influence interviewees and present sometimes messy, non-
linear processes in a more organized and meaningful way, can downplay misjudgments and 
highlight decisions that with hindsight proved to be more appropriate than others. Furthermore, 
questions can be answered in a way that the interviewee perceives as being the ones preferred 
by the researcher. These are inescapable realities of elite interview-based research, which 
always deals with highly politically conscious actors. They may admittedly generate an 
interpretation of the policy process that is more eloquent and tidy than the process being 
analyzed. This dissertation has tried to maintain a critical stance on the contents of the 
interviews, avoiding considering all answers to be a perfect history of the processes exactly as 
they happened, but seeing them as a recollection that ran through the many perceptional filters 
cited above. Still, the information provided composed the bulk of the data used to construct the 
dissertation’s arguments and they were, despite the shortcomings, the best possible sources for 
research on the themes. 
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The second issue is the nature of the researcher as an interpreter. While quantitative research, 
generally speaking, has tools such as statistics and models, to achieve a more objective stance 
towards the research subject, “qualitative issues and practices arise within the context of the 
inescapable interpretive activity of all humans including researchers” (Bradley, 1993, p. 433). 
The meaning of the information is assigned by the researcher and that meaning is affected, if 
not constructed, by the previous experiences and ideas of the researcher. In spite of this, an 
effort was made to keep the subjectivity of the author as separated from the interpretation as 
possible. Being fully objective, however, is impossible and even harder in the type of 
qualitative research performed here. 
 
The third challenge was the development of an analytical framework for the analysis. In the 
research planning stage, the researcher understood that, while the Multiple Streams Framework 
(MSF) had the potential to capture the decision-making processes that led to the adoption of 
the programs, none of the traditional policy analysis frameworks of public policy theory 
seemed to provide enough guidance to study the specific context of forest policy making in 
Latin America.  
 
The MSF provides a generally well-constructed explanatory framework for analyzing the 
introduction of incentive-based policies in the countries researched and was able to accurately 
capture key processes that led to the adoption of the programs under study. Of special relevance 
to this dissertation was the framework's attention to intra-organizational dynamics, to the role 
of specific interactions between institutions, and to the actions of key individuals. By 
conceiving the policy process as a result of complex ambiguity-prone interactions involving 
imperfectly informed actors and non-linear decision-making processes, the framework proves 
itself especially relevant in Latin American policy-making contexts. We identify, however, a 
few shortcomings in the framework. Some of the framework categories, while suitable for 
processes involving broad societal debates, strong party politics mobilization, and deep 
ideological cleavages, may be out of place in cases of strongly top–down, executive-centered 
decision-making processes, in which divergences express themselves at more technical levels 
and are seldom expressed publicly. Categories such as value acceptability within the policy 
stream, the idea of a policy entrepreneur with an advocacy-like operation, and the strong 
emphasis on organized political forces make little analytical sense when the policy changes are 
designed either inside the administration (Peru) or directly in the presidential office (Ecuador). 
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Such categories may also have a weak explanatory relevance when environmental issues are 
part of the core priorities of long-standing, voting-dominant, and stable governing groups 
(Acre). 
 
For the analysis of policy design, the complexity of the determinants meant that choices had to 
be made on which aspects of policy making were focused on. Choosing or developing an 
analytical framework will always mean focusing attention on some aspects and overlooking 
others. As stated by Bradley (1993, p. 434), research is done through “prespecified structures 
and strategies”, that “range from theory, constructs, and operational definitions guiding data 
collection to analytical methods driving data analysis”, and “in much qualitative research, these 
structures and strategies are viewed as suggestive and tentative rather than as directive and 
rigid”. In that sense, the same data used in this research could be analyzed through different 
theoretical lenses and yield some different insights from the ones reached here. The clearest 
example here is the non-use of discourse analysis within our framework, as discussed in 
Chapter III, section 3. However, the dissertation was developed with the aim of providing the 
most appropriate explanation possible of the cases analyzed, and the author is confident that 
this dissertation is, as of now, the most compelling explanation of the political processes of the 
three cases studied. But it is, by no means, the only one explanation possible.  
 
Another challenge is the external validity, or generalizability, of the findings. Contextual, case-
based research, such as the one performed here, does not aim primarily at providing 
explanations for political processes happening outside of the regions concerned. The objective 
of the research has, from the start, been to generate specific insights on the policy processes of 
the three regions studied, or at best for the whole Amazon region. That is not to say that some 
of the insights generated by the theoretical framework cannot reasonably work in other regions 
with similar political structures (i.e. priority to electorally important issues will be given in any 
jurisdiction with a democratic system; lessons from successful programs will likely be drawn 
by other programs in neighboring regions). That said, it is important to be aware that the 
findings reached here may not always hold in other geographical and political contexts. 
However, questions asked here and the policy theory-oriented outlook provided can generally 
help to understand the policy determinants of incentive-based conservation adoption and policy 
design, shedding light on what characteristics are context-specific and which are the to be 
expected in programs across the globe. 
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Other challenges are more concrete. For example, it was not possible to reach all of the best 
sources of information on the respective processes. In Ecuador, for example, the best 
respondent to understand the motivations for the creation of Socio Bosque would be President 
Rafael Correa. It was not possible to interview him, and some of the questions posed by the 
dissertation could not be responded with the same confidence an interview with him would 
have yielded. However, the majority of the respondents with the best knowledge in the process 
that could realistically be reached were interviewed. Finally, we have also tried to triangulate 
the information provided by the interviews with other sources of information, but often the 
memories of the respondents were the only sources available. Design meetings cited by the 
respondents have not, as it commonly happens in Latin America, been recorded or yielded 
minutes and aide-memoires, with the exception of a few meetings in Acre. That was another 
unfortunate hurdle to the research and another reason why the interviews ended up in many 
cases being the only source of information on the decision-making processes researched. 
 
3. Perspectives for incentive-based forest conservation 
 
To wrap up this chapter and the dissertation, it is relevant to reflect on what our findings might 
mean in the contexts of research and practice of incentive-based forest conservation policies in 
the Amazon and beyond. 
 
At the time this dissertation started being prepared, scholarly works focused on the political 
context of incentive-based conservation programs were few and far between. Since then, the 
topic remains outside typical research topics in the area, although a few more studies have 
surfaced since (Hausknost et al., 2017; Le Coq et al., 2015; Le Coq et al., 2014). The most 
important aspect of this dissertation within its academic context remains, therefore, to show the 
importance of understanding the political context in which policy is made. A perfectly efficient 
design of a PES program, as it was shown, faces a plethora of contextual barriers that might 
lead it to be unworkable, or at least perceived to be unworkable by the individuals and 
institutions that will ultimately need to get them approved within skeptical cabinets and ensure 
the enrollment of often distrustful community members. 
 
The usefulness of the dissertation’s findings clearly refers to the debate on science policy 
interfaces. The debate is complex and long-standing, too much to be taken on at the closing 
stages of the dissertation. It is worth it to make a few points though. There is a widespread 
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perception of a disconnect between science advice and policy-making. While a direct adoption 
of scientific advice seldom happens, it is “often forgotten […] that policy-making is messy. 
Although a tidy, analytically driven cycle of policy-making might seem logical to scientists 
trained in the tradition of hypothesis generation and testing, policy-making is instead a 
networked process in which scientific evidence is only one of many inputs” (Gluckman, 2016, 
p. 969). In that sense, while the governments studied have clearly not fully adopted the 
efficiency-oriented recommendations on PES, it is very likely that the inputs provided by the 
literature did, or will, at least indirectly make way into the considerations of policy-makers. It 
also seems clear that the interaction between academia and the governments implementing the 
programs should be a two-way street, with the governments also making it clear to researchers 
what their demands and limitations are. That way, research efforts might improve its usability 
by policy-makers and become more attuned to their real needs of information, both on science 
and governance.  
 
For one group of practitioners, the findings of this dissertation may be of special interest. 
Donors often face trade-offs in deciding which projects should be supported. Such support 
comes in terms of financial resources, and also often through technical cooperation. A closer 
understanding of the political and administrative contexts in which policies are designed will 
often be key for maximizing the results achieved by the resources donated. This dissertation 
has tried to show that those contexts will more often than not be as important as the technical 
proficiency of program proposals, as a conservation program will often only take off if 
contextual conditions are appropriate, both within and outside the government. Additionally, 
the consideration given by the programs’ non-environmental objectives opens questions that 
donors have to address. When choosing which programs to finance, which are the criteria to 
take into consideration? The sheer environmental efficiency of the design? The broad social 
improvements generated by the program? Some sort of mixed criteria aimed at a general 
improvement of a series of social and environmental indicators? How to deal with conflicting 
provisions in policy designs? Should they be more proactive in assisting the design processes 
of programs and not only their implementation? The findings of this dissertation show that the 
objectives of a program and the provisions planned to achieve them will not always 
satisfactorily match, at least not in the cost-effective ways that financing institutions are mostly 
interested in. A closer involvement from donors in the design stages of policy making, or at 
least a thorough ex-ante evaluation of the opportunities and shortcomings of a proposed policy, 
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could be very useful in sorting out which programs would be more suitable for any given 
donor’s strategic agendas. 
 
In addition to the characteristics of the programs themselves, issues related to the general 
administrative structure of the countries will also be ultimately important. The identified lack 
of cooperation between government agencies in the policy design process is likely to harm the 
effectiveness of the programs, since “better policies are likely to emerge if […] participants 
can cooperate with one another to uphold agreements and sustain them over time” (IDB, 2006, 
p. 8). Considering that non-environmental agencies tend to take precedence in intra-
administration debates and to come on top if differences are irreconcilable, environmental 
agencies must learn to tread carefully within the bureaucratic maze and to concede or stand 
ground if policies are to work in the long term. Additionally, large-scale programs will often 
need to cooperate with sub-national administrative levels (municipalities, states, provinces) in 
order to be efficiently implemented. It is common, however, that local political and economic 
interests and a lack of qualified personnel, among other issues, are hindrances to 
decentralization efforts, especially in the Amazon regions of the countries researched. 
 
Finally, in addition to the national-level context, the international debate on REDD+ and other 
performance-based development goals are likely to result in stricter evaluation standards for 
programs that receive international funding. Programa Bosques and Socio Bosque are clearly 
lagging behind such standards. SISA, for its turn, has considered a possible insertion in the 
REDD+ regime from the start, and for that reason has included additionality and safeguards 
among its concerns (although not yet thoroughly or concretely). Positive signs can be identified 
in the structure of SISA in the attempt to integrate inescapable welfare concerns in cost-
efficient conservation programs. The embedded structure designed in Acre may, for example, 
mean that a subprogram or project will target high-additionality areas while respecting welfare-
related safeguards established by the government. SISA, however, is facing an extremely slow 
starting phase, showing that a more thorough design may indeed hinder swifter 
implementation. It remains to be seen in the medium term how much Acre’s design model will 
be able to fulfill its own requirements, and if they will generate the desired conservation gains. 
 
As stated almost 30 years ago by Linder and Peters (1989, p. 45) “the choice of instrument, and 
more generally the design of policy, has substantial consequences for performance”. The 
recognition of the importance of policy adoption and design is, therefore, nothing new. 
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However, it is clear from our findings that not enough emphasis is placed on adapting technical 
recommendations to the contexts in which they have to be turned into real policies. Indeed, 
better knowledge on what constitutes a favorable public policy environment for effective 
incentive-based conservation can help to avoid investments in doomed policy programs. 
Strategies to enhance program efficiency, therefore, should be based on a careful evaluation of 
context-specific political and institutional constraints if both environmental and social 
objectives are to be achieved.  
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Annex 1 – Comparative table of projects 
Comparative table of incentive-based conservation programs in the Amazon region. 
 Socio Bosque - Ecuador Programa Bosques - Peru SISA – Acre, Brazil 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONTEXT  
   
Type of Jurisdiction  Unitary, Presidential Republic, direct 
election for President 
Unitary, Presidential Republic, direct 
election for President 
Federated Unit (state), direct election for 
governor and legislative assembly 
Political subdivisions 24 Provinces 25 Regions and 1 Province 22 Municipalities 
Latest basic law (Constitution) September 2008 December 1993 October 1988 (Brazil’s Federal 
Constitution) 
Time since major change in the 
government’s ruling group (by the time 
of program creation) 
~2 years ~4years ~12 years 
Ethnic make up Mestizos 71.9%, Montubios 7.4%, Afro-
Ecuadorian 7.2%, Amerindian 7.0%, 
Caucasian 6.1%, other 0.4% 
Amerindian 45%, Mestizo (mixed 
Amerindian and white) 37%, white 15%, 
Afro-Peruvian, Japanese, Chinese, and 
other 3% 
Multiracial (Pardos) 57,5%, Caucasian 
33,0%, Afro-Brazilian 7,8%, Asian or 
indigenous 1,7% 
Area (km2) 258,238 1,285,216 164,123 
Population 16,144,000 (2015 est.) 31,151,643 (2015 est.) 816 687 (2016 est.) 
Drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation in project area 
Mining, cattle ranching, agriculture Small scale migratory agriculture, wood 
extraction, mining 
Cattle ranching, agriculture, illegal logging, 
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS    
Proponent(s) Government Government State Government  
Legal Basis Ministerial Agreement Ministerial Agreement State Law 2.308/2010 
Start date September 2008 July 2010 October 2010 
Implementing Agencies Environment Ministry, Sub-secretariat of 
Natural Heritage 
Environment Ministry Climate Change Institute (IMC) and State 
Environment Secretariat (SEMA)  
Main Partners CI, GIZ, SENPLADES, Local NGOs GIZ, JICA, USAID, WWF, UNDP GIZ, Federal Government 
Funding Government, KfW, IDB Government State Government, KfW 
Budget US$ 12.5 million (2015) US$ 6.97 million (2016) n/a 
Changes in project coordination 
leadership 
1 6 1 
Size of the team Around 50 Around 50 Around 30 (IMC, CDSA, SEMA) 
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS    
Scale  Forest and páramo areas Amazon regions of Peru Entire state 
ES aimed Biodiversity protection, hydrological 
regulation, carbon storage (ES took as 
criteria for spatial prioritization) 
Climate Change Carbon storage and sequestration, socio-
biodiversity, water resources, climate 
regulation, soils conservation and 
traditional knowledge 
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 Socio Bosque - Ecuador Programa Bosques - Peru SISA – Acre, Brazil 
Duration Conservation Agreements last 20 years, 
with possible renewal. 
Conservation Agreements last 5 years, with 
possible renewal. 
Not defined 
Targeted beneficiaries Rural communities and individual 
landowners. 
Forest dwelling communities Not defined 
Deforestation threat in targeted areas 
(additionality potential) 
20-25% of the project area in 2012 is 
estimated to be in threatened areas73 
n/a Not defined 
Types of benefits Conditional direct cash transfers, technical 
assistance 
Conditional direct cash transfers, technical 
assistance 
Conditional direct cash transfers, technical 
assistance, others to be defined 
Amount direct cash transfer Between US$ 0.5 and US$ 60 per hectare 
per year (see Table 6) 
10 Soles per hectare per year Not defined 
Payment modalities Differentiated by the size of property, 
enrolled area, type of owner and type of 
vegetation. Smaller properties, 
communities, and communities in Páramo 
lands receive a higher amount per hectare 
(see table 6) 
Undifferentiated Payments Not defined 
Criteria for conserved area selection Self-selection by the community/ 
individual owner 
Self-selection by the community/ 
individual owner 
Not defined 
Enrolment requirements Valid tenure, legal establishment and 
geographical information documents, 
investment plan.  
Valid tenure, legal establishment and 
geographical information documents, 
investment plan. 
Not defined 
Conditions Not to promote land-use changes in the 
areas under conservation, not to hunt in 
those areas and to provide information on 
conservation state, tenure changes and 
compliance with the investment plans. 
Avoid deforestation in the areas to be 
conserved, no illegal logging or illegal 
crops, compliance with the investment 
plans. 
Not defined 
Enrolment procedures For communities: Signature of a 
Conservation Agreement and presentation 
of community approval of an Investment 
Plan. For individuals: Signature of a 
Conservation Agreement. 
Signature of a Conservation Agreement and 
presentation of community approval of an 
Investment Plan 
Not defined 
Number beneficiaries 187,687 (December 2015) 4,009 families (December 2015) n/a 
                                                          
73 Estimate from the program’s staff 
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